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ABSTRACT
Online platforms, such as Quora, Reddit, and Stack Exchange, provide substantial value to
society through their original content. Content from these platforms informs many spheres of
life—software development, finance, and academic research, among many others. Motivated
by their content’s powerful applications, we refer to these platforms as content-based plat-
forms and study their successes and failures. The most common avenue of studying online
platforms’ successes and failures is to examine user growth. However, growth can be mislead-
ing. While many platforms initially attract a massive user base, a large fraction later exhibit
post-growth failures. For example, despite their enormous growth, content-based platforms
like Stack Exchange and Reddit have struggled with retaining users and generating high-
quality content. Motivated by these post-growth failures, we ask: when are content-based
platforms sustainable? This thesis aims to develop explanatory models that can shed light
on the long-term successes and failures of content-based platforms. To this end, we conduct
a series of large-scale empirical studies by developing explanatory and causal models. In
the first study, we analyze the community question answering websites in Stack Exchange
through the economic lens of a “market”. We discover a curious phenomenon: in many
Stack Exchange sites, platform success measures, such as the percentage of the answered
questions, decline with an increase in the number of users. In the second study, we identify
the causal factors that contribute to this decline. Specifically, we show that impression sig-
nals such as contributing user’s reputation, aggregate vote thus far, and position of content
significantly affect the votes on content in Stack Exchange sites. These unintended effects
are known as voter biases, which in turn affect the future participation of users. In the third
study, we develop a methodology for reasoning about alternative voting norms, specifically
how they impact user retention. We show that if the Stack Exchange community members
had voted based upon content-based criteria, such as length, readability, objectivity, and
polarity, the platform would have attained higher user retention. In the fourth study, we
examine the effect of user roles on the health of content-based platforms. We reveal that
the composition of Stack Exchange communities (based on user roles) varies across topical
categories. Further, these communities exhibit statistically significant differences in health
metrics. Altogether, this thesis offers some fresh insights into understanding the successes
and failures of content-based platforms.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of Web 2.0—the inception of user-generated content in online platforms—
online platforms have ruled over the Internet for more than two decades. A lot has happened
in these two decades: the sudden demise of Myspace and Orkut, the meteoric rise of Face-
book and Twitter, and the recent struggle of Stack Exchange and Reddit, to name a few.
A running theme of Web 2.0 history has been the rise and fall of various online platforms,
which ensued from the mass adoption and occasional abandonment of these platforms by
Internet users.
While we witnessed many online platforms’ rise and fall, their sustainability has largely
remained a mystery to us. We do not know why some online platforms succeed in the long
run while others fail. The question is increasingly important as online platforms continue
to get entangled in our social fabric through a growing amount of content generation and
consumption. With the availability of large-scale log data from some platforms, we now have
the opportunity to investigate this question in detail.
1.1 SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF CONTENT-BASED PLATFORMS
In the post Web 2.0, content is integral to studying platform sustainability as they keep
the platforms alive by serving “nowness” in the user’s social web experience. Most of today’s
online platforms enable users to generate content and share them with the masses. We can
readily organize these platforms into verticals: social networks (e.g., Facebook, Twitter),
media-sharing platforms (e.g., Flickr, Youtube), blogs (e.g., Blogger, Medium), forums (e.g.,
Reddit, Stack Exchange), wikis (e.g., Wikipedia, Wiki How), and the list goes on. Amongst
these, blogs, forums, and wikis are of growing interest due to their prominence as high-
quality information sources [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. Content from these platforms informs software
development [6], financial decisions [7], and academic research [8], among many others.
Motivated by the numerous applications of their content, we refer to these platforms as
content-based platforms.
Quintessential content-based platforms, such as Quora, Reddit, and Stack Exchange, have
revolutionized how we can crowdsource the search for specific information by offering focused
content from online users. The users of these platforms generate bona fide content about
a wide variety of subjects: science (e.g., physics.stackexchange, r/physics), technology
(e.g., android.stackexchange, r/android), and recreation (e.g., movies.stackexchange,
r/movies), to name a few. Thanks to their content’s ingenuity, these platforms have expe-
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rienced enormous user growth in the last decade. For instance, the monthly active users in
Quora, Reddit, and Stack Exchange have exceeded 300 million, 400 million, and 100 million,
respectively [9, 10, 11].
However, their growth has come at a cost. For example, Stack Exchange has shown clear
signs of decline in retaining users and generating content. The percentage of stable users
in Stack Overflow—the largest and oldest of the Stack Exchange sites—steadily decreased
from 41.05% in 2011 to 34.89% in 2014 [12]. At the same time, the percentage of deleted or
unanswered questions increased from 22.45% to 39.43% [12]. Reddit has also struggled with
user retention and shown evidence of voting failures. Reddit users upvoted or downvoted
73% of the posts without first viewing the content [13]. Motivated by these post-growth
failures, we ask: when are content-based platforms sustainable? Here, by sustainability, we
refer to a platform’s ability to maintain different success metrics, such as user retention,
content generation, and informed voting, at scale.
To date, the sustainability of online platforms has mainly been studied from the perspec-
tive of user growth [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. There have been recent works on understanding con-
tent dynamics [19, 20, 21, 22, 23] and designing incentives for users [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30].
Prior work, however, concentrates on individual aspects of platform sustainability, paying
little attention to the holistic dynamics of users, content, and votes. Consequently, they fail
to explain the post-growth retention failures (users leaving the platform), participation fail-
ures (decline in content contribution), and gamification failures (an increase of low-quality
content) in these platforms.
In this thesis, we attempt to understand how user participation affects the long-term
successes and failures of content-based platforms. Through a series of large-scale empirical
studies conducted using explanatory models, we provide a holistic understanding of platform
sustainability. Our models provide causal explanations to understand why some content-
based platforms succeed in the long run while others fail. The models also inform mechanism
design to develop sustainable content-based platforms. What follows is an overview of the
four empirical studies conducted in this thesis.
• Why Content-Based Platforms Fail: In the first study, we investigate the factors
that drive content generation in a platform and how their relationship affects platform
sustainability.
• How Biases Affect Votes On Content: In the second study, we examine the factors
that affect votes on content and show how voters may be unconsciously biased against
newcomers.
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• How Voting Affects User Participation: In the third study, we reason about
different community voting norms and how these voting norms affect the participation
of users, including newcomers.
• How User Roles Affect Platform Health: In the fourth study, we discover the
behavioral roles users assume during participation and how the mixture of these roles
affects platform health.
1.2 PRIOR WORK ON PLATFORM SUSTAINABILITY
The initial success of any online platform depends on its ability to attract new users. For
this reason, much work has focused on understanding user growth in online platforms [14,
15, 16, 17, 18]. We now discuss several pioneering works on understanding user growth.
Kumar et al. [14] studied network structure evolution in two large online social networks.
They classified network members into three groups: users not interacting in the network;
small groups interacting with one another but not interacting with the network as a whole;
large groups connected through the network paths. They also proposed a simple network
growth model, which builds on the concept of these salient structures. Specifically, the
model introduces a disparity between the ease of finding potential connections within the
large groups and the difficulty of locating potential connections in the small groups.
Backstorm et al. [15] empirically examined the membership, growth, and evolution of
large online communities through a series of prediction tasks. They first developed models
to predict an individual’s probability of joining a community based on its features and the
user’s ties to the community. They then developed models to identify the communities that
will grow significantly over a given period. They also developed a methodology to measure
the movement of individuals between communities.
Kairam et al. [16] studied group growth mechanisms to understand the growth and
longevity of groups. They identified two different group growth mechanisms: i) diffusion
growth wherein groups attract new members through ties to current members, ii) non-
diffusion growth wherein individuals with no prior ties to current members become mem-
bers themselves. Their analysis revealed two main findings. First, while group clustering
increases diffusion growth, groups that grow more from diffusion tend to reach smaller even-
tual sizes. Second, while past growth features predict short-term growth more accurately,
network structural features better predict long-term growth for small groups.
Ribeiro et al. [17] studied the growth of the daily number of users (DAU) in membership-
based websites. They proposed a DAU prediction model, which utilizes a set of reaction-
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diffusion-decay equations that describe the interactions between active members, inactive
members, and not-yet-members of the website. The model can accurately classify membership-
based websites as sustainable and unsustainable.
While user growth is important for a platform’s initial success, we argue that the long-term
success of a platform based on content production can perhaps be more meaningful [19, 20,
21, 22, 23]. We now discuss two notable works on understanding content dynamics.
Guo et al. [19] empirically examined how users generate content in three content-based
platforms: a blog site, a bookmark sharing platform, and a question-answering network.
Their analysis revealed that users’ posting behavior in content-based platforms exhibits
daily and weekly patterns. Further, the user posting behavior in these platforms follows
stretched exponential distributions instead of power-law distributions. They also discovered
that the distributions of user contributions on high-quality content in these platforms have
smaller stretch factors for the stretched exponential distribution. This finding implies that
a small number of core users can not drive content generation in the platforms.
Walk et al. [20] modeled user-level activity dynamics in content-based platforms using two
factors: intrinsic activity decay and positive peer influence. Intrinsic activity decay captures
the notion that users lose the motivation to contribute without incentives, and thus platforms
become inactive. Positive peer influence captures the notion that the action of their peers
influences users. Using the model, they discovered that a platforms’ activity dynamics
has a natural fixed point—the point of complete inactivity—where all users’ contributions
have seized. However, through external stimuli, it is possible to destabilize the fixed point,
resulting in a potential increase in activity.
Another line of related work focuses on designing incentives for users, especially in the form
of badges. We now discuss some recent works on steering user behavior through badges [28,
29, 30].
Anderson et al. [29, 30] studied the effects of badges on user behavior. In [30], they pro-
posed a formal model for reasoning about user behavior in the presence of badges. They
found that if a badge rewards a certain level of activity of a particular type, users will increase
their activity of this type as they approach the level needed for the badge. They also discov-
ered that different badges lead to different amounts of steering, and the degree of steering
depends on how close the user is to achieve the badge. In [29], Anderson et al. conducted a
large-scale deployment of badges as incentives for learner engagement in a Coursera MOOC.
They conducted randomized experiments in which they varied the presentation of badges
across different groups. They found that making badges more salient increased engagement
in the MOOC.
Immorlica et al. [28] studied badge design mechanisms to maximize users’ total contribu-
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tion. They characterized badge mechanisms based on coarse partitioning (i.e., awarding the
same badge to many users) vs. fine partitioning (i.e., awarding a unique badge to most users).
They found that the optimal badge design mechanism utilized both fine partitioning and
coarse partitioning. They found that coarse partitioning is necessary for any approximately
optimal mechanism when status valuations exhibit a decreasing marginal value property. In
contrast, fine partitioning is necessary for approximate optimality when status valuations
exhibit an increasing marginal value property.
In the following few sections, we shall examine the research questions addressed in this
thesis in more detail.
1.3 WHY CONTENT-BASED PLATFORMS FAIL
Why did Yahoo Answers fail? Why is Stack Overflow declining? Will Quora
survive in 2020?
When are content-based platforms like Stack Exchange sustainable? To answer this ques-
tion, we interpret the community question answering websites on the Stack Exchange plat-
form as “knowledge markets” and analyze why these markets can fail at scale. A knowledge
market framing allows site operators to reason about market failures and design policies
to prevent them. Our goal is to provide insights on large-scale knowledge market failures
through an interpretable model. To this end, we explore a set of interpretable economic
production models to analyze the dynamics of content generation in knowledge markets.
Among these, the Cobb-Douglas model best explains empirical data and provides an intu-
itive explanation for content generation through the concepts of elasticity and diminishing
returns. Content generation depends on user participation and how specific types of con-
tent (e.g., answers) depend on other types (e.g., questions). We show that these factors
of content generation have constant elasticity—a percentage increase in any of the inputs
(e.g., number of users) leads to a constant percentage increase in the output (e.g., number
of answers). Furthermore, markets exhibit diminishing returns—the marginal output (e.g.,
marginal answer contribution) decreases as the input (e.g., number of users) is incrementally
increased. Knowledge markets also vary on their returns to scale—the increase in output
(e.g., number of answers) resulting from a proportionate increase in all inputs (e.g., number
of questions and number of users). Notably, many knowledge markets exhibit diseconomies
of scale—measures of market health (e.g., the percentage of questions with an accepted
answer) decrease as a function of system size (i.e., the number of participants). The impli-
cations of our work are two-fold: i) site operators ought to design incentives as a function
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of size; ii) the market lens should shed insight into complex dependencies among different
content types and participant actions in content-based platforms.
1.4 HOW BIASES AFFECT VOTES ON CONTENT
The premise of this study lies in our previous empirical finding: users who join a Stack Ex-
change site more recently contribute fewer answers per month compared to those who joined
at an early stage. Furthermore, the gap between the participation of old users and newcom-
ers increases significantly as the community grows in terms of the number of users. This
empirical phenomenon, along with qualitative evidence on biases in community feedback,
raises the following question:
Could it be that what is causing the newcomers to give up is not the poor quality
of their content, but the biased social judgment of their peers?
To answer this question, we examine biases in community feedback, specifically in the form
of votes. In content-based platforms like Stack Exchange, the aggregate of votes is commonly
used as the “gold standard” for measuring content quality. Use of vote aggregates, however,
is at odds with the existing empirical literature, which suggests that voters are susceptible
to different biases—reputation (e.g., of the poster), social influence (e.g., votes thus far),
and position (e.g., answer position). Our goal is to quantify, in an observational setting, the
degree of these voter biases in online platforms. Specifically, what are the causal effects of
different impression signals—such as the reputation of the contributing user, aggregate vote
thus far, and position of content—on a participant’s vote on content? Estimating causal
effects from observational data is challenging: there may be unobserved confounders (e.g.,
content quality) that explain the association between the impression signals (e.g., the repu-
tation of the contributing user) and the observed votes. To address this issue, we adopt the
instrumental variable (IV) method, a causal inference technique that enables a researcher
to quantify causal effects from observational data. IV relies on careful reasoning to identify
valid instruments that co-vary with the independent variable and cannot influence the de-
pendent variable through the unobserved confounder. To quantify voter biases, we identify
a set of candidate instruments, carefully analyze their validity through argumentation, and
then use the valid instruments to reveal the effects of the impression signals on observed
votes. Our empirical study using log data from Stack Exchange websites shows that the
bias estimates from our IV approach differ from the bias estimates from the ordinary least
squares (OLS) method. In particular, OLS underestimates reputation bias (1.6–2.2x for gold
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badges) and position bias (up to 1.9x for the initial position) and overestimates social influ-
ence bias (1.8–2.3x for initial votes). The implications of our work include redesigning the
user interface to avoid voter biases, making changes to platforms’ policy to mitigate voter
biases, detecting other forms of biases in online platforms.
1.5 HOW VOTING AFFECTS USER PARTICIPATION
In the first study, we show that platforms fail because newcomers ease off. In the second
study, we show that community voting is biased against them. Now we ask:
Would the newcomers have stayed longer or contributed more if the community
had voted objectively?
In content-based platforms like Stack Exchange, votes are the “social currency” that per-
suades users to create content. The deficiency of votes, therefore, is likely to impact the
future participation of users. From platform operators’ perspective, the interplay between
votes and retention is crucial as it allows them to make strategic decisions. For instance, if
platform operators could identify voting outcomes that would improve user retention, they
could purposefully engineer the voting conditions to steer votes towards those outcomes.
Understanding the relationship between different community voting norms and user reten-
tion is an essential first step towards achieving such altercation capabilities. In this study,
we develop a methodology to reason about alternative community voting norms. We refer to
the existing community voting norm as the control norm, whose voting outcomes can be ob-
served from log data. Our goal is to reason about alternative community voting norms whose
voting outcomes can not be observed in the data. For instance, how user retention in Stack
Exchange would be different if the community issues vote based upon the length of the con-
tent. To enable such reasoning about alternative norms, we must perform a counterfactual
analysis. To this end, we first develop a propensity model for quantifying the probabilities
of different voting outcomes under each voting norm. We then define a utility model for
quantifying the derived utility of users from the votes they acquire. Finally, we develop a
counterfactual model for reasoning about user retention under different voting norms. We
adopt an inverse propensity sampling (IPS) estimator to perform our counterfactual analysis.
We conduct extensive experiments on Stack Exchange websites comparing the default voting
norm in these sites with six alternative norms: random (i.e., content receive an arbitrary
number of votes), uniform (i.e., all content receive the same number of votes), length (i.e.,
content that contain more words receive more votes), readability (i.e., content that have
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higher readability receive more votes), objectivity (i.e., content that express facts rather
than opinions receive more votes), and polarity (i.e., content that express positive emotion
receive more votes). Our main finding is that if the community members had voted based
upon the length, readability, objectivity, or polarity of the content, the platform would have
observed higher retention. The main design implication of this study is that site operators
need to promote content based on factors that are intrinsic to the content.
1.6 HOW USER ROLES AFFECT PLATFORM HEALTH
In a content-based platform, users assume various action-based roles, e.g., asker, answerer,
moderator, etc. Prior work suggests that different user roles are crucial for sustainable
content production in these communities [31]. Motivated by the importance of user roles,
we ask the following research questions.
Does a community’s composition over user roles vary as a function of the topic?
How does it relate to the health of the underlying community?
In this study, we propose a generative model for discovering user roles and community
role compositions in Community Question Answering (CQA) platforms. While past research
shows that participants play different roles in online communities, automatically discovering
these roles and providing a summary of user behavior that is readily interpretable remains
an important challenge. Furthermore, there has been relatively little insight into the distri-
bution of these roles between communities. The generative model proposed in this work, the
mixture of Dirichlet-multinomial mixtures (MDMM) behavior model can (1) automatically
discover interpetable user roles (as probability distributions over atomic actions) directly
from log data, and (2) uncover community-level role compositions to facilitate such cross–
community studies. A comprehensive experiment on all 161 non-meta communities on the
Stack Exchange platform demonstrates that our model can be useful for a wide variety of
behavioral studies, and we highlight three empirical insights. First, we show interesting dis-
tinctions in question-asking behavior on Stack Exchange (where two distinct types of askers
can be identified) and answering behavior (where two distinct roles surrounding answers
emerge). Second, we find statistically significant differences in behavior compositions across
topical groups of communities on Stack Exchange, and that those groups that have statisti-
cally significant differences in health metrics also have statistically significant differences in
behavior compositions, suggesting a relationship between behavior composition and health.
Finally, we show that the MDMM behavior model can be used to demonstrate similar but
distinct evolutionary patterns between topical groups.
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1.7 SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTIONS
Our first study aimed to investigate the factors that drive content generation in platforms.
We now briefly discuss the contributions of this work.
1. Content Generation Model. We adopt macroeconomic production functions to
describe content generation in platforms, a novel application of economic production
functions. Our best-fit model, the Cobb-Douglas function, provides an intuitive expla-
nation for content generation in platforms.
2. Insights into Platform Sustainability. The Cobb-Douglas model provides three
critical insights: stable core, size-dependent distribution, and diseconomies of scale.
Briefly, there is a stable core of users who substantially contribute to platforms for a
long time. In many platforms, the size of this stable core does not increase with the
number of users. This discrepancy results in a size-dependent activity distribution, i.e.,
the expected user behavior changes with community size. As a result, these platforms
exhibit diseconomies of scale—platform health declines with the increase in the number
of users.
Our second study aimed to examine the factors that affect votes on content. We now
briefly discuss the contributions of this work.
1. Voter Bias Quantification. We quantify the degree of voter biases—namely, rep-
utation bias, social influence bias, and position bias—in content-based platforms. To
derive these bias estimates, we measure different impression signals’ effects on observed
votes through a novel application of instrumental variables.
2. Stronger Evidence of Biases. Our analysis reveals that prior work has significantly
underestimated the impact of voter biases. In particular, our empirical study using log
data from Stack Exchange sites shows that the bias estimates from our IV approach
differ from the bias estimates from the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. OLS
underestimates reputation bias (by a factor of 1.6–2.2 for gold badges) and position
bias (by a factor of 1.3-2.0 for the initial position).
Our third study aimed to develop a methodology to reason about alternative voting norms.
We now briefly discuss the contributions of this work.
1. Propensity Model for Voting Outcomes. We adopt a Dirichlet-multinomial model
for quantifying the probabilities of different voting outcomes under a community voting
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norm. Our propensity model explains the community voting behavior wherein voters
examine the current context to evaluate and vote on the answers.
2. Counterfactual Model for Community Voting. We develop an inverse propensity
score (IPS) model for reasoning about user retention under different community voting
norms. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to use IPS to reason
about alternative community voting norms.
3. Causal Insights into Voting Outcomes. Our analysis provides some of the first
causal insights into voting outcomes. For example, content-based voting norms can
improve user retention significantly compared to the current voting norm. Even par-
tial (20%) content-based norms significantly outperform the current norm for various
retention metrics.
Our fourth study aimed to develop a methodology to discover the behavioral roles users
assume during participation. We now briefly discuss the contributions of this work.
1. Role Discovery Model. We propose a generative model for discovering action-based
user roles along with community role compositions. The proposed model, mixture of
Dirichlet-multinomial mixtures (MDMM) behavior model, can automatically discover
interpretable user roles directly from log data and uncover community-level role com-
positions to facilitate cross-community studies.
2. Insights into Platform Health. Our model showed statistically significant differ-
ences in behavior compositions across topical groups of communities on Stack Ex-
change. Further, the model also revealed that the groups with statistically significant
differences in health metrics also have statistically significant differences in behavior
compositions, suggesting a relationship between behavior composition and platform
health.
1.8 ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
The rest of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the cross-
disciplinary research efforts on understanding platform sustainability. Chapter 3 describes
our first empirical study: what factors drive content generation and how their relationship
affects platform sustainability. Chapter 4 describes our second empirical study: what factors
affect votes on content and show how some of these factors lead to biases. Chapter 5 describes
our third empirical study: how different community voting norms affect the participation
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of users. Chapter 6 describes our fourth empirical study: what roles users assume during
participation and how the mixture of these roles affects platform health.
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CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND
In this thesis, we adopt an economic lens to study the successes and failures of content-
based platforms. Through a series of large-scale empirical studies conducted using economic
and causal models, we provide insights into the basis of platform success. Perhaps the most
relevant research to ours is prior work that studied content-based platforms from an economic
perspective, specifically from a “market” viewpoint. This chapter provides an overview of the
cross-disciplinary research landscape on understanding content-based platforms as knowledge
markets, reasoning about knowledge market failures, and learning how to build successful
knowledge markets. In the rest of the chapter, we will often refer to content-based platforms
as knowledge markets and users as participants. Plese note that a more in-depth analysis of
the prior work related to the problems studied in this thesis can be found in their associated
chapters.
2.1 CONTENT-BASED PLATFORMS AS KNOWLEDGE MARKETS
Once flourishing content-based platforms, such as Google Answers1 and Yahoo Answers2,
have drawn much attention from the research community. A growing body of Economics
and Computer Science literature has studied these platforms as “markets” [32, 33, 34].
Notably, Chen et al. [32] conducted a field experiment at Google Answers to investigate
the effects of various design features on knowledge markets’ performance. They particularly
examined the effects of price, tips, and reputation systems on the answerer’s effort and
answer quality under different pricing schemes. Their analysis revealed several interesting
findings. First, a higher price leads to a longer but not better answer. Second, the level and
type of tip do not affect answer length and quality. Third, an answerer with a high reputation
typically provides an answer with higher quality. The implication of these findings is that
reputation systems are critical for maintaining content quality in knowledge markets.
Daphne Ruth Raban [33] studied Google Answers to understand the incentive structure in
information markets when both economic and social incentives are present. Her analysis con-
firmed the preeminence of economic incentives: the most important predictor for answerer
participation in Google Answers was the anticipated tip. However, further analysis of two
answerer subgroups (frequent answerers and occasional answerers) revealed the importance
of social incentives: i) for frequent answerers, the crucial predictors include comments and
1Google Answers was a price-based Q&A platform offered by Google.
2Yahoo Answers is a free Q&A platform offered by Yahoo.
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ratings; ii) for occasional answerers, the crucial predictors include comments. These find-
ings imply that social incentives play a much more critical role in answerer engagement in
information markets than previously understood.
Benjamin Edelman [34] analyzed the questions and answers from Google Answers to ex-
amine earnings and ratings. He found several interesting trends in answerer behavior. First,
experienced answerers provide answers that askers tend to value more, thus acquiring higher
ratings. Second, specialists, i.e., answeres who focus on specific question categories, provide
higher quality answers than generalists. Third, on the whole, more experienced answer-
ers tend to be more specialized. These findings highlight the importance of experienced
answerers in operating knowledge markets.
Gary Hsieh conducted a series of studies highlighting the importance of applying market
mechanisms to support information exchange [35, 36, 37]. These studies show how markets
can improve welfare for the participants in information exchange, the operationalization of
markets for Q&A platforms (knowledge markets), and how they affect interpersonal rela-
tionships.
In [35], Hsieh et al. explored market mechanisms in communication systems. They
compared three communication systems modeled on questioning and answering: i) baseline
system, ii) variable-price market system, iii) fixed-price market system. In the baseline
system, the sender (asker) sends a request without any financial incentives, and the receiver
(answerer) has to decide whether to respond. In the variable-price market system, the askers
offer to pay an individually set price for an answer, and receivers accept communication if
this price exceeds their individually set reservation price. In the fixed-price market system,
askers pay answerers a fixed price if communication occurs. The study revealed that market
systems (both fixed and variable-price markets) lead to improved communication compared
to the non-market system (baseline system). This finding establishes the importance of
market mechanisms in information exchange.
In [36], Hsieh et al. designed two variants of a real-time Q&A system. The first variant
adopted a simple reputation system, whereas the second variant adopted an explicit market-
based system using a currency. The authors compared how the two systems were used and
then conducted a controlled study on question answering. Their analysis revealed that in the
explicit market-based system, askers and answerers were more selective in what they ask and
answer. This finding implies that the market-based system reduces low-quality questions and
answers at the cost of a reduction in overall content generation and community engagement.
In [37], Hsieh et al. analyzed randomly selected questions from Mahalo Answers—a price-
based Q&A service that allows its users to ask both free and for-pay questions. The authors
examined the factors that impact the decision to pay for answers and how financial rewards
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affect answers. They found that askers are more likely to pay for factual answers and when
questions are difficult to answer. The results also confirm the prior finding that paying
more leads to longer but not necessarily higher quality answers. These findings highlight the
factors that affect pricing in the knowledge market.
2.2 KNOWLEDGE MARKET FAILURES
The recent failures of content-based platforms, such as Google Answers3 and Yahoo An-
swers4, have made researchers curious about knowledge market failures. There is a recent
body of work on understanding knowledge market failures in terms of user retention, content
generation, and content quality.
Dror et al. [38] studied the problem of churn prediction on Yahoo Answers, specifically
for new users. They compiled a wide variety of demographic (e.g., age, gender), behavioral
(e.g., answering time, answering rate), and social (e.g., interaction with other users) features
to predict whether a new user is likely to churn out. Their feature analysis revealed that
the strongest indicators of user churn are the number of answers created by the user and the
user’s degree of recognition in the form of best answers, thumbs up, and positive responses.
These results indicate that social incentives are crucial for retaining participants in knowledge
markets.
Harper et al. [39] conducted a comparative field study of five Q&A sites—Library Reference
Services, Google Answers, AllExperts, Yahoo Answers, and Live QnA—to analyze answer
quality. They focused on answering two research questions: i) How do Q&A sites differ in
the quality and characteristics of answers? ii) What can askers do to receive better answers
on a Q&A site? They found that price-based Q&A sites such as Google Answers provide
better answers with more diverse opinions. Among the free Q&A sites, Yahoo Answers
provided higher-quality answers, enabled by its large yet dedicated user community. Overall,
participants get what they pay for in knowledge markets, and a knowledge market’s success
relies on the market size.
Srba and Bielikova [12] conducted a case study on why Stack Overflow, the largest Stack
Exchange site, is failing. They found that the churn rate of Stack Overflow is increasing,
especially for newcomers. Empirically, the proportion of one-time contributors, users who
leave after their first contribution, is steadily increasing (from 30.8% in 2011 to 33.1% in
2014). In contrast, the proportion of stable users, users who contribute for a prolonged
period, is rapidly decreasing (from 41.05% in 2011 to 34.89% in 2014).
3Google shut down Google Answers in 2006.
4Yahoo Answers has experienced a massive drop in traffic since 2011.
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Dearman et al. [40] conducted a survey to understand why users do not answer questions
in Yahoo Answers. They surveyed active members of Yahoo Answers, who revealed their
lack of motivation for answering questions. They found that top and regular contributors
do not answer questions for the same reasons. Also, questions that already received several
responses are less likely to be answered; this happens because the answerers fear that the
new response will not be noticed.
2.3 BUILDING SUCCESSFUL KNOWLEDGE MARKETS
While the failures of Google Answers and Yahoo Answers are concerning, the success of
Wikipedia gives researchers design ideas to develop successful knowledge markets. Notably,
Karut et al. have drawn on the literature in psychology, economics, and other social sciences,
as well as their own research, to improve the design of knowledge markets [41, 42, 43, 44].
Ren et al. [41] took one of the earliest steps towards mining social science theories by
arguing that online community design influences how people become attached to the com-
munity. They explored two group attachment theories with design implications for online
communities, namely common identity theory and common bond theory. The former asserts
the causes and consequences of people’s attachment to the group (macro). In contrast, the
latter asserts the causes and consequences of people’s attachment to individuals in the group
(micro). They explained how design decisions, notably recruiting newcomers vs. retaining
existing members and limiting group size vs. allowing uncontrolled growth, can lead to
different degrees and forms of community participation by those so motivated.
Ren et al. [42] also explored social psychology theory to understand how online commu-
nities develop member attachment. They implemented two sets of community features for
building member attachment by strengthening either group identity or interpersonal bonds.
To support identity-based attachment, they gave members information about group activities
and intergroup competition. They also provided members with group-level communication
tools. To support bond-based attachment, they gave members information about the ac-
tivities of individual members and interpersonal similarity. They also provided members
with interpersonal communication tools. They found that, under both conditions, members’
attachment to groups increased. Further, community features supporting identity-based
attachment had more substantial effects than features supporting bond-based attachment.
The new features also had more substantial effects on newcomers than on old users.
Zhu et al. [43] explored the role of shared leadership in building successful online com-
munities in the context of Wikipedia. They proposed a shared leadership model, which
asserts that leadership behaviors may come from members at all levels. Using propensity
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score matching, they investigated how different leadership behaviors and the position of the
people who deliver them (say formal leadership positions or not) influence the contributions
that other participants make. Their main finding is that leadership behavior performed by
members at all levels significantly influenced other members’ motivation. They also found
that transactional and person-focused leadership effectively motivated others to contribute,
whereas aversive leadership decreased other contributors’ motivations.
Zhu et al. [44] also investigated how combining group identification, and direction setting
can motivate volunteers in online communities. They argued that group identity triggers in-
group favoritism, while direction setting steers people’s group-oriented motivation towards
the group’s essential tasks. They tested their hypotheses in the context of Wikipedia’s
Collaborations of the Week (COTW), a social event within Wikiprojects. They found that
publicizing important group goals via COTW can substantially motivate editors who have
voluntarily identified themselves as group members. Further, the positive effects of goals
spill over to non-goal-related tasks. Finally, editors exposed to group role models are more
likely to perform similarly to the models on group-relevant citizenship behaviors.
2.4 SUMMARY
The diversity of ideas that prior literature has collectively considered motivates the present
work on platform sustainability. In Section 2.1, we surveyed prior work on understanding
content-based platforms as knowledge markets. The two main takeaways of the prior work
on knowledge markets are: i) reputation system plays a pivotal role in maintaining quality
and engagement in knowledge markets, ii) market mechanisms can improve welfare for the
participants in information exchange. In Chapter 4, we show the presence of biases in the
reputation systems that utilize votes. These biases affect the retention of participants in
knowledge markets. In Section 2.2, we surveyed prior work on knowledge market failures.
The two main takeaways of the prior work on knowledge market failures are: i) a knowledge
market’s success relies on its size, ii) social incentives are crucial for retaining participants in
knowledge markets. In Chapter 3, we show how the increase in the size of a knowledge market
can adversely affect its health. In Chapter 5, we examine the impact of social incentives
by studying the impact of voting norms on the retention of participants. In Section 2.3, we
surveyed prior work on building successful knowledge markets. The two main takeaways of
the prior work on successful knowledge markets are: i) community design diversely affects the
membership attachments of old users and newcomers, ii) leadership behaviors performed by
members at all levels significantly influence other members’ motivation. While these studies
illuminate design decisions for designing successful knowledge markets, they primarily focus
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on the role of membership attachment and shared leadership. In contrast, this thesis focuses
on the impact of voting norms and user roles.
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CHAPTER 3: MODELING CONTENT GENERATION
In content-based platforms, generating content is integral to the platforms’ sustainability.
For instance, Q&A platforms like Stack Exchange often use content generation metrics, such
as the percentage of answered questions and the percentage of questions with an accepted
answer, to monitor platform health. This chapter discusses our first study on modeling
content generation and exploring the relationship between content generation and platform
sustainability.
3.1 INTRODUCTION
In this study, we analyze a large group of community question answering (CQA) websites
on Stack Exchange network through the Economic lens of a market. Framing Stack Exchange
sites as knowledge markets has intuitive appeal: in a hypothetical knowledge market, if no
one wants to answer questions, but only ask, or conversely, there are individuals who want
to only answer but not ask questions, the “market” will collapse. What, then, is the required
relationship among actions (say between questions and answers) in such a knowledge market
for us to deem it healthy? Are larger markets with more participants healthier since there
will be more people to ask and answer questions?
Studying CQA websites through an economic lens allows site operators to reason about
whether they should grow the user base. Since most of the popular CQA websites (e.g.,
Quora, Stack Exchange) do not charge participants, but instead depend on site advertise-
ments for revenue, there is a natural temptation for operators of these sites to grow the
user base so that there is increase in revenue. As we show in this study, for most Stack
Exchange sites, growth in the user base is counter-productive in the sense that they turn
unhealthy—specifically, more questions remain unanswered.
Explaining the macroscopic behavior of knowledge markets is important, yet challenging.
One can regress some variable of interest (say number of questions) on variables including
number of users, time spent in the website among others. However, explaining why the
regression curve looks the way it does is hard. As we show in this work, using an economic
lens of a market allows us to model dependencies between number of participants and the
amount of content, and to predict the production of content.
Our main contribution is to model CQA websites as knowledge markets, and to provide
insight on the relationship between size and health of these markets. To this end, we develop
models to capture content generation dynamics in knowledge markets. We analyze a set of
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basis functions (the functional form of how an input contributes to output) and interaction
mechanisms (how the inputs interact with each other), and identify the optimal power basis
function and the interactive essential interaction form using a prediction task on the outputs
(questions, answers, and comments). This form is the well-known Cobb-Douglas form that
connects production inputs with output. Using the best model fits for each Stack Exchange
site, we show that the Cobb-Douglas model predicts the production of content with high
accuracy.
The Cobb-Douglas function provides an intuitive explanation for content generation in
Stack Exchange markets. It demonstrates that, in Stack Exchange markets, 1. factors such
as user participation and content dependency have constant elasticity—percentage increase
in any of these inputs will have constant percentage increase in output; 2. in many markets,
factors exhibit diminishing returns—decrease in the marginal (incremental) output (e.g., an-
swer production) as an input (e.g. number of people who answer) is incrementally increased,
keeping the other inputs constant; 3. markets vary according to their returns to scale—the
increase in output resulting from a proportionate increase in all inputs; and 4. many markets
exhibit diseconomies of scale—measures of health decrease as a function of overall system
size (number of participants).
There are two reasons why we see diminishing returns in the Stack Exchange markets.
First, the total activity of participants for any Stack Exchange market unsurprisingly follows
a power-law pattern. What is interesting is that the power-law exponent falls with increase
in size for most markets, implying that new users do not participate in the same manner as
earlier users. Second, we can identify a stable core of users who actively participate for long
periods of time, contributing to the market health.
Finally, we show diseconomies of scale through experiments on system size, analysis of
health metrics, and user exchangeability. For most Stack Exchange markets, we see that as
system size grows, the ratio of answers to questions falls below a critical point, when some
questions go unanswered. Furthermore, using health metrics of the number of questions with
an accepted answer, and the number of questions with at least one answer, we observe that
most Stack Exchange markets decline in health with increase in size. Finally, we compare
the top contributors with the bottom contributors to see if they are “exchangeable.” Most
Stack Exchange markets are not exchangeable in the sense the contributions of the top
and the bottom contributors are qualitatively different and differ in absolute terms. These
experiments on diseconomies of scale are consistent with the insight from Cobb-Douglas
model of production that predicts diminishing returns.
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3.2 RELATED WORK
Our work draws from, and improves upon, several research threads.
Sustainability. Srba et al. [12] conducted a case study on why Stack Overflow, the largest
and oldest of the sites in Stack Exchange network, is failing. They shed some insights into
knowledge market failure such as novice and negligent users generating low quality content
perpetuating the decline of the market. However, they do not provide a systematic way to
understand and prevent failures in these markets. Wu et al. [45] introduced a framework
for understanding the user strategies in a knowledge market—revealing the importance of
diverse user strategies for sustainable markets. In this study, we present an alternative model
that provides many interesting insights including knowledge market sustainability.
Activity Dynamics. Walk et al. [20] modeled user-level activity dynamics in Stack
Exchange using two factors: intrinsic activity decay, and positive peer influence. However,
the model proposed there does not reveal the collective platform dynamics, and the eventual
success or failure of a platform. Abufouda et al. [46] developed two models for predicting
the interaction decay of community members in online social communities. Similar to Wu
et al. [20], these models accommodate user-level dynamics, whereas we concentrate on the
collective platform dynamics. Wu et al. [47] proposed a discrete generalized beta distribution
(DGBD) model that reveals several insights into the collective platform dynamics, notably
the concept of a size-dependent distribution. In this study, we improve upon the concept of
a size-dependent distribution.
Economic Perspective. Kumar et al. [48] proposed an economic view of CQA platforms,
where they concentrated on the growth of two types of users in a market setting: users
who provide questions, and users who provide answers. In this study, we concentrate on
a subsequent problem—the “relation” between user growth and content generation in a
knowledge market. Butler et al. [49] proposed a resource-based theory of sustainable social
structures. While they treat members as resources, like we do, our model differs in that
it concentrates on a market setting, instead of a network setting, and takes the complex
content dependency of the platform into consideration. Furthermore, our model provides a
systematic way to understand successes and failures of knowledge markets, which none of
these models provide.
Scale Study. Lin et al. [50] examined Reddit communities to characterize the effect of
user growth in voting patterns, linguistic patterns, and community network patterns. Their
study reveals that these patterns do not change much after a massive growth in the size of
the user community. Tausczik et al. [51] investigated the effects of crowd size on solution
quality in Stack Exchange communities. Their study uncovers three distinct levels of group
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size in the crowd that affect solution quality: topic audience size, question audience size, and
number of contributors. In this study, we examine the consequence of scale on knowledge
markets from a different perspective by using a set of health metrics.
Stability. Successes and failures of platforms have been studied from the perspective of
user retention and stability [52, 53, 54, 55]. Notably, Patil et al. [52] studied the dynamics
of group stability based on the average increase or decrease in member growth. Our study
examines stability in a different manner—namely, by considering the relative exchangeability
of users as a function of scale.
User Growth. Successes and failures of user communities have also been widely studied
from the perspective of user growth [14, 15, 16, 17, 18]. Kairam et al. [16] examined diffusion
and non-diffusion growth to design models that predict the longevity of social groups. Ribeiro
et al. [17] proposed a daily active user prediction model which classifies membership based
websites as sustainable and unsustainable. While this perspective is important, we argue
that studying the successes and failures of communities based on content production can
perhaps be more meaningful [21, 22, 23].
Modeling CQA Websites. There is a rich body of work that extensively analyzed CQA
websites [1, 2, 3, 56, 57], along with user behavior [58, 59, 60, 61, 62], roles [63, 64], and
content generation [65, 66, 67]. Notably, Yang et al. [66] noted the scalability problem of
CQA—namely, the volume of questions eventually subsumes the capacity of the answerers
within the community. Understanding and modeling this phenomenon is one of the goals of
this study.
3.3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
The goal of this study is to develop a model for content generation in knowledge markets.
Content is integral to the success and failure of a knowledge market. Therefore, we aim to
better understand the content generation dynamics.
A model for content dynamics should have the following properties: macro-scale, explana-
tory, predictive, minimalistic, comprehensive.
Macro-scale: The model should capture content generation dynamics via aggregate mea-
sures. Aggregate measures help us understand the collective market by summarizing a
complex array of information about individuals, which is especially important for policy-
making.
Explanatory: The model should be insightful about the behavior of a knowledge market.
Understanding market behavior is a crucial first step in designing policies to maintain a
resilient, sustainable market.
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Predictive: The model should allow us to make predictions about future content generation
and resultant success or failure. These market predictions are integral to the prevention and
mitigation of market failures.
Minimalistic: The model should have as few parameters as necessary, and still closely
reflect the observed reality.
Comprehensive: The model should encompass content generation dynamics for different
content types (e.g., question, answer, comment) in varieties of knowledge markets. This
is important for developing a systematic way to understand the successes and failures of
knowledge markets.
In remaining sections we propose models that meet the aforementioned requirements,
and show that our best-fit model accurately reflects the content generation dynamics and
resultant successes and failures of real-world knowledge markets.
3.4 MODELING KNOWLEDGE MARKETS
In this section, we introduce economic production models to capture content generation
dynamics in real-world knowledge markets. We first draw an analogy between economic
production and content generation, and report the content generation factors in knowl-
edge markets (Section 3.4.1). Then, we concentrate on the knowledge markets in Stack
Exchange—presenting production models for different content types (Section 3.4.2).
3.4.1 Preliminaries
Economic production mechanisms well describe content generation in knowledge markets.
In economics, production is defined as the process by which human labor is applied, usually
with the help of tools and other forms of capital, to produce useful goods or services—the
output [68]. We assert that participants of a knowledge market function as labor to generate
content such as questions and answers. Analogous to economic output, content contributes
to participant utility.
Motivated by the production analogy, we design macroeconomic production models to
capture content generation dynamics in knowledge markets. In these models, instead of
directly modeling content generation as a dynamic process (function of time), we model it
in terms of associated factors which are dynamic.
There are two key factors that affect content generation in knowledge markets, namely
user participation and content dependency. User participation is the most important factor
in deciding the quantity of generated content. The participation of more users induce more
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questions, answers, and other contents in a knowledge market. Content dependency also
affects the quantity of generated content for different types. Content dependency refers
to the dependency of one type of content (e.g., answers) on other type of content (e.g.,
questions). In absence of questions, there will be no answers in a knowledge market, even
in the presence of many potential participants who are willing to answer.
3.4.2 Modeling Stack Exchange
Stack Exchange is a network of community question answering websites where each site
is based on a focused topic. Each user of the Stack Exchange network participates in one or
more of these sites based on their interests. Stack Exchange sites are free knowledge markets
where participants generate content for non-monetary reputation-based incentives. These
markets are diverse, varying in theme (subject matter), size (number of users and amount
of activity), and age (number of days in existence).
We design production models for three primary content types in Stack Exchange: questions
(the root content), answers (which nest below questions), and comments (which can nest
either beneath questions or answers). Based on the content dependency and user roles in
content generation, we propose the following relationships for question, answer and comment
generation in Stack Exchange (see Table 3.1 for notation).
Table 3.1: Notation used in the model
Symbol Definition
Uq(t) The number of users who asked questions at time t
Ua(t) The number of users who answered questions at time t
Uc(t) The number of users who made comments at time t
Nq(t) The number of active questions at time t
Na(t) The number of answers to active questions at time t
N qc (t) The number of comments to active questions at time t
Nac (t) The number of comments to active answers at time t
Nc(t) The number of comments to active questions/answers at time t
fx The functional relationship for content type x
There is a single factor in generating Nq questions: the number of users Uq who ask
questions (askers).
Nq = fq(Uq) (3.1)
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There are two key factors in generating Na answers: the number of questions Nq, and the
number of users Ua who answer questions (answerers).
Na = fa(Nq, Ua) (3.2)
There are two types of comments: comments on questions, and comments on answers.
Accordingly, there are three key factors in generating Nc comments: the number of ques-
tions Nq, the number of answers Na, and the number of users Uc who make comments
(commenters).
N qc = fcq(Nq, Uc) (3.3)






The aforementioned relationships imply that the amount of generated content of each
type depends on the function describing its factor dependent growth, and the availability
of factor(s). These relationships make three assumptions. First, different content types
interact only through their use of factors. Second, the functional relationships depend on
the consumption or usage of each factor. Third, the functional relationships depend on the
interaction among the factors—how the factors of a particular content type interact.
Now, we transform the functional relationships into production models by first choosing
a basis function to capture how a content type consumes its factor(s), and then choosing an
interaction type to capture the interaction among factors.
Basis Function. We use a basis function to capture the effect of a given factor on a
particular content type. While there is a variety of basis functions available for regression, we
consider three basis functions widely used in economics and growth modeling [69]: power—
g(x) = axλ; exponential— g(x) = abx; and sigmoid— g(x) = L
1+ek(x−x0)
.
Interaction among the Factors. We use an aggregate function to capture the interac-
tion among multiple factors of a given content type. Specifically, we consider the pairwise
interaction functions listed in Table 3.2.
We combine a basis function and an interaction type to design production models for
different content types. For example, answer generation can be modeled using power basis




a ). We consider twelve such possible
models (combination of three basis and four interaction type) for answer and comment
generation in Stack Exchange.
User Role Distribution. A fundamental assumption of our model is the awareness of
user roles (e.g., asker, answerer, and commenter) and their distribution (e.g., how many
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Table 3.2: Pairwise interaction between factors with contour
Essential: Essential factors are both required for
content generation, with zero marginal return for
a single factor. For a pair of essential factors, con-
tent generation is determined by the more limit-
ing factor: z = min(y1, y2) [70]. This is known
as Liebig’s law of the minimum.














Interactive Essential: In interactive essential in-
teraction, we get diminishing return (instead of
zero return) for a single factor: z = y1y2 [70]. If
factors are consumed using power basis function,
i.e., yi = ax
λ
i , it captures Cobb-Douglas produc-














Antagonistic: For antagonistic factors, content
generation is determined solely by the availabil-
ity of the factor which yields the largest return:
z = max(y1, y2) [70]. This interaction implies
that the production process has maximum possi-














Substitutable: Factors that can each support
production on their own are substitutable rela-
tive to each other: z = w1y1+w2y2 [70]. This im-
plies that there exists some equivalence between
the two factors. This is analogous to the general













z = y1 +y2
users are askers?). We empirically observe that all Stack Exchange markets have a stable
distribution of user roles. In fact, given the number of users, we can accurately predict the
number of participants for each role.
We apply linear regression to determine the number of participants Ux of a particular role
x ∈ {q, a, c} from the number of users U in a Stack Exchange market. For each market, we
compute three distinct coefficients of determination, R2, for predicting three roles (asker,
answerer, and commenter) using linear regression. In Figure 6.2 we show the distribution of
R2 for regressing user roles across 156 Stack Exchange markets. We use letter value plots1
to present these distributions—showing precise estimates of their tail behavior. We observe
1The letter-value plot display information about the distribution of a variable [71]. It conveys precise
estimates of tail behavior using letter values; boxplots lack such precise estimation.
25
that, in most markets, the R2 values are close to 1. Further, the tail capturing low R2 values





















Figure 3.1: The distribution of coefficient of determination, R2, for regressing user roles
across 156 Stack Exchange. In most Stack Exchange sites, the role distribution is stable—as
manifested by the arrangement of R2 in letter-value plots.
Number of Users. The number of users is the only free input to our content generation
models; the remaining inputs are functions of the number of users. In all these models,
the growth or decline of number of users is exogenous—determined outside the model, by
non-economic forces.
3.5 DATASET
We collected the latest release (September, 2017) of the Stack Exchange dataset. This
snapshot is a complete archive of all activities in Stack Exchange sites. There are 169 sites
in our collected dataset. For the purpose of empirical analysis, we only consider the sites
that have been active for at least 12 months beyond the ramp up period (site created, but
few or no activity). There are 156 such sites. The age of these sites vary from 14 months
to 111 months, number of users from 1,072 to 547,175, and the number of posts (questions
and answers) from 1,600 to 1,985,869. Further, the sites have small overlaps in user base;
therefore, we can reasonably argue that the underlying markets are independent.
In Figure 3.2 we present letter value plots (in log-scale) to show the distribution of number















Figure 3.2: The log-scale distribution of number of months (age), number of users, and
number of posts for 156 Stack Exchange sites.
3.6 EVALUATING OUR PROPOSED MODELS
In this section, we identify optimal models (basis and interaction) based on the accuracy of
fitting content generation time series observed in our dataset (Section 3.6.1), and evaluate the
performance of the optimal models in predicting content volume in long run (Section 3.6.2).
3.6.1 Model Fitting
We fit each variant of production model (basis and interaction), for each content type, to
the observed content generation time series (monthly granularity), in each Stack Exchange
site. Notice that among the different variants of production models, the models using power
or exponential basis have a parsimonious set of parameters. For example, answer generation
model using power basis function requires only three parameters for interactive essential
interaction (See Section 3.4.2), and four parameters for remaining interaction types. In
contrast, answer generation model using sigmoid basis function requires five parameters for
interactive essential interaction, and six parameters for remaining interaction types.
Parameter Estimation. We learn the best-fit parameters for capturing the observed
content generation time series. We restrict some parameters of our production models to be
non-negative, e.g., non-negative exponents in power basis. These restrictions are important
because the underlying factors positively affect the output. We use the trust-region reflective
algorithm [72] to solve our constrained least square optimization problem. The algorithm is
appropriate for solving non-linear least squares problems with constraints.
Evaluation Method. We evaluate fitting accuracy using four metrics: root mean
square error (RMSE), normalized root mean square error (NRMSE), explained variance
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score (EVS), and Akaike information criterion (AIC). Given two series for each content
type, the observed series N(t), and the prediction ˆN(t) of the series by a model with k



















(N(t)− ˆN(t))2) + 2k (3.9)
Among the four metrics, RMSE and NRMSE are error metrics (low value implies good fit),
AIC is an information theoretic metric to capture the trade-off between model complexity
and goodness-of-fit (low value implies good model), and EVS refers to a model’s ability to
capture variance in data (high value implies good model).
Fitting Results. We compare the fitting accuracy of production models for all Stack
Exchange sites using the four metrics. Each metric is summarized via the mean, across all
sites, for each content type. We use content generation time series with monthly granularity
as observed data. We found that the models with the exponential and sigmoid basis functions
do not fit the data for many Stack Exchange sites. Accordingly, in Table 3.3 we only present
the results for production models with the power basis and different interaction types. Notice
that the models with interactive essential interaction outperform the remaining models for
all metrics and content types. We performed paired t-tests to determine if the improvements
for interactive essential interaction are statistically significant; the results are positive with
p < 0.01.
Thus we use production models with power basis and interactive essential interaction for
prediction tasks.
3.6.2 Forecasting Content Generation
We apply production models with power basis and interactive essential interaction to
forecast content volume in long run—one year ahead in the future. Specifically, we train
each model using the content generation data from the first 12 months (beyond the ramp
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Table 3.3: The comparison of fitting accuracy of production models (with power basis and
different interaction types) for all Stack Exchange sites. The models with interactive es-
sential interaction outperform the remaining models for all metrics and content types. The
improvements for interactive essential interaction are statistically significant, validated via
paired t-tests, where p < 0.01.
Content
Interaction Avg. Avg. Avg. Avg.
Type RMSE NRMSE EVS AIC
Question Single Factor 25.74 0.09 0.79 104.47
Answer
Essential 70.31 0.09 0.79 208.82
I. Essential 64.62 0.08 0.83 196.39
Antagonistic 72.77 0.09 0.78 210.96
Substitutable 68.90 0.09 0.81 207.61
Comment
Essential 146.64 0.08 0.83 328.25
I. Essential 137.23 0.08 0.85 318.24
Antagonistic 155.97 0.09 0.82 334.12
Substitutable 155.43 0.09 0.82 335.10
period), and then examine how well the model forecasts content dynamics in the next 12
months. We validate the forecasting capability by examining the overall prediction error
(NRMSE).
We compute the prediction NRMSE across all Stack Exchange sites, and summarize the
results using the mean (µ) and variance (σ)— (i) question: µ = 0.11, σ = 0.08; (ii) answer:
µ = 0.12, σ = 0.09; (iii) comments: µ = 0.11, σ = 0.10. Notice that our models can forecast
future content dynamics with high accuracy. We performed these experiments for different
time granularity, e.g., week, month, quarter, and reached a consistent conclusion. We do
not report these results for brevity.
3.7 CHARACTERIZING KNOWLEDGE MARKETS
In this section, we characterize the knowledge markets in Stack Exchange. We explain the
best-fit models and their foundations (Section 3.7.1), reveal two key distributions that control




First, we explain the best-fit models found in Section 3.6.1. We observe that content
generation in Stack Exchange markets are best modeled through the combination of power
basis and interactive essential interaction. In addition, we found that the best-fit exponents
(λ parameter in basis g(x) = axλ, where x is a factor) of these models lie between 0 and 1
(inclusive), for all factors of all content types, for all Stack Exchange markets.
A model that uses the power basis (where exponents lie between 0 and 1) and interactive
essential interaction is known as the Cobb-Douglas production function [73]. In its most
standard form for production of a single output z with two inputs x1 and x2, the function
is as follows.
z = axλ11 x
λ2
2 (3.10)
Here, the coefficient a represents the total factor productivity—the portion of output not
explained by the amount of inputs used in production [73]. As such, its level is determined
by how efficiently the inputs are utilized in production. The exponents λi represent the output
elasticity of the inputs—the percentage change in output that results from the percentage
change in a particular input [73].
The Cobb-Douglas function provides intuitive explanation for content generation in Stack
Exchange markets. In particular, the explanation stands on three phenomena or principles:
constant elasticity, diminishing returns, and returns to scale.
Constant Elasticity. In Stack Exchange markets, factors such as user participation and
content dependency have constant elasticity—percentage increase in any of these inputs will
have constant percentage increase in output [73], as claimed by the corresponding exponents




a ), a 1% increase in number
of answerers (Ua) leads to a 0.65% increase in number of answers (Na).
Diminishing Returns. For a particular factor, when the exponent is less than 1, we
observe diminishing returns—decrease in the marginal (incremental) output as an input
is incrementally increased, while the other inputs are kept constant [73]. This “law of
diminishing returns” has many interesting implications for the Stack Exchange markets,
including the diminishing benefit of having a new participant in a market. For example,
in academia, if the number of answerers is 100, then the marginal contribution of a new
answerer is c(1010.65 − 1000.65) = 0.129c, where c is a constant; in contrast, if the number of
answerers is 110, then the marginal contribution of a new answerer is c(1110.65 − 1100.65) =
0.125c. Thus, for answer generation in academia, including a participant when the number
of participants (system size) is 110 is likely to be less beneficial compared to including a
participant when the system size is 100.
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Returns to scale. The knowledge markets in Stack Exchange vary in terms of scale
efficiency, as manifested by their returns to scale—the increase in output resulting from a
proportionate increase in all inputs [73]. If a market has high returns to scale, then greater
efficiency is obtained as the market moves from small- to large-scale operations. For example,
in academia, for answer generation, the returns to scale is 0.18 + 0.65 = 0.83 < 1. The
market becomes less efficient as answer generation is expanded, requiring more questions
and answerers to increase the number of answers by same amount.
3.7.2 Two Key Distributions
Next, we discuss two key distributions that control content generation in knowledge mar-
kets, namely participant activity and subject POV (perspective). These two distributions
induce the three phenomena reported in section 3.7.1.
Participant Activity. The distribution of participant activities implicitly drives a mar-
ket’s return in terms of user participation, as manifested by the corresponding exponent.
For example, in a hypothetical knowledge market where each answerer contributes equally,




a . In reality, the distribution of par-
ticipant activities is a size dependent distribution controlled by the number of participants
(system size). As the system size increases, most participants contribute to the head of the
distribution (few activities), whereas very few join the tail (many activities).
We systematically reveal the size dependent distribution for participant activities in three
steps. First, we empirically a fit power-law distribution to the activities of participants in a
month, for each month, for each Stack Exchange market. We follow the standard procedure
to fit a power-law distribution [74]. We observe that the power-law well describes the monthly
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Figure 3.3: The visibility of size dependent distribution: strong—android; moderate—
apple; and weak—biology. In most Stack Exchange markets, the power-law exponent
decreases with system size, similar to android. In other markets, there exists a non-zero
correlation between system size and power-law exponent.
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activity distributions. Second, we plot the exponents of the power-law against the number
of participants for all observed months in a market, for each market in Stack Exchange. We
observe that for most Stack Exchange markets, the power-law exponent decreases as the
system size increases. Third, we apply linear regression to reveal the relationship between
power-law exponent and system size. We observe that in general power-law exponent is
negatively correlated with system size. This negative correlation is strongly visible in big
knowledge markets that have at least 500 monthly participants in each month.
In Figure 3.3 we present empirical evidence of the size dependent distribution for answer
generation in three Stack Exchange markets: android, apple, and biology. We choose
these examples to cover three possible visibilities of the size dependent distribution, as
manifested by the correlation between the power-law exponent and system size—strong
correlation (|r2| ≥ 0.5), moderate correlation (0.3 ≤ |r2| < 0.5), and weak correlation
(|r2| < 0.3).
Subject POV. The distribution of subject POV implicitly drives a market’s return in
terms of content dependency, as manifested by the corresponding exponent. Subject POV
refers to the number of distinct perspectives on a particular content (e.g., questions) that
imposes a conceptual limit to the number of dependent contents (e.g., answers). For example,
an open-ended question such as ‘What’s your favorite book?’ has many possible answers,
whereas a close-ended question such as ‘What’s the solution for 3x+5 = 2?’ has a single
correct answer. In reality, most questions are neither completely open-ended nor completely
closed; however, from an answerer’s perspective, there’s a diminishing utility in answering
a question that already has an answer. This diminishing utility varies from question to
question—questions asking for recommendations attract many answers, whereas questions
seeking factual information attract few answers.
3.7.3 Uncovering the Stable Core
We uncover a stable user community in each Stack Exchange market, that maintains the
dynamic equilibria—the increase or decrease in overall user community does not affect the
Cobb-Douglas models. We assert that this stable user community generates a large fraction
of high-threshold contents that require more effort, e.g, answers and comments, whereas the
remaining users are unstable and contribute a small fraction of high-threshold contents.
We reveal the presence of the stable core by summarizing the answer contribution of users
with different tenure levels (# of active months). First, for each Stack Exchange market, we
apply equal-width binning to categorize its users into five tenure levels. Then, we plot the
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Figure 3.4: The distribution of monthly answer contribution of users with different # of
active months, for android. The users who contribute for many months also contribute a
large number of answers.
plot. We present the letter-value plots for android in Figure 3.4. We observe that monthly
answer contribution is an increasing function of tenure level—the users who contribute for
many months also contribute a large number of answers.
3.8 FAILURES AT SCALE
In this section, we discuss how and why knowledge markets may fail at scale. We first
empirically examine diseconomies of scale (Section 3.8.1), then analyze the effects of scale
on market health (Section 3.8.2), and finally study user exchangeability under scale changes
(Section 3.8.3).
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Figure 3.5: Diseconomies/economies of scale: the ratio of answers to questions decreas-
ing/increasing with the increase in number of users. Most Stack Exchange markets exhibit
diseconomies of scale. Examples: strong diseconomies—superuser; weak economies—
puzzling; and strong economies—cstheory.
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3.8.1 Diseconomies of Scale
First, we examine disceconomies of scale—the ratio of answers to questions declining with
the increase in number of users. The opposite of diseconomies is economies, when the ratio
increases with the increase in number of users. The concept of diseconomies is important
because a decrease in the answer to question ratio implies an increase in the gap between
market supply (answer) and demand (question). In fact, if the ratio falls below 1.0, the gap
becomes critical—guaranteeing there will be some questions with no answers.
In Figure 3.5 we present the economies and diseconomies of scale in three Stack Exchange
markets: cstheory, puzzling and superuser. We choose these examples to cover three
cases: strong diseconomies, strong economies, and weak economies. Among the three mar-
kets, superuser shows strong diseconomies of scale: if the number of users increases by 1%,
then the answer to question ratio declines by 0.95%. The other two markets show economies
of scale, where cstheory shows strong economies: if the number of users increases by 1%,
then the answer to question ratio increases by 0.8%; and puzzling shows weak economies:
if the the number of users increases by 1%, then the answer to question ratio increases by
0.2%. Note that most markets, especially the ones with more than 500 monthly active par-
ticipants, exhibit diseconomies of scale similar to superuser. Only five markets exhibit
strong economies of scale in Stack Exchange: cstheory, expressionengine, puzzling,
ja stackoverflow, and softwareengineering.
The Cobb-Douglas curves well fit the empirical trends of economies and diseconomies
(as shown in Figure 3.5). We derive these curves by dividing the answer models by the
corresponding question models, and subsequently developing curves that capture economies
and diseconomies (Na/q) as a function of number of users (system size).
The Cobb-Douglas models well explain the economies and diseconomies of scale. As per
the models, the primary cause of diseconomies is the difference between the diminishing
returns of questions and answers for user participation. In other words, in most markets, for
user input, the marginal question output is higher compared to the marginal answer output,
i.e., an average user is likely to ask more questions and provide few answers. This causes
the ratio of answers to questions to decline with an increase in the number of users.
3.8.2 Analyzing Health
Next, we examine the disadvantage of scale through two health metrics: H1—the fraction
of answered questions (questions with at least one answer); and H2—the fraction of questions
with an accepted answer (questions for which the asker marked an answer as accepted). H1
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and H2 capture the true gap between market supply (answers) and demand (questions).
An increase in the number of users may cause a decline in H1 and H2, as both metrics are
related to the ratio of answers to questions. In fact, if the ratio falls below 1.0, it guarantees
the decline of both metrics.
In Figure 6.4 we present the health advantage and disadvantage of scale (through H1 and
H2) for three Stack Exchange markets: cstheory, puzzling and superuser. We observe
that the results are consistent with our analysis of economies and diseconomies—cstheory
exhibits health advantage at scale, puzzling remains stable, whereas superuser exhibits
disadvantage at scale. These three examples cover the possible health effects of scale in
knowledge markets.
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Figure 3.6: Health disadvantage/advantage of scale: H1—the fraction of answered questions,
and H2—the fraction of questions with accepted answer, decreasing/increasing with the in-
crease in number of users. Most Stack Exchange markets exhibit health disadvantage at scale.
Examples: disadvantage—superuser; neutral—puzzling; and advantage—cstheory.
3.8.3 Effects on Exchangeability
Finally, we empirically study the effects of scale on user exchangeability. By exchange-
ability, we specifically mean the gap between the top contributors and other participants
in a knowledge market. Studying this gap is important because it can reveal if a market’s
success or failure depends on a small group of users.
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Figure 3.7: User exchangeability under scale: the gap (E1 and E2) between the top con-
tributors and other participants in a knowledge market decreasing or increasing with the
increase in number of users. Most markets exhibit a large gap between the top contributors
and other participants. Examples: high dissimilarity—superuser; moderate dissimilarity—
puzzling; and low dissimilarity—cstheory.
To empirically study user exchangeability, we define two metrics that reflect the gap
between the top contributors and other participants in a knowledge market. Note that,
we only consider the active participants who contributed at least one content. The first
metric E1 is defined as the ratio of contribution between the top 5% and the bottom 5% of
users. For computing E1, we measure the contribution of a user v as the ratio N
v
a/q of the
number of answers N va provided by the user to the number of questions N
v
q asked by the user.
Notice that E1 is a ratio based metric and we define user contribution to be consistent with
this metric. The second metric E2 is defined as the sum of two distances: (i) the distance
between the contribution of the top 5% of users and the median 5% of users, and (ii) the
distance between the contribution of the median 5% of users and the bottom 5% of users.





of the number of answers N va provided by the user and the number of questions N
v
q asked
by the user. Notice that E2 is an interval based metric and we define user contribution
to be consistent with this metric. While both metrics have certain limitations, e.g., they
are sensitive to outliers, these metrics allow us to comprehend user exchegeability to some
extent.
36
In Figure 3.7 we present the exchangeability of users under scale changes (through E1 and
E2) for three Stack Exchange markets: cstheory, puzzling and superuser. Among the
three markets, superuser exhibits the highest gap between the top contributors and the
other participants. However, as the number of participants increases, this gap decreases, i.e.,
the users become more exchangeable. In contrast, cstheory exhibits the lowest gap between
the top contributors and the other participants. However, as the number of participants
increase, this gap increases, i.e., the users become less exchangeable.
3.9 IMPLICATIONS
Our work promotes two new research directions—size-dependent mechanism design and
content dependency in social media—while advancing several others—metrics of market
health, power law of participation, and microfoundations of knowledge markets.
Size-Dependent Mechanism Design. We reveal that the health of a knowledge market
depends on the market’s size. A natural implication of this dependency is that site operators
should adjust mechanisms based on the number of participants. For example, a site operator
can decide between retaining existing users (via incentives) and attracting new users (via
advertising) based on the number of participants and their activity distribution.
Content Dependency in Social Media. We observe that many social media plat-
forms support several possible user actions with “complex dependencies”. For example,
in Facebook, a post is the root content (primary), comments on the post nest below the
post (secondary), and replies to these comments nest beneath the original comments (ter-
tiary). Further, a user can react to any of these content types with several possible reactions.
Overall user activity in Facebook is distributed across these possible actions with complex
dependencies, which drives the platform’s health.
Metrics of Market Health. We demonstrate the presence of diseconomies of scale with
several metrics that partially capture the health of a knowledge market. While we con-
centrate on content-generation based production metrics, our concepts can be extended for
page-view based consumption metrics as well. Also, there is room for developing new health
metrics that capture a more detailed picture of a knowledge market’s health including mar-
ket efficiency—the degree to which market price (amount of responses and reactions) is an
unbiased estimate of the true value of the investment (user effort in content generation) [75].
Power Law of Participation. In Stack Exchange markets, a small fraction of the
user community participate in high-engagement activities (e.g., linking similar questions),
whereas the larger fraction participate in low-threshold activities (e.g., voting). This asym-
metry leads to a Power Law of Participation [76]. We assert that both low-threshold and
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high-engagement activities are required for a knowledge market’s survival, and should pro-
portionately increase with the increase in number of participants. However, in reality, for
most knowledge markets, the size of the user community contributing high-engagement ac-
tivities does not scale with the system size. This creates a “gap” between market supply
and demand, and consequently affects market health.
Microfoundations of Knowledge Markets. The size-dependent distribution of user
contribution implies that users who join a community later in its lifecycle exhibit different
behavior than those who were present from the beginning. This very well may imply that
the distribution of individual user behaviors (not just their overall production) is “also” a
function of the system size. We should expect to see a stable user behavior distribution over
time for markets that appear to be more scale-insensitive; preliminary results suggest that
this may indeed be the case [77].
3.10 LIMITATIONS
We discuss several limitations of our work. First, the economic production models do
not account for user growth. While there exist several user growth models for two-sided
markets [48], membership based websites [17], and online social networks [15, 16, 18], it
would be useful to introduce economic user growth models that complement our proposed
content generation models. Specifically, there is a need to develop resource-based user growth
models that account for market health. A potential direction in this research is to extend
the Malthusian growth model [78]. Second, the proposed production models inherit the
fundamental assumptions of macroeconomics: an aggregate is homogeneous (without looking
into its internal composition), and aggregates are functionally related etc. [79]. It would be
useful to empirically study these assumptions for real-world knowledge markets.
3.11 CONCLUSION
In this study, we examined the CQA websites on Stack Exchange platform through an
economic lens by modeling them as knowledge markets. In particular, we designed a set
of production models to capture the content generation dynamics in these markets. The
resulting best-fit model, Cobb-Douglas, predicts the production of content in Stack Exchange
markets with high accuracy. We showed that the model provides intuitive explanations for
content generation. Specifically, it reveals that factors of content generation such as user
participation and content dependency have constant elasticity ; in many markets, factors
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exhibit diminishing returns ; markets vary according to their returns to scale; and finally
many markets exhibit diseconomies of scale. We further investigated these prognoses by
showing the presence of diseconomies of scale in terms of content production, and several
measures of market health. The implications of our work are two-fold: site operators need to
design incentives as a function of number of participants; there is a need to develop Economic
lenses that can shed insights into the complex dependencies amongst different content types
and participant actions in general social networks.
In this chapter, we showed how users generate content. As the size of a community grows,
new users do not contribute as much as old users. In the next chapter, we will learn more
about the reason why new users do not contribute.
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CHAPTER 4: QUANTIFYING VOTER BIASES
Our first study showed that users who join a Stack Exchange site more recently contribute
fewer answers per month than those who joined at an early stage. This observation raises
the question: is there any discrepancy between the motivation and perhaps the incentives
of old users and newcomers. Specifically, could it be that what is causing the newcomers
to give up is not the poor quality of their content but the biased social judgment of their
peers? This chapter discusses our second study, where we examine biases in social judgment,
specifically in the form of votes.
4.1 INTRODUCTION
In many online platforms, users receive up- and down- votes on content from fellow com-
munity members. An aggregate of the votes is commonly used as a proxy for content quality
in a variety of applications, such as search and recommendation [80, 81, 82, 83]. The princi-
ple of the wisdom of the crowds underlies this quantification, where the mean of judgments
on content tends to its true value. The principle rests on the assumption that individuals
can make independent judgments, and that the crowd comprises agents with heterogeneous
cognitive abilities [84].
However, in most online platforms, individuals are prone to using cognitive heuristics that
influence their voting behavior and prevent independent judgments [85, 86]. These heuristics
incorporate different impression signals adjacent to the content—such as the reputation of
the contributing user [87], aggregate vote thus far [88], and position of content [89]—as
input to help individuals make quick decisions about the quality of content. Prior literature
suggests that the use of impression signals as shortcuts to make voting decisions results
in biases [88, 89], where the aggregate of votes becomes an unreliable measure for content
quality. We designate these biases as voter biases, which stem from the use of impression
signals by voters.
There is a plethora of research on detecting and quantifying voter biases in online plat-
forms [13, 85, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98]. Broadly, researchers have adopted
one of the following two approaches: 1) conduct experiments to create different voting con-
ditions for studying participants [13, 88, 89, 90, 91, 93, 98]; 2) develop statistical models
to analyze historical voting data [85, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97]. Both approaches have limitations.
First, it is hard to perform randomized experiments in actual platforms due to feasibility,
ethical issue, or cost [99]. In addition, researchers not employed at a social media platform
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are at a disadvantage in conducting such experiments on that platform. Second, statistical
models on voter biases often lack causal validity: the derived estimates measure only the
magnitude of association, rather than the magnitude and direction of causation required for
quantifying voter biases. These limitations of prior research motivate the present work.
Present Work. In this study, we quantify the degree of voter biases in online platforms.
We concentrate on three distinct biases that appear in many platforms—namely, reputation
bias, social influence bias, and position bias. Reputation bias captures how the reputation
of a user who creates content affects the aggregate vote on that content; social influence bias
captures how the initial votes affect the subsequent votes on the same content; position bias
captures how the position of content affects the aggregate vote. We study these biases in
an observational setting, where we estimate the causal effects of their associated impression
signals on the observed votes.
The key idea of our approach is to formulate voter bias quantification as a causal in-
ference problem. Motivated by the successes of the instrumental variable (IV) framework
in studying causal phenomena in Economics and other social science disciplines—e.g., how
education affects earnings [100], how campaign spending affects senate elections [101], and
how income inequality affects corruption [102]—we adopt the IV framework to solve our bias
quantification problem. The IV framework consists of four components: outcome (dependent
variable), exposure (independent variable), instrument (a variable that affects the outcome
only through the exposure), and control (other covariates of interest). We operationalize
these IV components using variables compiled from log data. We use impression signals as
exposure, aggregate feedback as the outcome, and estimate the causal effect of exposure on
the outcome by identifying proper instrument and control.
Identifying an instrument is hard [103]. A valid instrument must satisfy three conditions
as follows. First, the relevance condition requires the instrument to be correlated with the
exposure. Second, the exclusion restriction requires that the instrument does not affect the
outcome directly. Third, the marginal exchangeability requires that the instrument and the
outcome do not share causes. Of these three conditions, only the relevance condition is
empirically verifiable; the remaining two conditions need to be justified through argumen-
tation [104]. Using large-scale log data from Stack Exchange websites, we identify a set
of nuanced instrumental variables for quantifying voter biases. We carefully analyze our
proposed instruments to reason about their ability to meet the three instrumental condi-
tions and then select a final set of instruments. We use the final instruments to estimate the
causal effects of impression signals on the observed votes using two-stage least squares (2SLS)
regression. These regression coefficients provide unbiased causal estimates for quantifying
voter biases.
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This study makes the following contributions.
Bias quantification. We quantify three types of voter biases by estimating the causal
effects of impression signals on the aggregate of votes. Prior research has either used
randomized experiments or statistical modeling for quantifying voter biases. While
the former can help us identify causal effects, randomized trials are not an option
for researchers who work outside the social media platform with observational data.
Statistical models help us identify correlation, not causation. In contrast, we use an
instrumental variable framework by first identifying a set of instrumental variables
and then carefully analyzing their validity. The significance of our contribution lies in
our framework’s ability to identify from observational data, causal factors (impression
signals) that affect an individual’s vote.
Findings. We find that prior work on bias estimation with observational data has signifi-
cantly underestimated the degree to which factors influence an individual’s vote. Our
empirical results show that OLS underestimates reputation bias (1.6–2.2x for gold
badges) and position bias (up to 1.9x for the initial position), and overestimates social
influence bias (1.8–2.3x for initial votes). Furthermore, we find that different impres-
sion signals vary in their effect: the badge type (gold, silver, bronze) plays a bigger
role in influencing the vote than does reputation score. Also, we find the degree to
which each impression signal influences vote depends on the community. This result
is significant for two reasons: first, the influence of some of these factors is much
more (∼100% more) than previously understood from statistical models on observa-
tional data; despite statistical models estimating regression coefficients, prior work
used these coefficients to impute causation, an incorrect inference. Second, had plat-
forms attempted to de-bias with results from prior work, they would have significantly
underestimated the effects of reputation and answer position.
Significance. Our identification of causal factors that influence votes has a significant
bearing on research in voter bias in particular, as well as the broader CSCW community.
First, there are practical implications. Impression signals (answer position, user reputation,
prior vote) play a significant role in influencing an individual’s vote, at times twice as much
as previously understood. Furthermore, the effect of these signals varies by community type
(with different content and social norms governing discussions). Second, our work has impli-
cations on the future interface design of these platforms. For example, these platforms may
conceal impression signals prior to the vote, or delay the vote itself to address social influ-
ence bias. Future research is needed, however, to understand the effect of these suggestions.
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Third, our work informs policy. By identifying causal factors, our work offers social media
platforms a way to transparently de-bias votes. The de-biasing may be community depen-
dent. Finally, by introducing the instrumental variable approach to the CSCW community,
to identify causal factors from observational data, we hope that more researchers will adopt
it to study other questions of interest: e.g., gender and racial bias online.
The rest of this study is organized as follows. We define our problem in Section 4.2 and
discuss the related work in Section 4.3. We describe our data in Section 4.4. We then
explain how our method works in Section 4.5. Section 4.6 reports the results of our study.
We discuss the implications of our research in Section 4.7 and the limitations in Section 6.5.
Finally, we conclude in Section 6.6.
4.2 VOTER BIAS
The goal of this study is to quantify the degree of voter biases in online platforms. We
concentrate on three distinct biases: reputation bias, social influence bias, and position bias.
To quantify these biases, we estimate the causal effects of their associated signals on the
observed votes. In Figure 4.1, we present a sample page from English Stack Exchange,
annotated with different signals that may induce the above-mentioned biases.
Reputation Bias. In content-based platforms (such as Stack Exchange and Reddit),
reputation system incorporates the votes on content into the content creator’s reputa-
tion [105, 106]. In Stack Exchange, for example, votes on content translate into reputation
score and badges for the contributing user [30, 105]. The reputation score and badges ac-
quired by each user are visible to all community members, who may use this information
to infer the quality of the user’s future contributions. Inferring content quality based on
user reputation forms the basis of reputation bias—when the reputation of a user influences
the votes he/she receives on content. We know from prior work that reputation exhibits a
Matthew effect [107]: early reputation increases the chances of future reputation via upvotes.
Consider a counterfactual scenario, where two users with different levels of reputation create
“identical” content; then, reputation bias implies that the user with a higher reputation will
receive more upvotes.
Social Influence Bias. The concept of social influence in collective action is well-
known [91]: contrary to the wisdom of the crowds principle, individuals do not make inde-
pendent decisions; instead, their decision is influenced by the prior decision of peers. Social
influence affects a variety of user activities in online platforms, including voting behavior on
content [85, 86, 88, 96]. Since most platforms reveal the aggregate vote thus far, the initial
votes act as a social signal to influence the subsequent voters, forming the basis of social
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Figure 4.1: A sample page from English Stack Exchange, annotated with different signals
that may induce voter biases. For all answers to a question: 1) the score at top left corner
shows the aggregate vote thus far (social signal), which may induce social influence bias; 2)
the statistics at bottom right corner shows the reputation score and badges acquired by the
answerer (reputation signal), which may induce reputation bias; 3) the answers are presented
in a sequential order (position signal), which may induce position bias.
influence bias. We know from prior work that for platforms that reveal social signal, users
exhibit a herding effect [13]: the first few votes on content can unduly skew the subsequent
votes. Consider a counterfactual scenario, where two “identical” content initially receive
dissimilar votes; then, social influence bias implies that the content with higher aggregate
vote thus far will receive more upvotes.
Position Bias. Many online platforms present content in some order, using a list-style
format. For example, in Stack Exchange, answers are sorted based on the aggregate vote
thus far. The position of content in a list-style format plays a critical role in deciding how
many users will pay attention to it, and interact with it via clicks [108] or votes [89]. Users
pay more attention to items at the top of a list, creating a skewed model of interaction for
the items. A consequence of this skewed interaction is position bias—when the position of
content influences the votes on it. Consider a counterfactual scenario, where two “identical”
content are located in different positions within a web page; then, position bias implies that
the content at the higher position will receive more upvotes.
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Relationship between Social Influence and Position. In many platforms, the pre-
sentation order of content depends on the aggregate user feedback. In Stack Exchange sites,
the default presentation order of answers is the aggregate vote thus far. Quora uses a wide
variety of factors to decide the order of answers, including the upvotes and downvotes on the
answers. Such vote-dependent ordering scheme imposes a critical challenge in estimating the
causal effects of social influence signal and position signal, as the two signals vary together.
As such, the lack of longitudinal variation in the relationship between the two signals makes
it difficult to isolate the effects of their corresponding biases.
4.3 RELATED WORK
Our work draws from and improves upon, a rich literature on online voting behavior and
voter biases. Since this study focuses on quantifying voter biases, we provide a taxonomy
of related work on voter biases (Table 4.1). We now discuss several pioneering works on
understanding voting behavior and voter biases.
Voting Behavior. Recent research has made significant advancements towards the un-
derstanding of rating and voting behaviors in online platforms [109, 110, 111, 112, 113].
Gilbert [109] reported the widespread underprovisioning of votes on Reddit : the users over-
looked 52% of the most popular links the first time they were submitted. Using data from
Amazon product reviews, Sipos et al. [110] showed that users do not make independent
voting decisions. Instead, the decision to vote and the polarity of vote depend on the con-
text : a review receives more votes if it is misranked, and the polarity of votes becomes more
positive/negative with the degree of misranking. Glenski et al. [112] found that most Reddit
users do not read the article that they vote on. In a later work, Glenski et al. [113] used
an Internet game called GuessTheKarma to collect independent preference judgments (free
from social and ranking effects) for 400 pairs of images. They found that Reddit scores are
not very good predictors of the actual preferences for items as measured by GuessTheKarma.
In this study, we examine three distinct cognitive biases that affect user voting behavior.
We quantify these biases by estimating the causal effects of their associated signals on the
observed votes.
Reputation Bias. Prior works on online reputation suggest that past reputation may be
useful in predicting current success [87, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118] (also known as “superstar
economics” [119]). Beuscart et al. [87] observed that in MySpace Music, most of the audience
is focused on a few stars. These stars are established music artists who signed on major
labels. Based on a user study on Twitter, Pal et al. [114] reported that the popular users
get a boost in their authority rating due to the “name value”. Tausczik et al. [115] found
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that in MathOverflow, both offline and online reputation are correlated with the perceived
quality of contributions. Paul et al. [116] found that Quora users judge the reputation of
other users based on their past contributions. Liang [117] showed that in Reddit, users
with higher comment karma tend to produce questions and comments with higher ratings.
Budzinski et al. [118] analyzed a sample of YouTube stars to show that past success positively
and significantly influences current success. While these prior studies show the evidence of
reputation bias, they do not provide any bias quantification. In this study, we provide a
quantification of reputation bias through causal estimates.
Table 4.1: A taxonomy of existing literature on voter biases.
Bias Approach References Summary
Reputation Correlation [87], [114], Show some evidence of correlation between a
Bias Study [115], [116], user’s past reputation and current success
[117], [118] [87, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118].
Social Randomized [90], [91], Create different decision making (say voting)
Influence Experiment [93], [98], conditions for study participants by varying the
Bias [13] availability of preceding decisions [90, 91, 98], and
purposefully engineered initial decision [13, 93].
AMT [88], [120], Simulate alternative voting conditions of platform
Simulation [86] in Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) by varying
the availability of preceding decisions [86, 88, 120].
Statistical [92], [94], Develop statistical model for quantifying bias:
Model [95], [96], Pólya Urn [92, 97], nonparametric significance
[97], [85] test [94], additive generative model [95], Poisson
regression [96], logistic regression [85].
Matching [121], [122] Contrast aggregate user feedback (say ratings)
Method on the same object in two different platforms
via matching [122].
Position Randomized [89], [88], Create different decision making (say voting)
Bias Experiment [98] conditions for study participants by varying
content ordering policies [88, 89, 98]
Statistical [96], [97], Develop statistical model for studying bias:
Model [123] Poisson regression [96], Pólya Urn [97],
counterfactual inference [123].
Matching [124], [108] Contrast aggregate user feedback (say ratings)
Method for objects occupying similar positions [108, 124].
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Social Influence Bias. Since the musiclab experiment by Salganik et al. [90], a large
body of work has been devoted to the social influence bias [85, 86, 88, 91, 92, 93, 94, 96, 97,
98, 121], and its resultant herding effect [13, 95, 120, 122]. A majority of the work tends to
fall into one of two categories—1) Experimental Study: randomized experiment [13, 90, 91,
93, 98], simulation via Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) [86, 88, 120]; and 2) Observational
Study: statistical model [85, 92, 94, 95, 96, 97], matching method [121, 122]. Randomized
experiments provide a nuanced way to quantify the degree of social influence bias in online
platforms; however, often, these experiments are infeasible due to ethical issues, or cost.
AMT based simulations fall short in representing the actual voting conditions of a platform.
Prior observational studies have used a wide variety of statistical models—Pólya Urn [92, 97],
nonparametric significance test [94], additive generative model [95], Poisson regression [96],
logistic regression [85]—for quantifying social influence bias. However, these studies lack
causal validation: the estimates measure only the magnitude of association, rather than
the magnitude and direction of causation. For example, in a regression-based herd model,
herding behavior could be correlated with the intrinsic quality of content [97]. Therefore,
it is difficult to separate the social influence bias from the inherent quality and quantify
its effect. In this study, we adopt the method of instrumental variables to quantify social
influence bias.
Position Bias. In recent years, there has been significant interest in studying position
bias in online platforms [88, 89, 96, 97, 98, 108, 123, 124]. Notably, researchers performed
several experimental studies in AMT, where they created different voting conditions for
study participants by varying content ordering policies [88, 89, 98]. Hogg et al. [88] revealed
that social signals affect item popularity about half as much as position and content do.
Abeliuk et al. [98] showed that the unpredictability of voting outcome is a consequence of
the ordering policy. Lerman et al. [89] found that different policies for ordering content could
improve peer recommendation by steering user attention. In this study, we study position
bias in an observation setup, in which it is difficult to isolate the position bias from the social
influence bias. To address this problem, we develop a joint IV model that quantifies both
position bias and social influence bias.
4.4 DATA AND VARIABLES
In this section, we first discuss the choice of our data source (Section 4.4.1), then describe
the datasets that we use in this study (Section 4.4.2); and finally present the variables that
we accumulate from the datasets (Section 4.4.3).
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4.4.1 Choice of Data Source
We seek online platforms that satisfy the following criteria: content is user-generated and
integral to the platform’s success, the position of content and reputation of the contributing
user depend upon votes, and the user interface contains various impression signals that
may influence the votes. Content-based online platforms such as Quora, Reddit, and Stack
Exchange satisfy these criteria. Among them, Reddit and Stack Exchange have publicly
available datasets.
We selected the Stack Exchange dataset over Reddit for the following reasons: 1) the Stack
Exchange dataset is a complete archive with no missing data (prior work [125] indicates that
the Reddit dataset is not complete), which prevents potential selection bias; 2) the governing
rules are the same for all Stack Exchange sites (in contrast, subreddits can have different
governing rules), which allows us to compare the results across different Stack Exchanges;
and 3) the incentives in Stack Exchange sites have been designed for getting to a “correct”
answer to a question rather than invoking a discussion as is sometimes the case in Reddit,
which makes the Stack Exchange content more focused.
4.4.2 Stack Exchange Dataset
Stack Exchange is a network of community question answering websites, where millions
of users regularly ask and answer questions on a variety of topics. In addition to asking
and answering questions, users can also evaluate answers by voting for them. The votes, in
aggregate, reflect the community’s feedback about the quality of content and are used by
Stack Exchange to recognize the most helpful answers.
Table 4.2: Descriptive statistics for the selected Stack Exchange sites.
Site Category # Users # Questions # Answers
English Culture 169,037 87,679 210,338
Superuser Technology 547,175 356,866 529,214
Math Science 356,699 822,059 1,160,697
Use of Published Data. We obtained Stack Exchange data from https://archive.
org/details/stackexchange on September 2017 (published by Stack Exchange under the
CC BY-SA 3.0 license). This snapshot is a complete archive of user-contributed content on
the Stack Exchange network. In this study, we analyze three Stack Exchange sites: English,
Superuser, and Math.
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Inclusion Criteria. We select the above-mentioned sites for several reasons. First,
the three sites represent the three major themes or categories in Stack Exchange: culture
[English], technology [Superuser], and science [Math]. Second, apart from Superuser,
the remaining two sites are the largest in their category in terms of the number of answers.
Superuser is the second largest site in its category, followed by StackOverflow; we
discard StackOverflow due to its massive scale difference in comparison to the remaining
sites. Third, the sites vary in terms of their susceptibility to voter biases, owing to content
that requires interpretation. For example, the quality of answers in English is a lot more
subjective compared to the quality of answers in Math. Table 4.2 presents descriptive
statistics for the three sites analyzed in this study.
4.4.3 Variables
In Stack Exchange sites, questions and answers are the primary content. Answer quality
is especially important for these platforms as they thrive to provide answers. For this reason,
we analyze the votes on answers. We compile a wide range of variables to capture the voter
biases, the factors related to these biases, and the potential effects of these biases. Table 4.3
describes the variables used in this study.
4.5 METHOD
In this section, we first discuss our choice of method for voter bias quantification (Sec-
tion 4.5.1), then explain the fundamentals of the chosen method (Section 4.5.2); and finally
present our models for quantifying voter bias (Section 4.5.3 and 4.5.4)
4.5.1 Choice of Method
The goal of this study is to quantify the degree of voter biases in online platforms. To
determine these biases, we need to estimate the causal effects of different impression signals
on the observed votes. Estimating causal effects from observational data is exceptionally
challenging [126]. The main reason is that there may exist hidden confounders that affect
both independent (say impression signal) and dependent (observed votes) variables. A hid-
den confounder may explain the degree of association between the variables, which prevents
standard regressions methods from providing causal estimates [103, 126]. We observe that
our voter bias quantification problem is susceptible to several hidden confounders, such as
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Table 4.3: The description of variables used in this study. The variables fall into four groups
based on the following constructs: site (the Stack Exchange site), question (the question
that has been addressed by the answer), answer (the answer in consideration), and answerer
(the user who created the answer).
ID Variable Description
V1 Site The Stack Exchange site in consideration
V2 T The limiting time of bias formation specific to the question
V3 QuestionViewCount No. of users who viewed the question
V4 QuestionFavoriteCount No. of users who favorited the question
V5 QuestionScore Aggregate vote (total upvotes - total downvotes) on the question
V6 QuestionScoreT- Aggregate vote on the question before time T
V7 QuestionScoreT+ Aggregate vote on the question after time T
V8 QuestionCommentCount No. of comments on the question
V9 QuestionCommentCountT- No. of comments on the question before time T
V10 QuestionCommentCountT+ No. of comments on the question after time T
V11 QuestionAnswerCount No. of answers to the question
V12 QuestionAnswerCountT- No. of answers to the question before time T
V13 QuestionAnswerCountT+ No. of answers to the question after time T
V14 AnswerDayOfWeek The day of answer creation
V15 AnswerTimeOfDay The time of answer creation
V16 AnswerEpoch Time gap between between the 1st post in site and the answer
V17 AnswerTimeliness Time gap between the question and the answer
V18 AnswerOrder Chronological order of the answer
V19 AnswerScore Aggregate vote on the answer
V20 AnswerScoreT- Aggregate vote on the answer before time T
V21 AnswerScoreT+ Aggregate vote on the answer after time T
V22 AnswerPosition Position of the answer based on the aggregate vote
V23 AnswerPositionT- Position of the answer before time T
V24 AnswerPositionT+ Position of the answer after time T
V25 AnswerCommentCount No. of comments on the answer
V26 AnswerCommentCountT- No. of comments on the answer before time T
V27 AnswerCommentCountT+ No. of comments on the answer after time T
V28 AnswererPostCount No. of posts (questions and answers) written by answerer
V29 AnswererAnswerCount No. of answers written by answerer
V30 AnswererActiveAge Time gap between between answerer’s 1st post and the answer
V31 AnswererReputation Total score of questions and answers written by answerer
V32 AnswererReputationViaAnswer Total score of answers written by answerer
V33 AnswererGoldCount No. of gold badges acquired by answerer
V34 AnswererSilverCount No. of silver badges acquired by answerer
V35 AnswererBronzeCount No. of bronze badges acquired by answerer
V36 AnswererBadgeDistribution [GoldCount, SilverCount, BronzeCount]
V37 AnsweredQuestionViewTotal No. of users who viewed past questions answered by answerer
V38 AnsweredQuestionFavoriteTotal No. of users who favorited past questions answered by answerer
V39 AnsweredQuestionScoreTotal Total score of past questions answered by answerer
V40 AnsweredQuestionCommentTotal No. of comments on past questions answered by answerer
V41 AnsweredQuestionAnswerTotal No. of answers to past questions answered by answerer
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the quality of the content (from the perspective of voters) and the ability of users (to gen-
erate high-quality content). These confounders (e.g., the ability of users) may affect both
the impression signals (e.g., the reputation of the contributing user) and the observed votes.
Ergo, we need to eliminate the effects of these confounders for estimating the causal effect.
The instrumental variable (IV) approach has been successfully used in the social sci-
ences [100, 101, 102] to estimate causal effects (e.g., how education affects earning [100],
how campaign spending affects senate selection [101], and how income inequality affects cor-
ruption [102]) from observational data. The IV method is especially useful for estimating
effects in the presence of hidden confounders [103, 104]. The technique requires identify-
ing candidate instruments that are correlated with the independent variable of interest. It
then relies on careful argumentation (thought experiments) to eliminate the candidate in-
struments that may affect the hidden confounders. This process implies that the remaining
instruments co-vary only with the independent variable, and cannot influence the dependent
variable through a hidden confounder. As such, instrumental variables allow us to estimate
causal effects, even in the presence of hidden confounders.
Prior research on voter biases regress aggregate vote on impression signals using ordinary
least squares (OLS) and interpret the regression coefficients as effects. However, OLS only
captures the correlation among variables; the resultant estimates are non-causal. For in-
stance, a positive OLS estimate corresponding to an impression signal does not imply that
the signal has a positive effect on the aggregate vote; the effect could be zero or even nega-
tive. This argument is especially applicable in the presence of hidden confounders. In fact,
in such a case, the OLS estimate is biased [103].
Table 4.4: The parallels between voter bias quantification and instrumental variable method.
IV Terminology Bias Terminology Example
Outcome Aggregate Feedback An aggregation (say sum or mean) of
votes on content
Exposure Impression Signal Reputation of the contributing user
in the form of scores and badges
Confounder Unobserved Quality What a voter assesses the quality
of the content to be
Regression Coefficient Voter Bias How the reputation of the contributing
user affects the aggregate vote
The key conceptual difference between the IV and OLS is: IV relies on argumentation to
reason about the underlying causal structure. If all we have access to is observational data,
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then careful argumentation is necessary to establish the causal structure. As pointed out by
Judea Pearl, “behind every causal conclusion there must lie some causal assumption that is
not testable in observational studies” [127]. As we can not conduct randomized control trials
on the actual platforms, and only have access to the observational data, IV is a reasonable
approach for estimating causal effects. Further, our problem aligns well with the use case
of IV: estimating causal effect in the presence of hidden confounders (In Table 4.4, we show
the parallels between our problem and IV). For these reasons, we adopt the IV method to
quantify voter biases.
4.5.2 Instrumental Variable Estimation
To motivate the use of IVs, we now explain a classic well-understood example: the causal
effect of education on earnings [100]. In general, education enables individuals to earn more
money, say through employment that is reserved for college graduates. One can estimate
the return to education by simply regressing the earnings of individuals on their education
level. However, this simplistic approach has a major limitation in the form of omitted
variable—the unobserved ability of individuals. Unobserved ability (confounder) might be
correlated with the level of education that an individual attains (exposure), and the wage
he/she receives (outcome). Specifically, higher intellectual ability increases the probability
of graduating from college, and individuals with more ability also tend to earn higher wages.
This complication is popularly known as the “ability bias” [100]. The ability bias suggests
that standard regression (OLS) coefficient would be a biased estimate of the causal effect of
education on earnings.
Over the past decades, researchers have attempted to solve the problem of “ability bias”
in a number of ways. Notably, a number of studies controlled for the effect of ability bias
directly by including measures of ability such as IQ and other test scores within the regression
model [128]. However, there are concerns over whether these types of variables are a good
proxy for wage-earning ability. An alternative strategy which has been the focus of much
of the literature is to identify one or more variables which affect education but do not
affect earnings either directly or indirectly through some other aspect. If such variables
can be found, they can be used as instrumental variables to derive a consistent estimate
of the return to education. A large body of literature has been devoted to identifying
proper instruments for estimating the causal effect of education on earnings. Some notable
instruments include—differences in education owing to the—proximity to college, quarter-
of-birth, and state variation when children have to commence compulsory schooling. A
consistent finding across IV studies is that the estimated return to education is 20-40%
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above the corresponding OLS estimate [100]. These IV studies motivate the question: could









Figure 4.2: General structure of an instrumental variable model. The paths from U to X,
and U to Y introduces confounding in estimating the causal effect of X on Y . For a valid
instrument Z, the pathways from Z to X, and X to Y must exist; whereas the pathways
from Z to U , and Z to Y must cease to exist.
Figure 4.2 depicts the general structure of an IV model. Designing an IV model requires
identifying a valid instrument Z—a variable to eliminate the effects of confounders—that
must satisfy the following conditions [104]:
1. Relevance Condition: The instrument Z is correlated with the exposure X. For exam-
ple, while estimating the causal effect of education on earnings, proximity to college
(Z) is correlated with college education (X).
2. Exclusion Restriction: The instrument Z does not affect the outcome Y directly,
except through its potential effect on the exposure X. This independence can be
conditional upon other covariates. For example, proximity to college (Z) should not
affect earnings (Y ), except through its effect on college education (X). One can argue
that—for people who work at college but are not college graduate themselves—the
independence of proximity to college from earnings depends on the job.
3. Marginal Exchangeability: The instrument Z and the outcome Y do not share causes.
For example, no common factor influences both proximity to college (Z) and earnings
(Y ).
Of the three instrumental conditions mentioned above, only the relevance condition is
empirically verifiable [104]. Therefore, in an observational study such as ours, we can not
test if a proposed instrument is a valid instrument. The best we can do is to use our subject
matter knowledge to build a case for why a proposed instrument may be reasonably assumed
to meet the exclusion restriction and marginal exchangeability.
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In IV literature, if the correlation between the instrument Z and the exposure X is strong,
then Z is called a strong instrument ; otherwise, it is called a weak instrument. A weak
instrument has three major limitations. First, a weak instrument yields parameter estimates
with a wide confidence interval. Second, any inconsistency from a small violation of the
exclusion restriction gets magnified by the weak instrument. Third, a weak instrument may
introduce bias in the estimation process and provide misleading inferences about parameter
estimates and standard errors. In this study, we seek a strong instrument for quantifying
each of the three voter biases.
In the remaining subsections, we develop IV models for reputation bias, social influence
bias, and position bias. For each voter bias, we operationalize the IV components (outcome,
exposure, instrument, and control) using our compiled variables (Table 1).
4.5.3 IV Model for Reputation Bias
We develop an IV model for quantifying reputation bias in Stack Exchange sites. We
estimate the causal effect of the reputation of the user who contributes an answer (exposure)
on the aggregate of votes on that answer (outcome). To this end, we operationalize the four
IV components (outcome, exposure, instrument, and control) as follows.
Outcome. Our outcome of interest is the aggregate vote on the answer. We represent
this outcome via variable AnswerScore 〈V19〉 1.
Exposure. Our exposure of interest is the reputation of the answerer. To represent
this exposure, we compute several reputation measures for the answerer, based on the
reputation and badge system in Stack Exchange. In Stack Exchange sites, the primary
means to gain reputation and badges is to post good questions and useful answers. We
compute the reputation measures for each answerer, per answer, based on the answerer’s
achievements prior to creating the current answer. Our reputation measures are as follows:
AnswererReputation 〈V31〉, AnswererReputationViaAnswer 〈V32〉, AnswererGoldCount
〈V33〉, AnswererSilverCount 〈V34〉, and AnswererBronzeCount 〈V35〉.
Note that, for a given answer, different voters may observe different reputation score and
badges for the answerer, depending on their time of voting. The voters who participate
later typically observe higher reputation score and badges, as the answerer may acquire
more upvotes on other answers. Our dataset does not provide the exact state of reputation
score and badges of the answerer for a particular vote. To get around this problem, we
assume that all voters observe the same state of reputation: the reputation score and badges
1We shall use this syntax consistently throughout this study. The first term is variable name and the
second term is variable id in Table 4.3. Please see Table 4.3 for the description of variables.
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acquired by the answerer before creating the current answer. In general, reputation increases
monotonically; therefore, our assumption is conservative.
Notice that, both our outcome (aggregate votes on the answer) and exposure (reputation
of the answerer) of interest can be influenced by the unobserved ability of the answerer.
Specifically, an answerer with high-ability is expected to generate high-quality answers that
would receive many upvotes, increasing his/her reputation. The unobserved ability of the
answerer and associated unobserved quality of answers prevent us from distilling the ef-
fect of the answerer’s reputation on observed votes. We need instruments to eliminate the
confounding effect of the answerer’s ability.
Instrument. Now, how can we find instruments to uncover the effect of an impression
signal (exposure) on the aggregate vote (outcome)? In the social science literature that
employs IV’s [101, 102], researchers use domain knowledge to identify variables that are
likely to influence the exposure and thus satisfy the relevance condition (these are candidate
instruments). Then for each candidate instrument, they use argumentation to determine if
it meets the remaining IV conditions—exclusion restriction and marginal exchangeability.
Motivated by the social science approach to IV, we seek candidate instruments that con-
tribute to an answerer’s reputation. Based on our literature review, we identify two such
factors: 1) answerer’s activity level (number of posts, especially answers contributed by the
answerer) [105], and 2) popularity of the answered questions (number of views, comments,
and answers attracted by the questions) [129]. Note that an answerer’s reputation increases
with the volume of his/her activities. Also, a popular question allows contributing answerers
to obtain more reputation by attracting more views (voters). To capture these two factors,
we compute several measures for each answerer, per answer—namely, AnswererPostCount
〈V28〉, AnswererAnswerCount 〈V29〉, AnswererActiveAge 〈V30〉, AnsweredQuestionViewTotal
〈V37〉, AnsweredQuestionFavoriteTotal 〈V38〉, AnsweredQuestionScoreTotal 〈V39〉, Answered
QuestionCommentTotal 〈V40〉, and AnsweredQuestionAnswerTotal 〈V41〉. We use these
variables as are our candidate instruments.
We now scrutinize the candidate instruments to reason about their ability to meet the three
instrumental conditions described in Section 4.5.2. Note that, all three conditions must be
met for a candidate instrument to be valid. We divide the candidate instruments into two
groups for qualitative reasoning: A) answerer’s activity level [AnswererPostCount 〈V28〉,
AnswererAnswerCount 〈V29〉, AnswererActiveAge 〈V30〉]; and B) popularity of past ques-
tions responded to by the answerer [AnsweredQuestionViewTotal 〈V37〉, AnsweredQuestion
FavoriteTotal 〈V38〉, AnsweredQuestionScoreTotal 〈V39〉, AnsweredQuestionCommentTotal
〈V40〉, AnsweredQuestionAnswerTotal 〈V41〉]. Both groups of candidate instruments em-
pirically satisfy the relevance condition. Therefore, we concentrate on the remaining two IV
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conditions: exclusion restriction, and marginal exchangeability. In other words, we aim to
identify instruments that affect the obtained reputation of the answerer (exposure) without
affecting the votes on current answer (outcome), either directly or through the ability of the
answerer (confounder).
Notice that the first group of candidate instruments—based on the answerer’s activity
level—may contribute to the ability of the answerer (confounder), which in turn may affect
the quality of the answer and resultant votes on the answer (outcome). For example, a user
who posted many answers may learn from experience to provide better quality answers in
the future. Thus, the first group of candidate instruments may violate marginal exchange-
ability. In contrast, the second group of candidate instruments—based on the popularity of
past questions responded to by the answerer—may affect the votes on the current answer
(outcome) only through the answerer’s reputation (exposure). These candidate instruments
do not inform us about the ability of answerer (confounder). The second group of candidate
instruments satisfies both exclusion restriction and marginal exchangeability. Ergo, we use
the second group of instruments to estimate the effects of reputation signals on observed
votes.
Based on the IV components mentioned above—exposure (reputation of the answerer),
outcome (votes on the answer), confounder (the ability of the answerer to create high-quality
answers), and instrument (popularity of the past questions)—we present the causal diagram
of our model in Figure 4.3. Please note that our causal diagram follows the general structure
of the instrumental variable framework (in Figure 2).
Reputation of 
Answerer (X)
Votes on Current 
Answer (Y)




Popularity of Past 
Questions (Z)












Figure 4.3: Causal diagram of our IV model for quantifying reputation bias. Here, the
unobserved ability of answerer introduces confounding via the unobserved quality of created
answers. To eliminate this confounding, we propose the popularity of the past questions
responded to by the answerer as the instrument.
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Control. While our claimed instruments (based on the popularity of past questions
responded to by the answerer) are unlikely to affect the outcome (votes on current answer),
we take further precautions in the form of controls, to establish the conditional independence
of proposed instruments from the outcome. To this end, we propose the following controls
in our IV specifiction: Site 〈V1〉, QuestionViewCount 〈V3〉, QuestionFavoriteCount 〈V4〉,
QuestionScore 〈V5〉, QuestionCommentCount 〈V8〉, and QuestionAnswerCount 〈V11〉.
Each Stack Exchange site accommodates a distinct audience, who may exhibit a dis-
tinct voting behavior; ergo, we control for Site 〈V1〉 via stratification. The remaining
controls capture the popularity of current question, which establish the conditional in-
dependence of proposed instruments from the outcome. Specifically, given the popular-
ity of current question, the popularity of past questions responded to by the answerer
should not affect the votes on current answer. We incorporate these control variables into
our model as regressors. For the outcome (AnswerScore 〈V19〉) and exposure of inter-
est (e.g., AnswererReputationViaAnswer 〈V32〉), we can select one or more instrumental
variables (say AnsweredQuestionViewTotal 〈V37〉), and appropriate controls (Site and
QuestionViewCount 〈V3〉) to estimate the causal effect of the exposure on the outcome.
4.5.4 Joint IV Model for Social Influence Bias and Position Bias
In Stack Exchange sites, the default presentation order of answers is the aggregate vote
thus far. This ordering scheme imposes a critical challenge in isolating the effect of position
bias from the social influence bias, as the two biases vary together. To address this challenge,
we develop a joint IV model to quantify social influence bias and position bias in the same
model. We estimate the causal effects of initial votes and resultant position on subsequent
votes by specifying the IV components as follows.
Outcome. Our outcome of interest is the aggregate vote on the answer after an initial bias
formation period—the time required for social influence signal (initial votes) and position
signal (answer position) to come into effect. We represent this outcome via AnswerScoreT+
〈V21〉: a response variable that captures the aggregate vote on the answer based on the votes
after time T , where T is the limiting time of bias formation specific to the question.
Exposure. We have two exposures of interest corresponding to the initial votes and
resultant position of the answer. To represent these exposures, we compute the aggregate
vote and resultant position of answer at the limiting time of bias formation T . Our exposures
are as follows: 1. AnswerScoreT- 〈V20〉 captures the aggregate vote on answer based on the
votes before time T ; 2. AnswerPositionT- 〈V23〉 captures the position of answer based on


























Figure 4.4: An illustration of the bias formation period to quantify our outcome
(AnswerScoreT+ 〈V21〉) and exposures (AnswerScoreT- 〈V20〉 and AnswerPositionT-
〈V23〉). The creation of question Q marks the beginning of our observation period. Then,
three answers A1, A2, and A3 that refer to Q arrive after time t1, t2, and t3 respectively.
Finally, TE marks the end of our observation period (the time of data collection). Notice
that, a total of 30 votes (20 upvotes, 10 downvotes) are casted on A1, A2, and A3 by time
TE. We consider the time by which P% of total votes are casted on on A1, A2, and A3 as
the bias formation period; TP marks the limiting time of this bias formation period. In this
example, the value of P is 30.
We define a bias formation period to quantify our outcome and exposures. We define
this period based on the dynamics of votes on the answers to each question. Specifically,
we define the bias formation period of a question as the time by which P% of total votes
on its answers are cast. Figure 4.4 shows an illustration of bias formation period, and how
we use this period to quantify our outcome and exposures. The creation of question Q
marks the beginning of our observation period. Then, three answers A1, A2, and A3 that
refer to Q arrive after time t1, t2, and t3 respectively. Finally, TE marks the end of our
observation period (the time of data collection). Notice that, a total of 30 votes (20 upvotes,
10 downvotes) are casted on A1, A2, and A3 by time TE. We consider the time by which
P% of total votes are cast on A1, A2, and A3 as the bias formation period; TP marks the
limiting time of this bias formation period. In this example, the value of P is 30 (in our
experiments, we use different values of P ranging from 5 to 30). The aggregate vote on
answer before time TP is quantified as AnswerScoreT- 〈V20〉, and the resultant position as
AnswerPositionT- 〈V23〉. The values of AnswerScoreT- 〈V20〉 for answer A1, A2, A3 in
Figure 4.4 are +4, -1, 0 respectively. The resultant values of AnswerPositionT- 〈V23〉 for
A1, A2, A3 are 1, 3, 2 respectively. The aggregate vote on answer from Time TP to time TE
is quantified as AnswerScoreT+ 〈V21〉. The values of AnswerScoreT+ 〈V21〉 for A1, A2, A3
are +6, -1, +2 respectively.
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Notice that, both our exposures and outcome of interest can be influenced by the unob-
served quality of the answer. We seek instruments to eliminate the confounding effect of
answer quality.
Instrument. We seek candidate instruments that can uncover the effects of initial votes
and position on subsequent votes. Same as before, we identify factors that contribute to
the initial votes and position, thereby likely to satisfy the relevance condition. For the time
being, we do not focus on the remaining IV conditions, exclusion restriction and marginal
exchangeability. Prior work on voting behavior in Stack Exchange suggest several factors
that contribute to initial votes, notably, activities on the question (number of views, com-
ments, and answers attracted by the question) [129], time of answer (day of the week, hour
of the day) [85], and timeliness of answer (time gap between question and answer) [96].
To capture these factors, we compute several measures—namely, QuestionScoreT- 〈V6〉,
QuestionCommentCountT- 〈V9〉, QuestionAnswerCountT- 〈V12〉, AnswerDayOfWeek 〈V14〉,
AnswerTimeOfDay 〈V15〉, AnswerEpoch, AnswerTimeliness 〈V17〉, and AnswerOrder 〈V18〉.
These variables are our candidate instruments.
We now scrutinize the candidate instruments to reason about their ability to meet the three
instrumental conditions described in Section 4.5.2. Recall that, all three conditions must be
met for a candidate instrument to be valid. We divide the candidate instruments into three
groups for qualitative reasoning: A) activities on the question within the bias formation
period [QuestionScoreT- 〈V6〉, QuestionCommentCountT- 〈V9〉, QuestionAnswerCountT-
〈V12〉]; B) actual time of answer [AnswerDayOfWeek 〈V14〉, AnswerTimeOfDay 〈V15〉, Answer
Epoch 〈V16〉]; and C) relative timeliness of answer [AnswerTimeliness 〈V17〉, AnswerOrder
〈V18〉]. All three groups of candidate instruments satisfy the relevance condition. The
activities on a question within the bias formation period positively influence the votes on its
answers within that period. The actual time of answer creation affects the initial votes due
to the varying amount of voter activity across time.The timeliness of an answer affects its
initial votes due to the amount time available for voting. Therefore, we concentrate on the
remaining two IV conditions: exclusion restriction, and marginal exchangeability. In other
words, we aim to identify the instruments that affect the initial votes or position (exposure)
without affecting the subsequent votes (outcome), either directly or through the quality of
the answer (confounder).
Notice that the first group of candidate instruments—based on the activities on the ques-
tion within the bias formation period—may be influenced by the popularity of question
(confounder), which in turn may contribute to both initial votes (exposure) and subsequent
votes on the answer (outcome). For example, a popular question may induce a high amount
of activity both within and beyond the bias formation period. The popularity of the question
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may also explain the initial and subsequent votes on the answer. Thus, the first group of
candidate instruments may violate marginal exchangeability. In contrast, the second group
of candidate instruments—based on the actual time of answer—may directly influence both
initial votes (exposure) and subsequent votes on the answer (outcome). Thus, the second
group of candidate instruments may violate exclusion restriction. Finally, the third group
of candidate instruments—based on the relative timeliness of answer—affect the subsequent
votes primarily through the initial votes and position. For example, if Bob posts the 2nd
answer to a particular question, then his initial votes within the bias formation period will
be affected by the fact that he is the 2nd answerer. However, the subsequent votes after
the bias formation period will not be affected by the same fact. Note that, the timeliness
of an answer may be affected by the answerer’s expertise. The answerer’s expertise may
also affect the outcome (subsequent votes on the answer) [130]. We address this issue by
incorporating the answerer’s expertise as a control variable in our IV model. Notice that,
the third group of candidate instruments does not inform us about the quality of the answer
(confounder) and help us avoid the primary confounder. These candidate instruments are
reasonably assumed to satisfy both exclusion restriction and marginal exchangeability. Ergo,
we use the third group of instruments to estimate the effects of initial votes and position on
subsequent votes.
Based on the IV components mentioned above—exposure (initial votes and position of
the answer), outcome (subsequent votes on the answer), confounder (quality of answer), and
instrument (timeliness of answer)—we present the causal diagram of our model in Figure 4.5.
Initial Votes / 







E.g., Bob posted 
the 2nd answer
E.g., In first 2 hours,
Bob’s answer received 
+5 votes
E.g., In next 10 hours,
Bob’s answer 
received +23 votes 
E.g., Quality of 
Bob’s answer
Figure 4.5: Causal diagram of our IV model for quantifying social influence bias and posi-
tion bias. Here, the unobserved quality of answer act as a confounder. To eliminate this
confounder, we propose the timeliness of answer as the instrument.
Control. While our claimed instruments (based on the relative timeliness of answer) are
unlikely to affect the outcome (votes on answer after the bias formation period), we take
further precautions in the form of controls, to establish the conditional independence of
proposed instruments from the outcome. To this end, we propose the following controls in
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our IV specifiction: Site 〈V1〉 and AnswererReputationViaAnswer 〈V32〉.
In the joint IV model, we control for Site 〈V1〉 (via stratification) to account for the dis-
tinct audience in each Stack Exchange site. We also control for AnswererReputationViaAnswer
〈V32〉 (via regression) as a proxy for the answerer’s expertise. Recall that, our claimed in-
strument (the timeliness of an answer) may be affected by the answerer’s expertise. The
answerer’s expertise may also affect our outcome (subsequent votes on the answer). While
we acknowledge that AnswererReputationViaAnswer 〈V32〉 is not a proxy for the answerer’s
expertise, it helps us to reduce the degree of bias in causal estimation.
In this section, we explain how to measure the effects of different impression signals on
observed votes through the instrumental variable method. We identify instruments that
co-vary only with the impression signals and do not influence the observed through a hidden
confounder. These instruments allow us to estimate the causal effect of impression signals
on votes.
4.6 RESULTS
In this section, we report the results of our study2. We begin by presenting the two-
stage least squares (2SLS) method for implementing IV models. We then present our bias
estimates for Stack Exchange sites—reputation bias (Section 4.6.1), social influence bias and
position bias (Section 4.6.2).
Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Method. Two-stage least squares (2SLS) is a pop-
ular method for computing IV estimates. The 2SLS method consists of two successive stages
of linear regression. In the first stage, we regress each exposure variable on all instrumental
and control variables in the model and obtain the predicted values from the regressions. In
the second stage, we regress the outcome variable on the predicted exposures from the first
stage, along with the control variables. The resultant regression coefficients corresponding
to the predicted exposures in second stage yield the IV estimates. More details can be found
in the supplementary material.
4.6.1 Quantifying Reputation Bias
We quantify reputation bias by estimating the causal effects of reputation score and badges
on the aggregate vote. We have one outcome variable (V19), five exposure variables (V31,
V32, V33, V34, V35), five instrumental variables (V37, V38, V39, V40, V41), and six control
2The source code is available at https://github.com/CrowdDynamicsLab/Quantifying_Voter_Biases
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variables (V1, V3, V4, V5, V8, V11). We use Site 〈V1〉 to stratify the data based on Stack
Exhchange site. We incorporate the remaining variables into 2SLS regression framework
to develop our IV models. We develop 10 IV models [5 (exposure) × 2 (with or without
control)] that use all instruments, two for each exposure (with or without control). We
develop another 50 IV models [5 (exposure) × 5 (instrument) × 2 (with or without control)]
to analyze the performance of individual instrument. We also develop a baseline OLS model
for each IV model. We perform log modulus transformation [L(x) = sign(x) ∗ log(|x|+ 1>)]
of variables before using them in regression; this is required to linearize the relationship
among variables. The use of log transformation in IV models is well-established [131].
We compare the performance of OLS and IV models by examining their estimates (regres-
sion coefficients). Table 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7 present the OLS and IV estimates for quantifying
the causal effects of reputation score and badges on the aggregate vote, for English, Math,
and Superuser respectively. We make the following observations from these estimates.
Relevance Condition. The final instruments for estimating the causal effects of reputa-
tion score and badges on the aggregate vote satisfy the relevance condition (stated in
Section 4.5.2). For all IV estimates reported in Table 4.5–4.7, we observe low p-values
and high t-statistics in the first stage of 2SLS. We do not report these numbers for
brevity. Notice that the IV estimates in Table 4.5–4.7 have a small confidence interval,
which is a byproduct of identifying strong instruments.
Causal Effect of Reputation Score. Prior research would interpret the regression coef-
ficients from OLS in a causal way. In this study, we interpret the IV estimates as
causal effects. For all three sites, the causal effect of reputation score on the aggregate
vote is small. While OLS and IV provide similar estimates for quantifying the effect of
reputation score, OLS assigns a slightly higher weight to the reputation score. Control
variables rectify the estimates from both OLS and IV by increasing weights.
Causal Effects of Badges. For all three sites, the causal effects of badges on the aggregate
vote is significant. The effects vary across the level of badges: high effect for gold
badges, a moderate effect for silver badges, and low effect for bronze badges. This
finding is consistent with the rarity of these badges. Stack Exchange sites grant a few
gold badges, some silver badges, and lots of bronze badges to their users. OLS and IV
differ a lot in quantifying the effects of badges. OLS tends to assign equal weights to all
badges, whereas IV assigns more weight to gold badges (1.6–2.2x of OLS weights). In
other words, OLS underestimates the causal effect of gold badges significantly. Control





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4.6.2 Quantifying Social Influence Bias and Position Bias
We quantify social influence bias and position bias by jointly estimating the causal effects
of initial votes and position on the subsequent votes. We have one outcome variable (V21),
two exposure variables (V20, V23), two instrumental variables (V17, V18), and two control
variables (V1, V32). We use Site 〈V1〉 to stratify the data based on Stack Exchange site.
We incorporate the remaining variables into 2SLS regression framework to develop one com-
prehensive IV model. Note that, we need all instruments and controls to develop our IV
model, as there are multiple exposure variables and confounders. For this reason, we can
not study the effect of an individual instrument.
The measurement of variables in this model relies on the specification of the bias formation
period, T . We define the bias formation period of a question as the time by which P% of
total votes on its answers are cast. We vary the value of P from 5 to 30, with an increment
of 5, to create six different instances of this model. We also develop a baseline OLS instance
for each IV instance.
Table 4.8: The causal effects (IV estimates) of initial votes and position on subsequent votes
in English, Superuser and Math. All results presented in this table are statistically
significant—validated via two-tailed t-tests—with p < 0.001. The results suggest that OLS
and IV differ a lot in quantifying the effects of initial votes and position. Notably, OLS
underestimates reputation bias and overestimates social influence bias significantly.
Y = AnswerScoreT+ 〈V21〉, Z1 = AnswerTimeliness 〈V17〉, Z2 = AnswerOrder 〈V18〉
X1 = AnswerScoreT- 〈V20〉 X2 = AnswerPositionT- 〈V23〉
Site T OLS IV OLS IV
English T0.05 0.803 (± 0.007) 0.442 (± 0.087) 0.215 (± 0.014) 0.401 (± 0.037)
T0.10 0.821 (± 0.006) 0.403 (± 0.080) 0.205 (± 0.012) 0.337 (± 0.030)
T0.15 0.819 (± 0.005) 0.385 (± 0.073) 0.184 (± 0.010) 0.300 (± 0.025)
T0.20 0.791 (± 0.005) 0.354 (± 0.067) 0.161 (± 0.009) 0.270 (± 0.022)
T0.25 0.752 (± 0.004) 0.323 (± 0.061) 0.126 (± 0.008) 0.230 (± 0.018)
T0.30 0.699 (± 0.004) 0.289 (± 0.057) 0.100 (± 0.008) 0.204 (± 0.016)
Math T0.05 0.802 (± 0.003) 0.359 (± 0.037) 0.470 (± 0.007) 0.483 (± 0.010)
T0.10 0.880 (± 0.003) 0.355 (± 0.036) 0.446 (± 0.005) 0.445 (± 0.009)
T0.15 0.920 (± 0.003) 0.352 (± 0.035) 0.380 (± 0.005) 0.399 (± 0.008)
T0.20 0.921 (± 0.003) 0.342 (± 0.034) 0.339 (± 0.004) 0.373 (± 0.007)
T0.25 0.885 (± 0.002) 0.331 (± 0.034) 0.284 (± 0.004) 0.343 (± 0.007)
T0.30 0.833 (± 0.002) 0.324 (± 0.033) 0.240 (± 0.003) 0.319 (± 0.006)
Superuser T0.05 1.814 (± 0.010) 0.800 (± 0.122) 0.842 (± 0.025) 1.209 (± 0.058)
T0.10 1.939 (± 0.008) 0.742 (± 0.108) 0.784 (± 0.021) 1.018 (± 0.045)
T0.15 1.983 (± 0.007) 0.689 (± 0.097) 0.705 (± 0.017) 0.899 (± 0.037)
T0.20 1.888 (± 0.005) 0.633 (± 0.087) 0.594 (± 0.014) 0.793 (± 0.030)
T0.25 1.633 (± 0.004) 0.583 (± 0.076) 0.463 (± 0.012) 0.712 (± 0.025)
T0.30 1.477 (± 0.003) 0.526 (± 0.067) 0.363 (± 0.009) 0.630 (± 0.021)
We compare the performance of OLS and IV models by examining their estimates (re-
gression coefficients). Table 4.8 presents the OLS and IV estimates for quantifying the
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causal effects of initial votes and position on the subsequent votes, for English, Math, and
Superuser. We make the following observations from these estimates.
Relevance Condition. The final instruments for estimating the causal effects of initial
votes and position on the subsequent votes satisfy the relevance condition. For all
IV estimates reported in Table 4.8, we observe low p-values and high t-statistics in
the first stage of 2SLS. We do not report these numbers for brevity. Notice that the
IV estimates in Table 4.8 have a small confidence interval, which is a byproduct of
identifying strong instruments.
Causal Effect of Initial Votes. For all three sites, the causal effect of initial votes on
subsequent votes is significant. OLS and IV differ a lot in quantifying the effect of
initial votes. OLS assigns high weights to initial votes, 1.8–2.3x of IV weights (based
on initial 5% votes). In other words, OLS overestimates the causal effect of initial
votes significantly.
Causal Effect of Initial Position. For all three sites, the causal effect of initial position
on subsequent votes is significant. OLS and IV differ a lot in quantifying the effect
of initial position. IV assigns high weights to initial position, at times 1.9x of OLS
weights (based on initial 5% votes). In other words, OLS underestimates the causal
effect of initial position significantly.
Effect of Bias Formation Period. For all three sites, increasing the bias formation pe-
riod T leads to a decrease in causal effects for both initial votes and position. This
finding implies that the first few votes significantly skew the subsequent votes.
In addition to the above-mentioned definition of bias formation period, we also define it
based on the day of question creation. Specifically, we use the votes on answers during the
day of question creation for computing AnswerScoreT- 〈V20〉 and AnswerPositionT- 〈V23〉.
We use the votes on subsequent days for computing AnswerScoreT+ 〈V21〉. The results are
available in the supplementary material.
4.7 DISCUSSION
In the presented work, we quantify the degree of voter biases in online platforms. To derive
these bias estimates, we make a methodological contribution in the study: how to measure
the effects of different impression signals on observed votes through a novel application of
instrumental variables. Our findings have implications for studying online voting behavior,
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making changes to the platforms’ interface, changes to the policy, and broader research
within the CSCW community.
4.7.1 Implications for Online Voting Behavior
Our work has provided some of the first causal insights into online voting behavior.
How Community Type Affects Voting. Our results show that the effects of impression
signals on votes widely vary across Stack Exchange sites. For example, the effect of
gold badges in English is twice as high as in Math. Again, the effect of content
position in Superuser is twice as high as in Math. This finding implies that what
impression signals voters pay attention to and what cognitive heuristics they use to
transform the signals into up- and down- votes may vary based upon the community
type. For instance, English, Superuser, and Math belong to different themes—
culture, technology, and science—which cater to different subsets of participants. On
the one hand, different themes induce a varying degree of content interpretation, e.g.,
content interpretation in English is perhaps more subjective compared to content
interpretation in Math [80]. On the other hand, users who are interested in different
themes may be driven by different factors to contribute [85]. Overall, the communities
appropriate the platforms in different ways as they deal with different themes and define
their own understanding of what is good content or what signals competent users. Our
finding, coupled with the above-mentioned corollaries suggest that voter bias may vary
as a function of community type. We follow up on the design implications of these
insights in Section 4.7.3.
On Social Prestige of Badges. Our results show that different reputation signals have
varying effects on votes. While both badges and reputation score are indicative of user
reputation, badges exhibit higher influence on votes compared to reputation score. An
interpretation of this finding is that badges are perhaps deemed more “prestigious”
than reputation score by voters. Recent work by Merchant et al. [132] investigated the
role of reputation score and badges in characterizing social qualities. By adopting a
regression approach, they found that reputation score and badges positively correlate
with popularity and impact. Our finding, in contrast, provides causal evidence in favor
of the social prestige of badges [133], over reputation score. This evidence, coupled with
growing concerns about user engagement in online platforms [134] suggest that badge
systems may put newcomers at a significant disadvantage. Our results also reveal the
relationship between the prestige of badges and their exclusivity. Gold badges are the
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rarest among the three types of badges, and their effect is two to three times higher
compared to that of silver and bronze badges.
4.7.2 Implications for User Interface Design
Our research reveals how impression signals in user interface affect the votes and lead to
biases. These findings have the potential to inform interface design to avoid biases.
Conceal Impression Signals. Our results show that impression signals, such as prior
votes and badges, heavily influence voting behavior. An interface design implication of
this finding is to conceal these signals from voters. Online platforms may adopt differ-
ent interface design techniques to conceal impression signals from voters. For example,
impression signals can be moved from the immediate vicinity of content; these signals
may appear in other places, e.g., badges may still appear in the profile pages of the
contributing users. Alternatively, impression signals can be concealed from voters till
vote casting; a voter may access the signals only after casting his/her vote. The con-
cept of concealing impression signals has been explored in another context: Grosser
et al. [135] prescribed removing impression metrics (e.g., number of followers, likes,
retweets, etc.) from social media feed to prevent users from feeling compulsive, com-
petitive, and anxious. Note that, while concealing impression signals may eliminate
the influence of these signals on voters, it is hard to anticipate how voters will react in
the absence of such signals. For instance, voters may then rely on other factors, such
as the offline reputation of the contributing user, to make voting decisions. Further,
the interface changes may also impact the contributing users, who may adopt new
strategic behaviors to maintain their online reputation.
Delay the Votes. Recall that, to uncover the effects of prior votes and position on subse-
quent votes; we use the timeliness of answers as the instrument. The main motivation
of our chosen instrument is that early-arriving answers get more time to acquire votes.
A design implication of this finding is to prevent the early arriving answer(s) from
accumulating higher initial votes. Platforms could withhold the provision of voting for
a fixed amount of time to achieve this. The withholding period could be decided based
on the historical time gap between the arrival time of questions and answers.
Randomize Presentation Order. Our results show that the position of content also ex-
hibits a strong influence on voters. As the position of content cannot be concealed
in a webpage, the design implication is to eliminate position bias via other means.
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Platforms may randomize the order of answers for each voter and thus prevent any
answer from gaining a position advantage (on average). Lerman et al. [89] studied the
effects of different ranking policies on votes, including the randomized ordering policy.
They found that random policy is best for unbiased estimates of preferences. However,
since a small fraction of user-generated content is interesting, users will mainly see
uninteresting content under the random policy.
4.7.3 Informing Policy Design
Our research could also inform policy design to mitigate biases.
De-biasing Votes. What can a platform operator do to mitigate voting biases? A natural
remedy is to de-bias the feedback scores post-hoc. Our research provides a major step
in this regard by providing accurate bias estimates using the IV approach. Apart from
such a remedial approach, platform operators could also use a preventive approach,
including adopting more evolved aggregation mechanisms to combine individual feed-
back from voters. Such complex aggregation already occurs on some websites. For
example, Amazon no longer displays the voter average for each product but instead
uses a proprietary Machine Learning algorithm to compute the aggregate ratings [136].
The aggregation policy for votes may account for potential biases, say by weighting
the votes based on their arrival time (later votes are more susceptible to herding be-
havior), history of the voter (differentiating novice voters from the more experienced
voters), and content type. While prior work has considered weighted voting—to iden-
tify the answer that received most of the votes when most of the answers were already
posted [137]—the weighting mechanism for bias mitigation merits further investigation.
It’s especially important to understand the effects of weighted voting on participation
bias, as different weighting mechanisms may attract different subsets of the voter pop-
ulation to participate. For instance, any weighted voting policy where all votes are not
equal is likely to dissuade the disadvantaged voters from participation.
Community Dependent Policy Design. Our research revealed how community type could
affect the degree of voter biases. A policy design implication of this finding is to design
policies based on the type of community. Instead of using the same vote aggregation
and content ranking function for all Stack Exchange sites, platform operators could
use variants of the same function for different sites, accounting for the behavior of the
underlying voter base. How variation in policy (across sites) may affect the users who
participate in multiple communities is an interesting direction for future research.
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4.7.4 Impact on CSCW Research
We show how to estimate the degree to which a factor bias votes through an application of
instrumental variables (IV) method. We believe that IV is a valuable tool for use in CSCW
research, in particular, for researchers studying biases and online behavior.
IV for Studying Biases. The presented research concentrates on quantifying voter biases
in the light of impression signals. However, online platforms also accommodate other
more serious forms of biases, such as race and gender biases [138, 139, 140]. Jay
Hanlon—the vice president of community growth at Stack Overflow—acknowledged
the presence of race and gender biases in Stack Exchange: “Too many people experi-
ence Stack Overflow as a hostile or elitist place, especially newer coders, women, people
of color, and others in marginalized groups.” [140]. Vasilescu et al. [138] revealed the
gender representation in Drupal, WordPress, and StackOverflow: only 7-10% of the
participants in these communities are women. Through semi-structured interviews
and surveys, Ford et al. [139] identified some of the barriers for female participation
in Stack Overflow, such as lack of awareness about site features and self-doubt about
qualification. Estimating the causal effects of race and gender on the perceived com-
munity feedback could reveal the degree of race and gender biases in online platforms.
We believe IV could be a valuable tool in this regard. The argumentation based un-
derpinning of IV is well-suited for studying biases in observational setup; it prompts
researchers to reason about the underlying causal process.
4.8 LIMITATIONS
The observational nature of our study imposes several constraints on our analysis, which
requires us to make a number of assumptions. First, we assume that all voters observe the
same state of reputation and badges for the answerer. In reality, voters arrive at different
times, and the reputation score and badges of the answerer may change between the voter
arrivals. Second, we assume that the voters who arrive after the bias formation period observe
the same state of initial votes. However, due to the sequential nature of voting, the observed
votes may change from one voter to the next. We also assume that the positions of answers do
not change after the bias formation period. Third, we ignore the effects of external influence.
For example, a voter may be influenced by Google search results or Twitter promotion to
upvote an answer. Fourth, while the default presentation order of answers in Stack Exchange
is to sort them by votes, we can not track the views that individuals used to make voting
decisions. We assume that the default presentation order is the one that influences voter
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judgment. Finally, we inherit the key limitation of the instrumental variables method, relying
on two untestifiable assumptions: exclusion restriction and marginal exchangeability.
4.9 CONCLUSION
In content-based platforms, an aggregate of votes is commonly used as a proxy for content
quality. However, empirical literature suggests that voters are susceptible to different biases.
In this study, we quantify the degree of voter biases in online platforms. We concentrate on
three distinct biases: reputation bias, social influence bias, and position bias. The key idea
of our approach is to formulate voter bias quantification using the instrumental variable (IV)
framework. The IV framework consists of four components: outcome, exposure, instrument,
and control. Using large-scale log data from Stack Exchange sites, we operationalize the IV
components by employing impression signals as exposure and aggregate feedback as outcome.
Then, we estimate the causal effect of exposure on outcome by using a set of carefully chosen
instruments and controls. The resultant estimates quantify the voter biases. Our empirical
study shows that the bias estimates from our IV approach differ from the bias estimates
from the ordinary least squares (OLS) approach. The implications of our work include:
redesigning user interface to avoid voter biases; making changes to platforms’ policy to
mitigate voter biases; detecting other forms of biases in online platforms.
In this chapter, we showed that voters are biased. We found that voters use reputation as
a proxy for content quality, which hurts new users. In the next chapter, we will investigate
if voters had voted impartially, how it would have affected the retention of users.
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CHAPTER 5: EVALUATING VOTING NORMS
Our first study showed that platforms fail because newcomers are not as devoted to plat-
forms as old users. Our second study showed that community voting is biased against
newcomers. These findings raise the question: would the newcomers have stayed longer or
contributed more if the community had voted impartially? This chapter discusses our third
study on evaluating voting norms, specifically how they affect user retention.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
Creating content and receiving feedback on the content are at the core of today’s social web
experience. Feedback on content—which comes in the form of votes (e.g., Stack Exchange,
Reddit), likes (e.g., Facebook, Twitter), etc.—captures how much a community values the
content. More so, it captures how much the community appreciates the user who created
the content. For example, in Stack Exchange and Reddit, votes on content translate into
social rewards such as reputation [105], badges [30], and karma [106]. These vote-based
social rewards incentivize users to create more content [141, 142].
Owing to the underlying social value, community feedback such as votes can alter user
behavior. Indeed, prior research suggests that votes on content may significantly affect the
future participation of users [143]. The degree to which votes affect the participation of users
is important. Votes not only does it form the basis of most platform’s policies for rewarding
behavior but also because we know that many online platforms (e.g., Stack Exchange) are
not welcoming to newcomers [144] and whose membership is falling [12]. Could it be that
what is causing these newcomers to give up is not the lack of interest in the platform, but the
“poor” social judgment of their peers? That is, had their peers voted differently by focusing
on the objective qualities of content (e.g., length, readability, objectivity, polarity)—instead
of using impression signals (e.g., the reputation of the content creator)—fewer individuals
would have left the platform. In this study, we ask a counterfactual question: what would
have happened if the members of a community had voted based on some objective criteria?
Much of the work thinking about understanding behavior on online social platforms has
centered around the question of mechanism design, especially the role of badges [26, 30].
Another line of related work examines voter biases in online platforms [88, 89], suggesting
that individuals are prone to using cognitive heuristics that influence their voting behavior
and prevent independent judgments. Specifically, voters tend to use different impression
signals adjacent to the content—such as the reputation of the contributing user, aggregate
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vote thus far, and position of content—as an input to make quick decisions about the quality
of content. Impression signals as shortcuts to make voting decisions result in biases, which
makes aggregate votes an unreliable measure for content quality. Also, voter biases may ad-
versely affect user retention, as they put certain users, especially newcomers, at a significant
disadvantage.
Present Work. In this study, we develop a methodology for quantifying the effects of
different counterfactual community voting norms on user retention. Our methodology pro-
vides a formalism to reason about the retention effects of never-experienced voting norms,
e.g., how user retention in Stack Exchange would be different if the community issues votes
based upon the length of content. By developing a methodology to answer such counterfac-
tual questions, we identify voting norms that improve user retention.
To perform our counterfactual analysis, we must understand the probability of different
outcomes under a given voting condition. To this end, we develop a model for quantifying
the propensity of voting outcomes. Our propensity model explains the voting behavior of a
community from a contextual perspective. In this context, voters examine all answers to a
given question (the context) to evaluate and subsequently vote on the answers. We adopt
a Dirichlet-multinomial model that captures the joint distribution of votes for all answers
to a question. The posterior distribution from the model quantifies the propensity of voting
outcomes.
To study the effect of votes on users, we need to transform the propensities of voting
outcomes into propensities of user utility. To this end, we first aggregate the observed
(empirical) voting results from the content level to compute utility at the user level. Then,
using the propensity of votes, we compute the propensity of user utility.
Using the propensities computed above, we develop a counterfactual model to reason
about alternative voting norms. The main idea of our approach is to interpret community
voting norms as functions that determine the votes on content. The current (unaltered)
community voting condition acts as the control norm, whose outcomes can be observed
from the log data. We then adopt a counterfactual setup to reason about the outcomes
of the alternative voting norms. We adopt an inverse propensity sampling (IPS) estimator
to perform our counterfactual analysis. An IPS estimator has three components: context,
action, and reward. Context, in our case, refers to the content created by a user; action
refers to the allocation of votes on content, determined by the norm in consideration; reward
refers to the retention of the user.
We conduct extensive experiments on Stack Exchange websites comparing the default
voting norm in these sites with six alternative norms: random (i.e., content receive an
arbitrary number of votes), uniform (i.e., all content receive the same number of votes),
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length (i.e., content that contain more words receive more votes), readability (i.e., content
that have higher readability receive more votes), objectivity (i.e., content that express facts
rather than opinions receive more votes), and polarity (i.e., content that express positive
emotion receive more votes). Our main findings are that had the community members voted
based upon content-based criteria, such as length, readability, or objectivity or polarity, the
platform operator would have observed higher retention.
This study’s main design implication is that platform operators need to promote content
based on factors that are intrinsic to the content (e.g., length). The payoff: a higher retention
rate amongst the community members.
5.2 PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we provide an informal problem description, introduce the terminology we
use throughout the study, and discuss our problem statement in detail.
Informal Description. Consider an online social platform where users post content, and
they receive up and down votes on the content from peers. Broadly, the users derive utility
from the votes they receive on content. Some of these users would continue to participate
in the platform at a given time, while others would depart. Our goal is to understand that
if the peers as a community had voted differently, would many of these departed users have
stayed.
Terminology. In this study, we use the following terms.
1. Voting Criteria: Voting criteria refers to the factors that an individual takes into
account while casting votes on content, say the quality of content and the reputation
of content creator.
2. Voting Norm: Voting norm refers to the normative voting criteria around which a
community votes, say the members of a community may cast votes on content based
upon the reputation of content creator.
3. Voting Outcome: Voting outcome refers to the distribution of votes over content (re-
sulting from a voting norm), say the distribution of votes over the answers to a question
in Stack Exchange.
Problem Statement. The goal of this study is to develop a methodology for evaluating
the effects of alternative voting norms on user retention.
In content-based social platforms (such as Stack Exchange and Reddit), users receive up-
and down- votes on content from fellow community members. An aggregate of the votes
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is displayed alongside content, which allows the community to recognize the most helpful
content. The votes also contribute to an online reputation system that measures how much
the community values any content and the user who contributed the content. The vote-
based reputation is the main form of social reward that incentivizes users to create content
on these platforms.
However, prior research on online communities suggests that voters tend to use different
impression signals adjacent to the content—such as the reputation of the content creator,
aggregate vote thus far, and position of content—as their primary voting criteria, which
leads to systematic biases. Indeed, impression signals’ use as voting criteria puts certain
users (say, newcomers) at a significant disadvantage. This evidence, coupled with growing
concerns about user retention in content-based platforms, suggests that voting norm may
impact users’ retention in these platforms.
The goal of this study is to infer, in an observational setting, the outcomes of counterfac-
tual scenarios where the voting norm is different from the one in use. Specifically, given the
historical logs of user content creation and associated community voting, is it possible to
investigate scenarios where the community adopts a voting norm different from the one ob-
served in log data? More importantly, what happens when the community votes differently?
In this study, we develop a methodology to reason about the consequences of counterfactual
voting norms using log data, specifically in terms of user retention. Using our methodology,
we examine several alternative voting norms and quantify their effects on user retention.
Without loss of generality, consider the following scenario in a Stack Exchange website.
A user Alice has provided an answer to a particular question. The question, overall, has
three answers, one each from Alice, Bob, and Carol. Now, imagine that the voting norm in
Stack Exchange is to cast votes based upon the content creator’s reputation, which causes
Alice to receive fewer votes than Bob and Charles. How is this voting norm going to affect
Alice’s tenure on the platform? Further, how would Alice’s tenure be different if the voting
norm were different, say the readability of answers? In the rest of the study, we develop a
methodology that allows answering such counterfactual questions from log data.
5.3 OPERATOR’S REWARD: USER RETENTION
User retention is perhaps the most important factor that determines the success or failure
of any online social platform. With more and more platforms failing to maintain their user-
base [12, 145, 146, 147], retention remains a major concern for the platform operators. In this
study, we examine user retention in content-based social platforms such as Stack Exchange
and Reddit. We specifically study retention from a content generation standpoint—whether
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a user participates in content generation or not.
Retention Metrics. There is a wide range of metrics for measuring user retention in
online platforms, such as duration of membership (also known as “lifetime) [148, 149] and
average time gap between visits. We are particularly interested in metrics that capture the
tenure of a user based on content generation. To this end, we adopt the following metrics for
measuring the retention of a user: the number of content created by the user, the number of
active months (an active month refers to a month during which the user created at least one
content), and the range of active months (time gap between the user’s first active moth and
last active month). Note that, within the range of active months, the user may be active in
some months and inactive in others; therefore, the number of active months and the range
of active months may be different.
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Figure 5.1: Censorship in measuring retention metrics. If we collect data at the end of month
10, we do not observe the last active month for three users (u4, u6, and u9).
Data Censorship. While our retention metrics are practical, they are susceptible to data
censorship. Specifically, at the end of our observation period (or the time of data collection),
we encounter two types of users: users who are already inactive (labeled as “dead”), and
users who are still active (labeled as “censored”). In Figure 5.1, for instance, if we collect
data at the end of month 10, three users (u4, u6, and u9) are censored. These censored users
may continue to be active in future. If we use the observed final value of a retention metric
as its limiting value, we may underestimate the retention of censored users. This faulty
estimation, in turn, will affect the overall retention statistics, such as the average retention
of users.
Survival Curves. To overcome the data censorship issue, we examine a detailed view of
77




























































0 18 36 54 72 90



















0 15 30 45 60 75



















0 8 16 24 32 40















































































Figure 5.2: Survival curves for user retention in three Stack Exchange sites: English, Scifi,
and Worldbulding.
the retention metrics through survival curves. The survival curves in Figure 5.2 show the
probability that a user will be active after a specified period say a certain number of active
months or a certain number of answer contributions. Notice that retention is particularly
low for newcomers, as exhibited by the sharp decline in survival curves.
In this study, we ask the following question: is it possible that if the members of a com-
munity (say, English) vote differently, the platform operators would see higher retention?
The goal of the rest of this study is to develop a methodology to evaluate alternative voting
norms to investigate how they can improve user retention.
5.4 COUNTERFACTUALS OF VOTING
In this section, we develop a counterfactual formalism to reason about alternative voting
norms using log data. We first describe the alternative voting norms that we will examine in
this study (Section 5.4.1). We then explain our counterfactual setup to evaluate these norms
(Section 5.4.2). Finally, we present statistical estimators for our counterfactual evaluation
(Section 5.4.3).
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5.4.1 Alternative Voting Norms
In this study, we develop a methodology to reason about alternative voting norms based
on the principles of counterfactual evaluation. We refer to the existing voting norm as the
control norm, whose voting outcomes can be observed from log data. Our goal is to evaluate
the outcomes of alternative voting norms that were never observed. To this end, we examine
several voting norms that express how the members of a community can vote based upon
different voting criteria. Specifically, we examine six alternative voting norms defined as
follows.
Random: Under the random voting norm, the members of a community cast votes on
content without following any common voting criteria. For the purpose of our analysis
on Stack Exchange, we assume the following distribution of votes to instantiate the
random voting norm: the total number of votes on all answers to a question are
distributed randomly among the answers.
Uniform: Under the uniform voting norm, the members of a community cast votes on
content based on “the principle of equality”, where all content receive the same number
of votes. We instantiate the uniform voting norm as follows: the total number of votes
on all answers to a question are distributed equally among the answers.
Length: Under the length voting norm, the members of a community cast votes on content
based on the number of words in content, where content that contain more words
receive more votes compared to content that contain fewer words. We instantiate the
length voting norm as follows: the total number of votes on all answers to a question
are distributed in such a way that the number of votes on each answer is proportional
to the number of words it contains.
Readability: Under the readability voting norm, the members of a community cast votes
on content based on the degree of ease in understanding content, where content with
higher readability receive more votes compared to content with lower readability. We
instantiate the readability voting norm as follows: the total number of votes on all
answers to a question are distributed in such a way that the number of votes on each
answer is proportional to its Flesch reading score [150]. Flesch reading score is a real
number within the range [0.0, 1.0], where 0.0 implies confusing to read and 1.0 implies
easy to read content.
Objectivity: Under the objectivity voting norm, the members of a community cast votes
on content based on the degree to which content express facts rather than opinions,
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where content with higher objectivity receive more votes compared to content with
lower objectivity. We instantiate the objectivity voting norm as follows: the total
number of votes on all answers to a question are distributed in such a way that the
number of votes on each answer is proportional to its objectivity score. We compute
objectivity score using a lexicon based approach [151], which returns a number within
the range [0.0, 1.0], where 0.0 implies highly subjective and 1.0 implies highly objective
content.
Polarity: Under the polarity voting norm, the members of a community cast votes on
content based on the type of emotion expressed in content, where content with positive
emotion receive more votes compared to content with neutral or negative emotion.
We instantiate the polarity voting norm as follows: the total number of votes on all
answers to a question are distributed in such a way that the number of votes on each
answer is proportional to its polarity score. We compute polarity score using a lexicon
based approach [151], which returns a number within the range [-1.0, 1.0], where -1.0
implies negative emotion, 0.0 implies neutral emotion and 1.0 implies positive emotion
in content.
In the next subsection, we develop a counterfactual formalism to evaluate the retention
effects of alternative voting norms. What would have happened (in terms of user retention)
if the members of a community had cast votes on content following one of these norms?
5.4.2 Counterfactual Evaluation of Voting Norm
Given the control voting norm and an alternative voting norm, we now explain our coun-
terfactual setup to evaluate the outcomes of the alternative voting norm in terms of user
retention. Recall that, the outcomes of the control norm are experiential (recorded in log
data), whereas the outcomes of the alternative norm are counterfactual (never-experienced).
The key idea of our counterfactual evaluation is to use the outcomes of the control norm as
references for evaluating the outcomes of the alternative norm in terms of user retention. In
the remaining of this section, we introduce the key constructs of our counterfactual setup,
describe the characteristics of our log data which embody these constructs, and explain the
mechanics of our counterfactual evaluation using the log data.
Constructs. The key elements of our counterfactual setup are three co-varying constructs
: user (u), votes (v), and retention (r). Below we explain each of these constructs.















User (𝑢) Votes (𝒗) Retention (𝑟)
Figure 5.3: An example scenario of community voting in Stack Exchange. A user Alice
created three answers. The answers received 3, 2, and 1 votes respectively. Alice left Stack
Exchange after two months. Could a change in voting norm make her stay?
the scenario illustrated in Figure 5.3, where a user Alice created three answers in a
Stack Exchange website.
Votes (v): Our second construct refers to the collection of votes v that user u received on
his/her content. For instance, in the scenario illustrated in Figure 5.3, Alice received
3, 2, and 1 votes on her three succeeding answers, summarized using a utility vector.
Retention (r): Our third construct refers to the retention r of user u. For instance, in the
scenario illustrated in Figure 5.3, Alice left Stack Exchange website after two months.
Log Data. Our log data L can be seen as a set of n historical observations of form
(u,v, r) that embody the three constructs: L = {(u1,v1, r1), . . . , (un,vn, rn)}. Note that,
the observations in our data are based upon the control voting norm. To reason about
an alternative voting norm in a counterfactual setup, we must adjust the weights of these
observations as per the alternative norm. The concept of propensity score weighting underlies
this adjustment, where the probability of a particular observation under the control and
alternative norm may be different.
Mechanics. We develop a counterfactual formalism to evaluate the outcomes of an
alternative voting norm in terms of user retention. Our formalism relies on two functions
that capture voting norm and user retention respectively.
Voting Norm π(v|u): We consider platforms where voting norm decides the votes on con-
tent. The key idea of our counterfactual evaluation is that under different voting norms,
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the probability of a user u receiving a particular collection of votes v may be different.
Accordingly, we conceptualize each voting norm (both control and alternative) π as a
function of form π(v|u) that takes user u as input and generates the conditional prob-
ability of collection of votes v as output. For control norm, we estimate π(v|u) from
observational data; whereas for alternative norm we estimate π(v|u) from synthetic
data generated using the functions described in Section 5.4.1. We defer the discussion
of this estimation to the next section. For the remaining of this section, we assume
that, for a given voting norm, there’s a way for us to estimate π(v|u).
User Retention r(u,v): Our evaluation metric of interest is user retention, which can be
captured via any of the retention metrics described in Section 5.3. To evaluate voting
norms, we conceptualize user retention as a function r(u,v) that takes user u and the
collection of votes v that he/she received as input and generates the retention of the
user as output.
We refer to our control and alternative norm as πc and πa respectively. The goal of our
counterfactual evaluation is to evaluate norm πa using a log L collected under norm πc, where
our evaluation metric is user retention. To perform this evaluation, we need to compute the
expected retention R(πa) for norm πa.
Now, the expected retention R(π) of a norm π is a mathematical expectation of the







For control norm πc, we can estimate this expected retention R̂(πc) directly from log







Recall that we do not have any log data collected under the alternative voting norm
in a. Therefore, we can only use the data collected under control norm c for evaluating
the alternative norm. Intuitively, since we can not change the observed votes, what we are
interested in asking is that what if the alternative norm generated the observed votes. We can
achieve this by using the Inverse Propensity Score Estimator or IPS estimator, which simply
adjusts the weights of observations from log data based on the ratios of their occurrence
probabilities under the control and alternative norms. The average retention in the adjusted
data provides us the counterfactual retention for the alternative norm.
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5.4.3 Inverse Propensity Score Estimators
As log L is collected under πc, we can not use its observations directly for computing
expected retention R̂(πa) for πa. Rather, we must adjust the weights of the observations in L
to generate pseudo-observations for nπa. In this subsection, we present several counterfactual
estimators for performing this task. The basic concept of counterfactual estimators lies in
importance sampling or inverse propensity score (IPS) [152]. We present several IPS based
estimators to determine the expected retention under an alternative norm.
Basic IPS Estimator (IPS). The basic IPS estimator adjusts the weights of obser-
vations from log L = {(u1,v1, r1), . . . , (un,vn, rn)} based on the ratios of their occurrence











IPS is an unbiased estimator that is guaranteed to converge to the expected retention with
sufficient samples. The key limitation of this estimator is its high variance, which may make
it unsuitable for norm comparison. There are two sources of variance in IPS: the variability
of retention function r(u,v), and the mismatch in probabilities between the norm πc and
πa. To address the second source of variance, control variates are a popular choice. Control
variates exploit information about known quantities to reduce the variance of an estimate
of an unknown quantity.
Normalized IPS Estimator (NIPS). The normalized IPS estimator uses expected
sample size Ŵ (πa) as a multiplicative control variate to reduce the variance of the basic IPS


















Unlike basic IPS, NIPS provides a biased estimate of the expected retention, however, with
a lower variance compared to the basic IPS. Further, the bias itself decreases in proportion
to the sample size.
Using the IPS estimators described above, we can compute the expected retention R̂(πa)
for norm πa. The only required items are πc(v|u) and πa(v|u), which we need to estimate
from data. In the next section, we show how we estimate these functions.
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5.5 ESTIMATING VOTING NORMS
In this section, we first quantify how a user derives utility from votes (Section 5.5.1), then
describe our models for estimating the control norm π0 (Section 5.5.2) and alternative norm
πa (Section 5.5.3).
5.5.1 Quantifying User’s Utility
To evaluate the effects of voting norms on user retention, we need to represent the collection
of votes that a user received on his/her content in terms of derived utility. Our goal is to
keep this quantification as simple as possible while still capturing the acquisition of votes on
content as incentive. Motivated by the prior work on community voting [143], we adopt a
proportion based approach to quantify how an answerer derives utility from the votes he/she
receives on answers in Stack Exchange.
Without loss of generality, let’s assume that in Stack Exchange an answerer’s utility can
be discretized into two utility bins (see Table 5.1 for definition): Bhigh, Blow. The utility bins
capture the percentage of votes an answer receives with respect to the total votes across all
answers to its parent question. We quantify the utility of an answerer as the distribution of
his/her answers over these two utility bins. For instance, consider the following scenario in
Stack Exchange. For instance, consider the scenario illustrated in Figure 5.4. A user, Alice,
created three answers on a Stack Exchange site. She received 3, 2, and 1 vote on her three
succeeding answers. As per the observed votes, the first answer one falls into the high utility
bin, whereas the next two answers fall into the low utility bin. We represent this distribution





Figure 5.4: Example of constructing utility vector.
For each user user u, we represent the collection of received votes v using the two utility
bins (Blow, Bhigh) as follows: v = [λlow, λhigh], where λlow represents the number of answers
that falls into the bin Blow, and λhigh represents the number of answers that falls into the bin
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Table 5.1: The two utility bins (Bhigh, Blow) capture the percentage of votes an answer
received with respect to the total votes across all answers to its parent question.
Bin Definition
Blow Answer received less than 50% of total votes.
Bhigh Answer received more than or equal to 50% of total votes.
Bhigh. We use this representation to estimate π(v|u) for the control norm π0 and alternative
norm πa. Our estimation relies on two main hypotheses. First, for any voting norm, voting
outcomes are probabilistic. Second, the probabilities of voting outcomes may vary from
one voting norm to another. On the basis of these two hypotheses, we estimate the voting
norms in successive steps as follows. First, for a given community voting norm, we either
observe (control norm) or compute (alternative norm) the votes on each answer. We then
derive a probability distribution per answer that explains the uncertainity around the votes
on that answer. Next, using these probability distributions, we compute the probability of
each answer to belong to each of the two utility bins defined in Table 5.1. Finally, for each
answerer, based upon the probabilities associated with each of his/her answers (to belong
to the two utility bins), we compute the probability of the answerer to receive the utility
observed under the control norm. In the next subsections, we show how we estimate the
control and alternative voting norms as discussed above.
5.5.2 Estimating Control Norm π0
To estimate the control norm π0, we begin by examining our log data. The log data
reports the voting outcomes—the distribution of votes over the answers to a question—under
the control norm. However, there is uncertainty associated with the votes. We develop a
propensity model for quantifying the uncertainties in voting outcomes. Propensity, in our
setup, refers to the probability that a certain voting outcome will be observed. For instance,
given a question with three answers, what is the probability that the answers will receive 5,
5, and 2 votes respectively?
Our propensity model explains the voting behavior of a community from a contextual
perspective, in which voters examine the current context to evaluate and subsequently vote
on the answers. We define the context of an answer as all answers to its parent question.
There is a natural tendency among voters to cast vote on an answer in the light of other
answers to its parent question. We jointly model the votes on the answers to a given question
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using a Dirichlet-multinomial model, which offers high flexibility and expressive power in
quantifying uncertainity.
In our Dirichlet-multinomial model, we represent the distribution of votes over all answers
to a given question as a multinomial distribution. In addition, we use a Dirichlet distribution
with symmetric parameters as a conjugate prior for the parameters of the multonomial.
To generate a voting outcome for all k answers to a given question, we first draw a k-
dimensional probability vector θ from a Dirichlet distribution with parameter vector α.
We then draw a k-dimensional observation x from the multinomial distribution with the
probability vector θ and the total number of votes n.
θ = (θ1, θ2, . . . , θk) ∼ Dir (α) (5.6)
x = (x1, x2, . . . , xk) ∼ Multi (n,θ) (5.7)
To learn the propensities of voting outcomes from the observed votes, we need to estimate
the posterior distribution p(θ|D), whereD refers to the observed data. In our Bayesian setup,
p(θ|D) ∝ p(D|θ)p(θ). If the prior of a multinomial distribution is a Dirichlet distribution
with parameter vectorα, then its posterior reduces to a Dirichlet distribution with parameter
vector N + α, where N is the the observed distribution of votes over the answers to a
question.
p(θ|D) ∼ Dir (N +α) (5.8)
We use this posterior distribution to quantify the uncertainty in the distribution of votes
over the answers to a given question. We can further quantify the uncertainly for individual
answers by computing the marginal distributions of our posterior Dirichlet, which are beta
distributions.
Using the marginal beta distributions described above, we can compute the probability of
an answer to belong to each of the two utility bins defined in Table 5.1. For each answerer,
we can further combine these probabilities to compute the probability of the answerer to
receive the utility derived under the control norm. The underlying probability model is a
generalization of the multiple biased coin model—given z biased coins, each with a different
Bernoulli parameter pi, determine the probability that k of these coins will land on heads. In
our case, given z content generated by a user, each with a different probability distribution
over the utility bins, determine the probability that k of these content will belong to the
high utility bin.
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5.5.3 Estimating Alternative Norm πa
To estimate the alternative norm πa, we begin by generating synthetic data using the
functions described in Section 5.4.1. The synthetic data captures counterfactual voting
outcomes—the distribution of votes over the answers to a question—under the alternative
norm. However, same as the control norm, there is uncertainty associated with the votes un-
der the alternative norm. Accordingly, we develop a Dirichlet-multinomial model to capture
the uncertainty around votes on the answers, as per the alternative norm. Further, using
the steps described in Section 5.5.2, we compute the probability of the answerer to receive
the same utility under the alternative norm.
In Figure 5.5, we show how we estimate the alternative norm. Consider our hypothetical
user Alice, who created three answers and received 3, 2, and 1 vote, summarized using a
utility vector. In the control norm, the first answer’s probability of belonging to the high
utility bin is high (0.7). For the remaining two answers, the probabilities are low (0.2 and
0.1). The overall probability of the utility vector (2 answers in low and 1 answer in high
utility bin), can be computed as a joint. For the control norm, the probability is high (0.576).
In contrast, for the alternative norm, the first answer’s probability of belonging to the high
utility bin is high (0.8). For the remaining two answers, the probabilities are also high (0.4
and 0.7). The overall probability of the utility vector under the alternative norm is low. In
other words, Alice is less likely to receive low votes under the alternative norm.
Al
ice 1 2










𝜋! 𝒗𝒊 𝑢# = 𝜋! [1, 2] Alice
= 0.8*0.4*0.7
= 0.224




Figure 5.5: Example of estimating alternative norm.
Based on the estimation of control norm π0 (0.576) and alternative norm πa (0.224), we
conclude that Alice has a higher probability of receiving the aforementioned utility under
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the control norm compared to the alternative norm.
5.6 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section, we identify the best performing community voting norm on the basis of
user retention. We report the experimental setup (Section 5.6.1), compare different voting
norms using our IPS framework (Section 5.6.2), and analyze the performance of the best
performing norm through the lens of survival curve (Section 5.6.3).
5.6.1 Experimental Setup
We first describe our experimental setup: the dataset, the evaluation metrics, and the
candidate policies.
Dataset. We collected the latest release (September, 2017) of the Stack Exchange dataset.
This snapshot is a complete archive of all activities in Stack Exchange sites. There are 169
sites in our collected dataset. For the purpose of analysis, we show the results for three Stack
Exchange sites: English (English linguistics), Scifi (science fiction), and Worldbuilding
(building imaginary worlds). We select these three sites for following reasons. First, the sites
contain many open-ended questions that accommodate more than one correct answer. The
average number of answers per question for the three sites are as follows: 2.4 for English,
1.96 for Scifi, and 4.82 for Worldbuilding. Second, the topics of the sites promote
descriptive content with rich text, which make them suitable for our text based quality
metrics. The average number of words per answer for the three sites are as follows: 110
for English, 203 for Scifi, and 271 for Worldbuilding. Third, the sites cover diverse
categories: life (Worldbuilding), culture (English), and recreation (Scifi).
Table 5.2: Summary statistics for Stack Exchange sites analyzed in this section.
Site # of Users # of Questions # of Answers Answer Length
English 31381 87679 210338 110
Scifi 19144 41943 82130 203
Worldbuilding 8546 12853 61966 271
Evaluation Metrics. We use the following retention metrics for comparing the perfor-
mance of our community voting norms.
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Table 5.3: Comparison of community voting norms for English.
Voting Norm Answer Contributions Active Months Site Tenure
Control 23.27 (± 7.73) 4.42 (± 0.57) 16.60 (± 1.53)
Uniform 20.59 (± 16.68) 4.59 (± 1.75) 16.99 (± 3.79)
Random 21.10 (± 16.73) 4.74 (± 1.80) 16.65 (± 3.68)
Length 87.98 (± 75.57) 11.07 (± 5.37) 29.22 (± 10.16)
Readability 34.03 (± 38.55) 6.81 (± 3.04) 23.34 (± 7.83)
Objectivity 24.59 (± 12.94) 6.93 (± 2.96) 24.44 (± 8.64)
Polarity 70.10 (± 65.95) 9.89 (± 4.67) 28.46 (± 9.47)
Table 5.4: Comparison of community voting norms for Scifi.
Voting Norm Answer Contributions Active Months Site Tenure
Control 15.42 (± 5.32) 4.81 (± 0.60) 15.96 (± 1.43)
Uniform 10.99 (± 5.46) 4.63 (± 1.57) 15.59 (± 3.45)
Random 14.00 (± 6.47) 5.88 (± 2.10) 17.36 (± 3.97)
Length 37.80 (± 34.38) 7.33 (± 3.00) 19.74 (± 5.53)
Readability 16.68 (± 8.19) 6.63 (± 2.50) 19.17 (± 4.90)
Objectivity 13.06 (± 6.65) 5.73 (± 2.25) 18.28 (± 4.74)
Polarity 14.24 (± 6.74) 6.18 (± 2.25) 19.04 (± 4.68)
1. Answer Contributions: The average number of answers contributed by the users.
2. Active Months: The average number of active months (when a user contributes) for
the users.
3. Site Tenure: The average tenure (in months) for the users.
We compute the expected value of these metrics for different voting norms using the IPS
estimator (as described in Section 5).
Community Voting Norms. We estimate user retention for the community voting
norms described at Section 5.4.1. For each of these seven norms—control, random, uniform,
length, readability, objectivity, and polarity—we compute the expected value of the retention
metrics.
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Table 5.5: Comparison of community voting norms for Worldbuilding.
Voting Norm Answer Contributions Active Months Site Tenure
Control 17.72 (± 4.63) 4.79 (± 0.41) 11.83 (± 0.79)
Uniform 27.26 (± 26.57) 4.99 (± 1.28) 11.62 (± 1.72)
Random 31.67 (± 27.23) 5.59 (± 1.52) 12.36 (± 2.13)
Length 67.12 (± 46.24) 9.99 (± 3.52) 18.36 (± 5.00)
Readability 28.19 (± 13.82) 7.69 (± 2.52) 15.73 (± 3.90)
Objectivity 60.13 (± 37.42) 9.52 (± 3.14) 17.29 (± 4.39)
Polarity 66.92 (± 44.39) 9.79 (± 3.22) 17.63 (± 4.51)
5.6.2 Voting Norm Comparison
We compare the performance of the community voting norms by estimating the expected
value of retention metrics through IPS estimator. We specifically examine the retention of
first 1000 users in the platforms. Table 5.3 shows the comparison of community voting norms
for English; Table 5.4 for Scifi; Table 5.5 for Worldbuidling. We make the following
observations from these results.
1. Content Matters. For all three sites, the four content-based voting norms, namely,
length, readability, polarity, and objectivity, typically outperform the control norm. In
some cases, the content-based voting norms achieve order of magnitude improvement
in user retention over the control norm.
2. Effort Matters. For all three sites, length based voting norm outperforms the re-
maining voting norms across all retention metrics. Since a longer answer typically
requires more effort by the answerer, it is intuitive that voting based on the effort of
the answerer significantly improves retention.
3. Equality is Not Equity. For all three sites, the uniform voting norm typically un-
derperform the content-based norms. This is consistent with our expectation that a
uniform voting norm may demotivate a user from contributing as the utility is low.
4. Not So Random. Across all sites, the random voting norm typically underperform
the content-based norms. Community voting norms are stochastic, in which random-
ness is a necessary element. However, a completely random voting norm may demoti-
vate users.
In summary, we observe that content-based voting norms can improve user retention in
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Figure 5.6: Survival curves for control and length voting norm in three Stack Exchange sites:
English, Scifi, and Worldbulding.
Stack Exchange wsites. In the next subsection, we examine the best content-based voting
norm (length based voting) in the light of survival curves.
5.6.3 Survival Curve
We observe that the length based voting norm improves the average retention of users
for all sites. However, this could be achieved by increasing the probability of tail users
(users with high life expectancy), while ignoring other users. A more evolved norm should
improve the overall survival probability for entire population. We investigate whether the
high retention in length based voting norm is due to the tail users or not. To this end,
we compare the survival functions for the control norm and the length based voting norm.
Specifically, we use KM estimator to compute survival functions for the control norm and
the length based norm. Figure 5.6 presents these survival functions using survival curves.
Notice that, the length based voting norm improves survival probability of users at all stages.
The norm’s improvement therefore comes from the entire population.
Survival Function. The survival function S(t) captures the probability that a user will
survive past time t, and can be expressed as S(t) = p(T > t). It has the following properties:
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0 ≤ S(t) ≤ 1, S(t+ δt) ≤ S(t), and limt→∞ S(t) = 0.
Kaplan-Meier Estimator (KM). Kaplan-Meier estimator is a non-parametric statistic








where di is the number of death events at time t and ni is the number of subjects at risk
of death just prior to time t.
5.7 RELATED WORK
Our work draws from, and improves upon, a wealth of research on social media—notably,
voting behavior, policy design, user retention, content evaluation, and counterfactual esti-
mation.
Voting Behavior. Recent research has made great advancements towards the under-
standing of rating and voting behaviors in online platforms. Much of the work has focused
on studying biases, including social influence bias (especially herding behavior) [13, 88, 90,
93, 95, 97, 98, 120, 122], and reputation bias [114, 153]. The most relevant work to ours is
research that has investigated community voting behavior [96, 143], and its consequences.
Notably, Cheng et al. [143] proposed a propensity matching framework for examining how
votes on a content affect the future behavior of the content creator. It is important to note
the contrast between our proposed framework and the framework by Cheng et al.—that our
framework allows examining the effects of future (i.e., never experienced) voting behavior on
user retention.
Policy Design. Designing policies, in particular badges, for maximizing user participa-
tion has attracted a lot of attention in recent years [24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30]. Notably, Ander-
son et al. [29, 30] developed both theoretical and empirical methods for examining the effects
of badges on user behavior, and studied badge design in MOOCs [29] and question-answering
platforms [30]. Immorlica et al. [28] studied badge design mechanisms for maximizing the
total contribution of users. In this study, we examine policy design from a behavioral per-
spective, in which we conceptualize community behavior as a “policy”. Therefore, our policy
design problem is in fact a behavior adoption problem. We are not looking to deploy better
incentives (say badges), rather identify the desired voting behavior of a community, which
is expected to improve user retention.
User Retention. Another line of related work studied user retention in online plat-
forms [149, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159]. Yang et al. developed ClusChurn [154]—a
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framework for interpretable user clustering and churn prediction, based on an analysis of
Snapchat’s userbase. Kapoor et al. [149] applied Cox’s proportional hazard model to predict
the return time of users in an online music service. In this study, we examine user reten-
tion in the light of content generation and subsequent community feedback ; specifically, how
community feedback on content affects the retention of users who generated these content.
Content Evaluation. Evaluating social media content is crucial for recommendation
and search, and has been extensively studied by researchers [80, 81, 82, 83, 160, 161, 162].
The general theme of these works is to predict content quality based on various textual (e.g.,
length) and non-textual (e.g., user reputation) features. Most of these works determine the
quality of a content by aggregating the raw opinion scores (e.g., votes) from users. However,
raw opinion scores from users are often unreliable, due to various biases resulting from the
absence of independent assessment [110]. In this study, we investigate if alternative voting
schemes that do not accommodate these biases could improve user retention.
Counterfactual Estimation. There is a rich body of work on counterfactual estima-
tion, and its applications to the offline evaluation of recommendation systems and search
engines [163, 164, 165]. Similar to these works, we adopt an inverse propensity sampling
(IPS) framework to reason about new policies. However, unlike any previous work on coun-
terfactual evaluation, we evaluate community voting policies. Our goal is to identify an
evolved voting policy for the purpose of improving user retention.
5.8 CONCLUSION
In this study, we developed a counterfactual framework for examining the effects of commu-
nity voting on user retention. We conducted extensive experiments on 169 Stack Exchange
sites comparing the default voting policy in these CQA forums with six alternative policies:
random, uniform, length, readability, objectivity, and polarity. Our main finding is that had
the community members voted on the basis of content properties, we would have observed
increased user retention in Stack Exchange sites.
In this chapter, we showed how voting norms affect the retention of users. In the next
chapter, we will study how user roles affect platform health.
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CHAPTER 6: DISCOVERING USER ROLES
During the early years of this thesis, we investigated if the lack of platform sustainability
is due to the roles users play in platforms. Specifically, could it be that the abundance
or shortage of certain types of users causes platforms to decline? This chapter discusses
our fourth study, where we discover the roles users assume in content-based platforms and
examine how the mixture of these roles affects platform health.
6.1 INTRODUCTION
Discovering user roles and community role compositions on Community Question Answer-
ing (CQA) platforms is an important challenge. CQA platforms such as the Stack Exchange
platform1 play an incredibly important role in today’s society, and recent years have seen an
increase in both the number of such CQA communities and the user populations within each
community. For example, in 2017, StackOverflow2 added over 200,000 new questions and
over 130,000 new users every month; many software developers regularly depend StackOver-
flow to be effective at work. An understanding of behavior within communities can help to
inform the decisions made by platform providers to steer the communities to be maximally
effective.
It is well established that users in these communities play important, distinct roles [31,
166, 167, 168, 169], but it remains an important scalability challenge to automatically un-
cover these distinct user roles across a large number of communities. Stack Exchange as
a platform, for example, facilitates 161 distinct websites. Manual investigation of user be-
havior compositions within and across these communities is prohibitively expensive to do
without some level of automation, and with these communities continuing to grow over time,
the need for automated role discovery intensifies.
Existing approaches fall short of our needs in a number of ways. Many existing mod-
els for role discovery do not consider the case of modeling many communities at once,
yet such a cross-community understanding of behavior is important to enable comparative
studies across communities. Previous work often defines roles based on a graph-centric ap-
proach [170, 171, 172], which fails to uncover many distinct roles beyond “answer people”
and “discussion people.” Other approaches require a manual definition of individual features
to describe roles [173, 174], which can fail to cover all of the empirically present role patterns
1https://stackexchange.com
2https://stackoverflow.com, the largest community on the Stack Exchange platform
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in the data.
In this paper, we propose a generative model for discovering action-based user roles and
community role compositions in CQA platforms directly from log data. We formally define
an action-based user behavior role as a probability distribution over atomic actions a user
may take with respect to the CQA community within one browsing session. We also di-
rectly model the role compositions across all communities within the platform to facilitate
comparative analysis of communities. This is achieved via the use of a mixture of Dirichlet-
multinomial Mixtures (MDMM), which allows us to use statistical inference to uncover the
latent user roles and community role compositions from log data directly, which can facili-
tate studies into user behavior both within and across communities on a CQA platform at
scale. We envision that with the assistance of our model, human analysts can “see” more
patterns than what they could see otherwise. Such a tool provides a useful “lens” through
which to view behavior data, and opens up many directions for future studies that would
not otherwise be possible.
To demonstrate that such a model is indeed useful as a tool to assist human discovery
of behavior patterns within and between CQA communities, we perform a comprehensive
experiment on all 161 non-meta communities on the Stack Exchange CQA platform that
delivers three empirical insights. First, we show interesting distinctions in question-asking
behavior on Stack Exchange (where two distinct types of askers can be identified) and an-
swering behavior (where two distinct roles surrounding answers emerge). Second, we find
statistically significant differences in behavior compositions across topical groups of commu-
nities on Stack Exchange, and that those groups that have statistically significant differences
in health metrics also have statistically significant differences in behavior compositions, sug-
gesting a relationship between behavior composition and health. Finally, we show that
the MDMM behavior model can be used to demonstrate similar but distinct evolutionary
patterns between topical groups.
6.2 RELATED WORK
The presence of roles on CQA platforms has been argued by many. For example, Adamic
et al.[166] demonstrate that, on the Yahoo! Answers platform, there are at least three distinct
user types—answerers, askers, and discussion persons. Mamykina et al.[167] argue for the
presence of at least four distinct user roles on StackOverflow: community activists, shooting
stars, low-profile users, and lurkers and visitors. Other studies have explored whether roles
characterized by a single action are separate or overlapping [168, 169]. Developing tools to
automatically uncover distinct user behavior types is a major thrust of this paper.
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Many approaches for discovering these distinct user roles in the CQA setting require
practitioners to define individual features used to describe the discovered roles [173, 174],
and early work in the domain of user role modeling could only easily identify two critical
roles (“answer people” and “discussion people”) through the use of a graph-centric modeling
approach [170, 171, 172]. More recent work explores a mixed-membership approach to
user behavior modeling [175] in order to identify more user roles, but still takes a graph-
centric modeling approach. In this work, we explore the newer direction of action-focused
probabilistic modeling for user behavior in order to automatically discover roles in a way that
requires less hands-on effort to define features and is flexible enough to be able to capture
more nuance within the roles of “answer people” and “discussion people”.
The application of probabilistic modeling for user behavior understanding has been ex-
plored before [176, 177, 178]. We extend this body of research by modeling the behavior
composition at a community level, rather than just at a user level. This allows us to under-
stand the behavior at the level of an entire community as it relates to others.
Perhaps the most relevant probabilistic behavior model to ours is the one proposed by
Han et al.[179], where they attempt to jointly model three phenomena: social network link
formation, community discovery, and behavior prediction. Their definition of user behavior
differs from ours, however, as it considers only posting and reposting as the two possible
actions a user can take. We attempt to define a much more comprehensive behavioral action
set in this work. Furthermore, their discovered role distributions model real-valued user
attributes, rather than behavior directly, which makes interpretation challenging. Our work,
in comparison, assumes a different generative process over user action lists that leads to a
set of readily interpretable probability distributions that define our roles.
CQA data, and in particular the Stack Exchange CQA platform, have been analyzed in
many ways in previous literature [166, 167, 168, 169, 174, 180], but many do not discuss
user roles in depth. Furtado et al.[174], however, do explore user roles and their dynamics
using five of the communities on the Stack Exchange platform, but their definition of user
roles arises from manual construction of user attributes and an agglomerative clustering
approach. Our model, in comparison, is more general in that it should be applicable to any
CQA community (or any social network) where articulating the set of actions users can take
within the community is the only manual supervision required.
Our session-focused approach is closely related to the notion of clickstream mining [181,
182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187], where a variety of clustering techniques is applied to find
users that share similar clickstream traces. Many of these techniques utilize Markov models
and focus on the task of predicting a user’s next action. In this paper, we instead focus
on characterizing the behavior of users in an interpretable way that also facilitates cross-
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community comparisons.
The model we propose in this paper is essentially similar to topic models such as PLSA [188]
or LDA [189], but the key difference is that the data modeled by our model are the user
actions whereas topic models generally model text data where the input tokens are individ-
ual words within topics. The Dirichlet-multinomial mixture (DMM) [190, 191] is the closest
related model to ours in this space. A DMM assumes that individual documents exhibit
only one topic—our generative framework also assumes that one user session exhibits only
one role.
Other approaches for user behavior modeling on CQA communities consider both actions
and textual content to generate topic-specific action distributions [178, 192]. These distri-
butions are similar to what we call roles, but the meaning they capture is very different—in
their work these capture how users interact with a specific topic, whereas in our work they
describe how to characterize an individual user’s entire browsing session.
6.3 MODEL
The design of our model is motivated by our goal of discovering interpretable descriptions
of functional roles played by users on CQA platforms, as well as a representation for each
community as a mixture over these user roles. We explore a definition of user roles that
considers the co-occurrence behavior of actions users take within individual browsing ses-
sions. To accomplish this, we represent the roles as probability distributions that describe
the likelihood of taking individual actions when a user is assuming a particular functional
role in one session. This definition is advantageous: first, it is general, and thus should
be applicable to any CQA platform (or even any social network); second, roles represented
in this way can be readily interpreted by inspection; and third, it is able to capture the
uncertainty associated with assigning users to roles.
6.3.1 Generative Process and Inference
The first step in the use of our action-based role discovery model is to define the set A of
actions users may take within a community. Defining the actions in this action set is very
important in order to capture meaningful roles under our model, so careful attention should
be paid to the construction of a set of disjoint actions whose proportions can meaningfully
reflect a type of domain-relevant behavior.
Next, one must identify the collection of observed communities C1:N to analyze that all
share the same action set A. We do not address the problem of community discovery in this
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paper; rather, these communities are treated as input to the model. Each community must
share the same types of allowed actions. In our case, we use individual websites that are all
part of the same CQA platform (but focus on different topical domains) to ensure that by
defining A with respect to the CQA platform itself we can represent behavior across all of
these communities.
To automatically discover distinctive user behavior types, which we will call our roles,
we appeal to the general technique of probabilistic graphical models [193] and model user
behavior using a mixed membership approach. The model assumes that there are K distinct
user roles, each of which is characterized with a categorical distribution φk over actions from
some A; each of the roles φk is assumed to be drawn from a Dirichlet distribution with
parameter β. With these user roles defined, we further assume that each community Ci
is associated with a mixing distribution θi (drawn from another Dirichlet distribution with
parameter α) that governs the distribution over the user roles for each user session that
occurs within that community. If a user makes actions in multiple communities within one
browsing session, we subdivide their browsing session into a collection of sessions, one for
each community they participated in.
More concretely, we represent each community Ci with a list of the user sessions 〈si,1, si,2,
. . . , si,M〉 associated with it. Each session is itself a list of actions si,j = 〈ai,j,1, ai,j,2, . . . , ai,j,T 〉,
with each ai,j,t ∈ A. Each individual session si,j is associated with one particular user role
zi,j that indicates the role distribution φzi,j from which each of the actions within the session
is drawn (note that an individual user is free to exhibit a different roles between different
sessions). The full generative process is thus
1. For k = 1 to K (number of roles), draw an action distribution φk ∼ Dirichlet(β)
2. For each community Ci:
(a) Draw a role mixing distribution θi ∼ Dirichlet(α)
(b) For each si,j in community Ci:
i. Draw a role for the session zi,j ∼ Categorical(θi)
ii. For t = 1 to |si,j| (the length of the session), draw a single action within the
session ai,j,t ∼ Categorical(φzi,j)
and is depicted using plate notation in Figure 6.1.
The resulting model is quite similar to a Dirichlet-multinomial mixture (DMM), which has
seen use in the text mining community for clustering [191] and classification [190]. A major
difference from our model, however, is that in a DMM one learns a single distribution θ that
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Figure 6.1: Plate notation for the role discovery model we propose. α parameterizes a Dirich-
let distribution from which each community’s role proportions, θi, are drawn. z represents
the role assignment for a specific user session, and a represents the actions taken within that
user session. β parameterizes a Dirichlet distribution from which each of the user roles φk
are drawn, each of which is a categorical distribution over the possible action types.
governs the mixing proportions over the components φk that is shared for each element Ci,
whereas our model instead learns a separate distribution θi for each individual community,
but shares the description of the components φk between each. This allows us to compare
two communities by their role proportions in a meaningful way since each θi will be a
distribution over the same set of roles φk. If one were instead to fit multiple DMMs, one
for each community, comparison of the θ distributions would not necessarily be immediately
obvious due to the fact that each model would learn a separate set of roles φk. Thus, we view
our model as a principled mixture of DMMs (MDMM) where we have made a deliberate
decision to share a global set of role components between all communities Ci.
There are several approaches to inference in a DMM. Nigam et al.[190] use maximum a
posteriori (MAP) estimation to obtain a point estimate. We instead choose to follow a more
fully Bayesian approach similar to Yin et al.[191] and instead appeal to Markov-chain Monte
Carlo methods to approximate the desired posterior distribution. Specifically, we integrate
out θ and φ in order to then derive a collapsed Gibbs sampler that iteratively updates the
latent role assignments zj by sampling new values from the full conditional distribution.
When this chain has converged, we extract a MAP estimate for each θi and φk from the
current state of the Markov chain.
Formally, we can define the full conditional distribution
p(zm,n = z | Z¬m,n,S, α, β)
=
p(Z,S | α, β)
p(Z¬m,n,S | α, β)
∝ p(Z,S | α, β)
p(Z¬m,n,S¬m,n | α, β)
, (6.1)
where Z¬m,n indicates the set of all the assignments of zi,j with only zm,n excluded, and
similarly S¬m,n indicate the set of all user sessions with only the specific session sn,m absent.
We begin by noting p(Z,S | α, β) = p(S | Z, β)P (Z | α), and focus on each term separately.
99






B(α) is the multivariate beta function and ηi is a vector where ηi,k indicates the number
of times role k is chosen as the role assignment for a session in community Ci. Similarly,





where τk is a vector with τk,a indicating the number of times
action type a was assigned to role k through its session’s role assignment. From here, we can
derive the sampling probability through cancellation of terms and exploiting the property
of the gamma function that Γ(1 + x) = xΓ(x) and arrive at
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where c(a, sm,n) indicates the number of occurrences of action type a in session sm,n.
As a practical matter, computing this probability is susceptible to underflow issues due to
the products occurring in the second term. To prevent this issue, we use the Gumbel-max
trick [194] to sample from this discrete distribution. This trick works by first computing the
sampling proportions in log-space γk = log p̃(zm,n = k | Z¬m,n,S, α, β), where p̃ represents
the un-normalized probability in equation 6.2, which effectively prevents the underflow issues.
We then can sample from the original discrete distribution by sampling k values gk ∼
Gumbel(0), and taking the sample zm,n = arg maxk γk + gk. We have open-sourced the
implementation of our inference algorithm under a liberal license3.
6.3.2 Choosing the Number of Roles
The number of roles, K, remains a hyperparameter of the MDMM behavior model. How
should one choose the “optimal” value for K? This is a similar question that is asked for
nearly any mixed-membership or clustering model. We note, first, that the choice of K can
be an empirical parameter that is sometimes beneficial as it can give users control over the
granularity of the model, much like a user can adjust the zoom level of a microscope. If the
user does not know how to set K a priori, we describe a procedure that can help choose a
particular value of K that may be optimal.
In our specific case, not only do we wish to discover distributions over actions that can
3https://github.com/CrowdDynamicsLab/stackoverflow-stream
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adequately describe a user’s behavior within a single session, but we wish for these distribu-
tions to be meaningfully different from one another. An ad-hoc approach, then, is to simply
run the model for different values of K in some range, and then investigate the roles φ1:K
that are produced. When moving from k to k + 1 roles, if a new role arises that is not
meaningfully different from all of the k roles found previously, this suggests that k was the
optimal number of roles for the data being modeled.
One can define a simple quantitative heuristic to capture this intuition. Formally, let φ1:k
be the k roles proposed by the model previously, and let φ̂1:k+1 be the k + 1 roles proposed
by the model when incrementing K. Consider a single new role φ̂i. We can compute how
different it is from each of the previously proposed roles φ1:k by using the KL-divergence
metric [195]. By taking the minimum divergence from the newly proposed role φ̂i to each
of the k previous roles, we have a measure for how “surprising” this new role is compared
to the previous roles. If it is very similar to one of the existing roles, it will have a very
low minimum KL-divergence; on the other hand, should it be very different from all of the
previous roles, it would have a very large minimum KL-divergence.
If we then take the maximum value of this measure over all of the k + 1 newly proposed
roles φ̂1:k+1, we obtain a number that reflects the largest minimum divergence between the
set of k old roles and the set of k+ 1 new roles. The smaller this value, the more redundant










To find the optimal value of K, one can run the model for K in a range of values to
be considered, computing MaxMinKLk→k+1 for each transition. When this value drops
substantially, this is a sign that the new set of roles is not meaningfully different from the
previous set of roles, and we should stop increasing K.
6.3.3 Applications of the Model
The MDMM behavior model is a tool to enable humans to discover new knowledge, explore
new hypotheses, and test those hypotheses about user behavior in ways that they were
unable to before. There are a number of different applications of the model beyond just the
discovery of user behavior roles. We outline a few of them below, but note that this list is
not exhaustive—exploring those opportunities are interesting future directions.
Community Profiling. A secondary output of the model are the mixing proportions θi
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over the roles for each community. These distributions provide a profile of the behavior of
users within the community, which can be used as a representation for that community in
downstream tasks. To explore this in more detail, in Section 6.4.3 and 6.4.4 we explore how
we can use this representation to uncover communities with different behavior profiles, and
show how these groups are correlated with many metrics of community success.
User Profiling. The model can also be used to infer the roles of a user by averaging
over the roles they assume in their sessions. This output can then be used in downstream
tasks that relate to understanding user behavior on an individual level and can be used as
a representation of a user for other machine learning algorithms.
Behavior Dynamics of Communities. We can also uncover temporal community
representations by further segmenting the user browsing sessions into buckets relating to
different points in time. This allows us to study how behavior proportions evolve over time
as community age. We explore this in more depth in Section 6.4.5.
Behavior Dynamics of Users. In much the same way we can uncover community
representations over time, we can also uncover user representations over time. This output
could be used to understand how individual users, or groups of users, change their behavior
over time.
6.4 EXPERIMENTS
The goal of our experiments is to demonstrate the usefulness of the MDMM user behavior
model as a tool for investigating user behavior in different ways. Our goal is not to be
completely comprehensive or conclusive in our study of user behavior, but rather to lay a
framework for future studies in a variety of different directions that could not otherwise be
studied.
Our MDMM user behavior model provides two important outputs to characterize user
behavior in CQA communities: (1) the latent role representations, and (2) the degree to
which each latent role is present within each of the CQA communities. We apply our model
to communities from the Stack Exchange CQA platform4 in order to better understand its
utility for role discovery and CQA community behavior analysis tasks. We take the entire
Stack Exchange dataset consisting of a total of 322 websites and discard all “meta” websites
(websites discussing one of the other Stack Exchange websites), leaving us with 161 non-meta
websites (communities) for our analysis.
4The dataset is available here: https://archive.org/details/stackexchange. We used a dataset from
2016-12-12, which covers from 2008-07-31 through 2016-12-11.
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Table 6.1: Action names and their definitions for our application of the MDMM behavior
model on StackExcahnge. (m: “my”, o: “other”, q: “question”, a: “answer”)
Action Name Action Definition
question Posting a new question
answer-mq Answering your own question
answer-oq Answering someone else’s question
comment-mq Commenting on your own question
comment-oq Commenting on someone else’s question
comment-ma-mq Commenting on your own answer to your own question
comment-ma-oq Commenting on your own answer to someone else’s question
comment-oa-mq Commenting on someone else’s answer to your own question
comment-oa-oq Commenting on someone else’s answer to someone else’s
question
edit-mq Editing your own question
edit-oq Editing someone else’s question
edit-ma Editing your own answer
edit-oa Editing someone else’s answer
mod-vote Voting for moderation action
mod-action Moderating a post
6.4.1 Dataset Construction
A critical component of the use of the MDMM in our setting is properly defining the
action space to be considered, as the roles discovered are to be distributions over that action
space. The flexibility of defining actions outside of the MDMM model makes it easy to
accommodate analysis of action patterns at different levels of granularity by adjusting the
granularity of the action space to be analyzed itself. However, in any specific application,
carefully choosing the exact action set used is naturally very important. If the space of
actions is defined too narrowly, this prevents discovering subtle differences between user
roles.
To analyze the Stack Exchange dataset, we defined an action space based on the inherent
content hierarchy present on the Stack Exchange platform (see Table 6.1 for a list of the
action set we consider). Content on the Stack Exchange platform comes in three main types:
questions (the root content), answers (which nest below questions), and comments (which
can nest either beneath questions or answers), so it is natural to consider an action set
consisting of the creation action for each of these three types of content. However, limiting
the action space to just these three actions will fail to uncover meaningful differences in
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commenting behavior, the most frequently generated type of content. We subdivide the
commenting action by first distinguishing between comments that occur on questions from
comments that occur on answers, and then further dividing these based on the original poster
of the parent content further up in the content tree. Concretely, we arrive at six separate
commenting action types: commenting on my own question (comment-mq), commenting
on others’ questions (comment-oq), commenting on my answer to my question (comment-
ma-mq), commenting on my answer to others’ questions (comment-ma-oq), commenting on
others’ answers to my question (comment-oa-mq), and finally commenting on others’ answers
to others’ questions (comment-oa-oq). Similarly, we can subdivide the answering action into
answering my own question (answer-mq) and answering others’ questions (answer-oq).
While creation actions are arguably the most important actions to consider for modeling
user behavior with respect to the generation of content, it is also important to consider the
role that editors play within the communities. We define four types of edit actions: editing
my question (edit-mq), editing others’ questions (edit-oq), editing my answer (edit-ma), and
editing others’ answers (edit-oa). We also include two actions related to moderation (the
closing, locking, deleting, moving, etc. of posts) on Stack Exchange with two actions: voting
for moderation activity (mod-vote) and the actual application of moderation (mod-action).
Once we have defined our action space, we can then begin the session segmentation process.
We start with a chronologically ordered list of all of the actions from the action space taken
within a community, and then partition this list into separate action lists associated with
each individual user. Then, we define a session as a contiguous chunk of a user’s action
list such that the gap between consecutive actions is less than six hours to roughly capture
a day’s worth of activity per session. The collection of all of these sessions, grouped by
community, serves as the MDMM’s input.
We further decompose the community session lists by segmenting them into month-long
chunks to enable temporal analysis of the behavior compositions over time for our com-
munities. We define the “birth” of a community as the timestamp of the very first action
taken in any user session associated with it, and then use that as the reference point for
constructing the monthly session lists. This gives us 49,768,660 user sessions across 9117
community-month pairs.
6.4.2 Analysis of the Discovered Roles
We start our analysis by examining the usefulness of the discovered roles φ1:K . Because
the number of roles, K, is a hyperparameter of our model, it must be chosen in advance of
our investigation into the roles. Our MaxMinKL heuristic suggests a value of K = 5 for our
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Table 6.2: The MaxMinKL heuristic for the MDMM behavior model applied to the Stack
Exchange dataset. Notice the substantial drop when moving from K = 5 to K = 6, indicat-
ing redundancy obtained in the set of new roles. This matches our own visual inspection of







dataset (see Table 6.2 for the scores for each transition), and manual inspection also indicated
role redundancies found at K > 5. We ran our model on an Intel(R) Core(TM) i7-5820K
CPU, and each iteration takes approximately 20 seconds. We ran the model for 100 total
iterations, as we found the output stopped changing appreciably after about 40 iterations.
Each role we discovered at K = 5 is depicted in Figure 6.2, along with labels constructed
from our own interpretation of the roles. These results directly help us understand what the
“typical” roles assumed by users are in CQA communities.
“Eager asker” (Figure 6.2a): Users exhibiting this role tend to ask questions, and comment
on others’ answers to their questions.
“Careful asker” (Figure 6.2d): While both this role and the previous role tend to ask
questions in the same proportion within a session, a “careful asker” tends to comment
a lot in discussions on their own question rather than on answers to their question,
and they also have a much higher chance of updating their question when compared to
the “eager asker” role. This subtle difference in asking behavior types would be lost if
we had not carefully subdivided the commenting action by considering both the type
and originator of the parent content of the comment.
“Answerer” (Figure 6.2c): For the most part, this reflects a user that is concerned about
their own answers. They provide their answers, they comment on their answers, and
they update their answers. They may also seek clarification on a question by engaging
in the discussion on that question, but not nearly as much as the next role.
“Clarifier” (Figure 6.2e): Users exhibiting this role tend to engage in the discussion on
a question (by far their most frequent action) before answering; they also tend to
comment on others’ answers to others’ questions more than any other role.
“Editor/moderator” (Figure 6.2b): This role captures nearly all of the observed moder-







































































































(a) An asker role we call “ea-
ger asker.” In comparison
to Figure 6.2d, we see that
when a user exhibiting this
role chooses to comment, they
tend to comment on others’








































































































role. This role is the only
role that exhibits moderation
behavior, and we see that
the vast majority of actions
a user takes when exhibiting







































































































(c) An “answerer” role. The
majority of the time, users ex-
hibiting this role answer oth-
ers’ questions, engage in dis-
cussion on their provided an-







































































































(d) An asker role we call “careful asker.” In
comparison to Figure 6.2a, we see that when
a user exhibiting this role chooses to comment,
they tend to do so on their own question. This
may indicate engagement with users exhibiting
the “clarifier” role (see Figure 6.2e) to improve







































































































(e) A “clarifier” role. The majority of this user’s
activity is centered on commenting behavior,
and is predominately engaging in discussion on
others’ questions. This is likely a result of this
type of user engaging with others exhibiting the
“careful asker” role (see Figure 6.2d) in order to
clarify the question before providing an answer.
Figure 6.2: The role distributions discovered by our MDMM behavior model fit to 161
Stack Exchange communities. The labels given to these roles reflect our own interpretation
of the role and are given here to make disambiguating the roles easier in the text. The
MDMM behavior model can uncover subtle distinctions in asking behavior (see Figure 6.2a
vs Figure 6.2d) and answering behavior (see Figure 6.2c vs Figure 6.2e).
While it might not be very surprising to see two distinct roles corresponding to primarily
asking questions and primarily answering questions, the model goes beyond discovering
such “obvious” roles to provide further fine distinction of interesting variations of roles for
both question askers and question answerers, which may not be easy to discover otherwise
by simply manually examining their behaviors. Our MDMM behavior model is able to
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uncover these meaningful user behavior roles, including those with subtle differences, in a
completely unsupervised way directly from log data once given an appropriate action space.
Note that due to the generality of the MDMM model, we can easily refine action categories
to potentially discover even finer-grained variations of user roles than what we have seen
here—in this way, our model naturally supports multi-resolution analysis of user behavior.
6.4.3 Analysis of Behavior Compositions
The MDMM behavior model also outputs role proportions θi for each community in the
dataset. These proportions provide an informative summary of the composition of behaviors
in a community, i.e., a behavior profile. This profile provides a representation of a community
that can be further analyzed, as we will discuss in this section.
We start with the following question: are there systematic differences in role proportions
between groups of communities in our dataset? To answer this question, we grouped each
community in the Stack Exchange dataset using the taxonomy provided by Stack Exchange
itself5: (1) Technology, (2) Culture/Recreation, (3) Life/Arts, (4) Science, (5) Professional,
and (6) Business. To allow for a “warm-up” period for the community and to eliminate
the issue of noisy proportion vectors arising due to data sparsity during community launch,
we discard the first 12 months of role proportion data for each community. We then only
consider communities that have at least 12 months of data beyond that warm-up period to
allow for computing an average proportion vector to represent the community over at least
one year. After filtering, the “Professional” and “Business” groups have only five and four
communities, respectively, so we consider only the four larger groups. “Technology” had 52
communities, “Culture/Recreation” had 36, “Life/Arts” had 20, and “Science” had 17. We
show the group memberships in Table 6.3.
These four groups’ role proportions are visualized in Figure 6.3. Visually, we can see a
number of differences. First, the “eager asker” role is more prominent in the “Technology”
group than all three others. Both the “Technology” and “Science” groups have higher
prominence of the “careful asker” role when compared against “Culture/Recreation” and
“Life/Arts”. We can also see that the “clarifier” role is diminished in the “Technology”
compared to the others.
There are also notable commonalities between groups. The “Culture/Recreation” and
“Life/Arts” groups are quite similar across nearly all of the roles. The “editor/moderator”
role prevalence is similar across all of the groups (with only a slight increase present for
the “Culture/Recreation” group). “Answerer” prevalence is similar across all of the groups
5https://stackexchange.com/sites
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Table 6.3: Communities belonging to each of the four groups we consider from Stack Ex-
change’s own taxonomy.
Group Members
Technology android, apple, arduino, askubuntu, bitcoin, blender, codegolf, codereview, craftcms,
crypto, datascience, dba, drupal, dsp, ebooks, electronics, emacs, expressionengine,
gamedev, gis, ja.stackoverflow, joomla, magento, mathematica, networkengineering,
opendata, programmers, pt.stackoverflow, raspberrypi, reverseengineering, robotics,
ru.stackoverflow, salesforce, security, serverfault, sharepoint, softwarerecs, sound,
space, sqa, stackapps, stackoverflow, superuser, tex, tor, tridion, unix, ux, webapps,
webmasters, windowsphone, wordpress
Culture/Recreation anime, beer, bicycles, boardgames, bricks, buddhism, chess, chinese, christianity, ell,
english, french, gaming, german, ham, hermeneutics, hinduism, history, homebrew,
islam, italian, japanese, judaism, martialarts, mechanics, outdoors, poker, politics,
puzzling, rpg, rus, russian, skeptics, spanish, sports, travel
Life/Arts academia, avp, cooking, diy, expatriates, fitness, gardening, genealogy, graphicdesign,
lifehacks, money, movies, music, parenting, pets, photo, productivity, scifi, sustain-
ability, worldbuilding
Science astronomy, biology, chemistry, cogsci, cs, cstheory, earthscience, economics, hsm, lin-
guistics, math, matheducators, mathoverflow.net, philosophy, physics, scicomp, stats
(where the reduction in variance in “Life/Arts” and “Science” likely attributable to there
being fewer communities in those groups).
To quantify the statistical significance of the above observations, we use a Kruskal-Wallis
H test [196] to perform a one-way ANOVA test to determine the existence of a difference
between a single role proportion across all four groups, for each role proportion. Then, if a
statistically significant difference between the groups is reported, we use a post-hoc Conover-
Iman test [197] to determine which of the groups exhibit statistically significant differences
in that role proportion. To correct for multiple testing in both cases, we use the Holm-
Bonferroni method [198] to correct the p-values. We report our findings in Table 6.4. On
the whole, we see that the “Technology“ group differs strongly from the other three groups in
terms of its proportion of “eager asker” (where it is higher) and “clarifier” roles (where it is
lower). We also see that the “careful asker” role is more prominent in the communities from
the “Technology” and “Science” groups and less prominent in the “Culture/Recreation” and
“Life/Arts” groups. This suggests that the more technical communities in “Technology” and
“Science” require more discussion around questions than the less technical communities of
“Culture/Recreation” and “Life/Arts”.
Thus, we have demonstrated the utility of using the MDMM behavior model for under-
standing differences in user behavior across communities. This is easily facilitated because it


















































































































































Figure 6.3: Letter-value plots of the role proportion vectors for the four largest Stack Ex-
change groups after filtering communities with less than 12 months of data after filtering a
start-up period of 12 months.
of the discovered roles φ1:K .
6.4.4 Behavior Compositions and their Relationship to Community Success
As another example of what one can learn by studying the community role compositions
that can be discovered by the MDMM user behavior model, we now ask the following ques-
tion: how does the proportion of roles within a community relate to its success? In order
to explore this, we first need to be able to define what we mean by “success” in a CQA
community. We have taken a content-focused approach to understanding behavior, so we
also choose to define the success of a community in terms of its content generation. Bor-
rowing from Dev et al.[199], we have the following metrics: (1) the ratio of the number of
answers Na to the number of questions Nq, which is a reflection of the ability of a community
to cope with question load; (2) the percentage of questions that receive an answer; (3) the
percentage of questions that receive an “accepted” answer6, which reflects the community’s
ability to provide high-quality answers to new questions; and finally (4) the average time
before the arrival of the first answer7, which measures the timeliness of the community’s
answering capabilities.
Each of these metrics can be computed for each monthly snapshot of a community (by
considering the questions that are asked within that time period). Then, we can average the
value for a metric across all of the months of a community to obtain an overall score for that
metric for that community. We again only consider the communities that, after dropping 12
6On Stack Exchange, the original poster of a question can designate one of the answers provided as being
“correct” by “accepting” that answer.
7We compute this only for questions that did receive an answer.
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Table 6.4: Statistical significance tests for differences in role proportions across the four
groups. All p-values are adjusted using the Holm-Bonferroni method. Shown are only those
tests that are statistically significant at a threshold of 0.05. We notice strongly significant
differences (p < 1 × 10−5) in role proportions for the “eager asker”, “careful asker”, and
“clarifier” roles.
Role p-value Group Pair p-value
eag. ask. 3.87× 10−11
cult. tech. 1.49× 10−14
life vs. tech. 5.41× 10−7
sci. vs. tech. 6.63× 10−7
edit/mod. 1.10× 10−2 cult. vs. tech. 2.40× 10−3
care. ask. 7.53× 10−9
cult. vs. sci. 3.00× 10−6
cult. vs. tech. 3.41× 10−9
life vs. sci. 5.80× 10−5
life vs. tech. 3.07× 10−6
answerer 1.10× 10−2 cult. vs. sci. 4.44× 10−3
clarifier 4.41× 10−8
cult. vs. tech. 5.22× 10−8
life vs. tech 1.69× 10−6
sci. vs. tech 2.30× 10−5
months of “warm-up” period data, have at least 12 months of data.
The results are visualized in Figure 6.4. While differences in these metrics are small, they
are statistically significant (see Table 6.5). In particular, we notice that the “Culture/Recre-
ation” and “Life/Arts” groups have a higher ratio of answers to questions (Figure 6.4a) and
a higher fraction of answered questions (Figure 6.4b) when compared to the “Science” and
“Technology” groups. These same pairs exhibit statistically significantly different propor-
tions of the “careful asker” role.
This provides an interesting insight: groups of communities that have a higher propensity
for the “careful asker” role exhibited lower health metrics across multiple measures. In fact,
every pair of groups that exhibited a statistically significant difference in this role proportion
also had statistically significant differences present in at least two metrics (with one pair with
three and another with four). While we cannot say whether this correlation is causal, this
opens the door for more studies into impact of the “careful asker” profile on community
health—a question we could not have raised without first having a tool like the MDMM
behavior model to aid our efforts to understand user behavior.
Furthermore, notice that groups that do not exhibit differences in their behavior profiles
(namely “Culture/Recreation” and “Life/Arts”) also do not exhibit differences in any of our
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Table 6.5: Statistical significance tests for differences in health metrics across the four groups.
All p-values are adjusted using the Holm-Bonferroni method. Shown are only those tests
that are statistically significant at a threshold of 0.05. We note that, with a single exception
(“Science” vs “Technology”), when there is a statistically significant difference in role propor-
tions, there is a statistically significant difference in at least one of the four health metrics we
explore. Similarly, groups that do not have different role proportions (“Culture/Recreation”
and “Life/Arts”) do not have significant differences in health metrics.
Metric p-value Group Pair p-value
Na/Nq 7.08× 10−7
cult. vs. sci. 4.26× 10−5
cult. vs. tech. 3.51× 10−6
life vs. sci. 1.20× 10−4
life vs. tech. 6.50× 10−5
% ans. 6.34× 10−5
cult. vs. sci. 7.44× 10−5
cult. vs. tech. 4.12× 10−4
life. vs. sci. 3.16× 10−3
life. vs. tech. 3.36× 10−2
% acc. ans. 1.08× 10−2 cult. vs. sci. 6.68× 10−3
Resp. time 1.08× 10−2 cult. vs. sci. 2.31× 10
−2
cult. vs. tech. 3.34× 10−2
four health metrics.
6.4.5 Evolution of Behavior Composition
The questions we have explored so far have focused mainly on static snapshots of the CQA
communities in our dataset. However, these communities do not exist in a vacuum—they
continually evolve over time as they acquire new users and address new topics. How can
we understand how community behavior changes over time as these communities grow and
evolve? Here, we explore one potential solution using the MDMM behavior model as yet
another example application.
Because we segmented the user sessions by month for each community, we have a role
proportion associated with each (community, month) pair. With this information in hand,
we can then plot a collection of time-series for each community by considering the role
proportions for each individual role over the life of the community. This plot can allow us
to understand how role proportions fluctuate as the community evolves. In Figure 6.5, we
show the evolution of the top three oldest communities belonging to the “Technology” and










































































































(d) Avg. days until first
answer
Figure 6.4: Health metrics for each of the four groups of Stack Exchanges considered in Sec-
tion 6.4.3. Differences are small but statistically significant (see Table 6.5). Na/Nq is higher
for “Culture/Recreation” and “Life/Arts” than for “Science” and “Technology”. Similarly,
“Culture/Recreation” and “Life/Arts” enjoy a higher fraction of answered questions com-
pared to “Science” and “Technology”, and also have faster average response times (though
only “Culture/Recreation” statistically significantly so). “Culture/Recreation” also has a
higher fraction of questions with an accepted answer compared to the other three groups.
when the community first has at least 100 browsing sessions.
We can see a few trends occurring. First, we can see a common trend in Figure 6.5a–
6.5c, where the proportions for the “eager asker” role grow, reach a peak within the first
quarter or so of the community’s life, and then begin a steady decline over time. We also
notice that the “careful asker” and “clarifier” roles tend to increase steadily over time,
nearly in tandem. Second, we can see in Figure 6.5d–6.5f that the role proportions tend
to be more consistent over time for members of the “Culture/Recreation” group than for
“Technology”. Note, however, that the exact composition that is remaining stable varies
between the communities. That is to say, communities in “Culture/Recreation” appear to
be more stable relative to themselves over time, but exhibit variation in what that stability
looks like.
Why does this behavior shift happen in “Technology” while “Culture/Recreation” com-
munities remain more stable? While we cannot yet provide an answer to this question, we
note that without first being able to see that this kind of behavior evolution is even taking
place (which requires a model like our MDMM behavior model), we could not even begin
to ask such a question. This shows that the MDMM behavior model opens new interesting
research directions in understanding user behavior in ways we were not able to before.
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Figure 6.5: Role proportions over time for the three oldest communities belonging to the
“Technology” and “Culture/Recreation” groups. (a)–(c) belong to the “Technology” group,
and (d)–(f) belong to the “Culture/Recreation” group. We can see a common trend in (a)–
(c) where the proportion of the “eager asker” role grows until it peaks, and then declines
as the community ages. The “clarifier” and “careful asker” roles increase over time, almost
in tandem in this group. However, in (d)–(f) we see that that communities belonging to
“Culture/Recreation” tend to have role proportions that remain more consistent over time
(in that they do not demonstrate long-term trends.)
6.5 DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
The goal of this work is to contribute a new and general tool for role discovery and analysis
of community role compositions. There are two key ideas in the design of the proposed model.
The first is the formalization of a shared set of user roles, distributions over user actions,
across communities. This is an expressive representation of a user role as the distribution can
vary to capture subtle differences between user roles while also allowing us to discover user
roles empirically from the data using sound statistical principles. The second is the direct
modeling of the composition of user roles in a CQA community with another distribution
over the user roles. This second distribution provides a general and flexible way to model
variations in the composition of user roles that may exist in different communities, and again
allows us to use statistical inference to discover each community’s role composition.
The use of a generative model over user actions to discover user roles and community role
compositions is advantageous in that it allows the model to be very general and applied in a
variety of different analysis scenarios without requiring hand-crafted features to be defined in
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order to describe user roles. On the other hand, the use of a generative model is not without
some cost. Because statistical inference of such a model is intractable, we must resort to
approximate posterior inference methods. In this paper, we have used Gibbs sampling to
approximate the posterior, but this comes with some risk—it is difficult to determine whether
the sampler has actually converged to the true posterior, despite there being a theoretical
guarantee that it will do so given enough time. Had we instead opted for a different inference
method like variational inference which instead optimizes a variational lower bound, we
trade the convergence question for a question about the quality of the solution found by the
optimization because the variational lower bound is highly non-convex. In practice, we can
attempt to mitigate these concerns via multiple runs of the sampler (or multiple randomly
initialized optimizations for variational inference)—we found multiple runs of the model all
converged to nearly identical solutions.
Because the model does not impose an action set upon the user, they are free to specify a
different action set for different analysis purposes. This again makes the model quite flexible,
but also requires some up front work to define an appropriate action set for the model.
Feeding the model with less meaningful actions can lead to the output of less meaningful
role patterns. Fortunately, in the case of CQA communities, defining an action set based on
the content hierarchy and content ownership semantics is a reasonable choice that should
lead to interpretable roles as demonstrated here for Stack Exchange. However, a user does
need to manually interpret the role distributions φ1:K discovered by the model.
Finally, our model makes a strong assumption that a user only performs one role in a
given session. While this assumption is valid in most cases, there are situations where users
potentially perform more than one role in a given browsing session. In these cases, the model
will incorrectly conflate these two roles and this will contribute some “noise actions” to that
role.
6.6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Computational analysis of user roles on CQA platforms is important not only for the
understanding of users in such a new social network environment, but also for improving
their efficiency and utility. To this end, we proposed a general probabilistic model for
discovering and analyzing action-based roles on CQA platforms. The generative model
assumes that the observed user actions in a single session are samples drawn from the
same, but unknown, action distribution (the role). Individual communities are modeled as
mixtures over these role distributions, allowing for cross-community analysis. Through a
comprehensive experiment on all 161 non-meta communities on the Stack Exchange CQA
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platform, we demonstrated that our model is indeed useful for understanding user behavior
on these platforms. We were able to show interesting distinctions in asking and answering
behavior on the platform are captured through our roles, that different groups of communities
exhibit statistically significant differences in role composition, and those communities also
exhibit statistically significant differences in a variety of health measures. Finally, we were
also able to uncover two clear and distinct trends of role compositions over time between
the “Technology” and “Culture/Recreation” groups on Stack Exchange.
The proposed model is very general and does not require labeled data for training. It can
thus be applied to analyze any CQA platform immediately. Since the definition of actions
is outside the model, analysts can vary the granularity of actions as needed; this flexibility
allows for multi-resolution analysis of user actions, behavior, and roles. An interesting
future work is to fully exploit this flexibility to further analyze roles with even more refined
actions on CQA platforms as well as to apply the model to other social networks. Another
interesting future direction is to develop tools based on this model for monitoring the “well-
being” of those CQA platforms and helping the community managers to improve the utility
and efficiency of a community so as to maximize the utility of all the CQA communities.
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION
This chapter provides a summary of the four empirical studies conducted in this thesis.
It then discusses avenues of future work for studying platform sustainability.
7.1 THESIS SUMMARY
In Chapter 3, we interpret community question answering websites in Stack Exchange
as knowledge markets. Our objective is to model content generation in these markets and
reason about their sustainability. In any knowledge market, users generate different types of
content such as questions, answers, and comments. Content has dependency; for example,
comments depend on questions and answers. We want to capture these two factors—user
participation and content dependency—in our content generation model. To this end, we
model content generation in knowledge markets using production functions, which is a nat-
ural choice to model output in a market. These functions involve two components: a basis
function and an interaction type. A basis function captures the relationship between indi-
vidual input and output. We consider three possible relationships: exponential, power, and
sigmoid. Interaction types capture how different inputs interact to produce an output. We
consider four possible interactions: essential, interactive essential, antagonistic, and substi-
tutable. Considering these choices of basis function and interaction types, we found the
power basis and interactive essential interaction provided the best fit to our data. In the
broader field of economics, this is known as the Cobb-Douglas model. The Cobb-Douglas
model gives us three critical insights: stable core, size-dependent distribution, and disec-
onomies of scale. Briefly, in Stack Exchange websites, there is a stable core of users who
substantially contribute to the websites for a long period. In most websites, the size of
this stable core does not increase with the number of users. This discrepancy results in a
size-dependent activity distribution—the expected user behavior changes with community
size. As a result, these websites exhibit diseconomies of scale; for example, the fraction of
answered questions declines with the increase in number of users.
In Chapter 4, we examine biases in social judgment, specifically in the form of votes.
We concentrate on votes because they are the primary social feedback in content-based
platforms, such as Stack Exchange, Reddit, and Quora. Votes are crucial as they form the
basis of most platform’s ranking and recommendation services and their rewarding policies.
Motivated by such powerful implications of votes, we ask the following questions. What
are the factors that affect votes on content? Which of these factors may lead to biases?
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What is the degree to which biasing factors affect the votes on content? Our goal is to
answer these causal questions in an observational setup. Prior research suggests several
factors that may affect votes on content. Some usual suspects include: 1) content topic, 2)
content quality, 3) presentation order, 4) social influence, and 5) author reputation. Among
these five factors, the first two factors (content topic and content quality) are the content’s
properties. The remaining factors are impression signals that appear in the user interface
and act as sources of biases. Our goal is to quantify, in an observational setting, the degree
of voter biases in online platforms. Specifically, what are the causal effects of different
impression signals—such as the reputation of the contributing user, aggregate vote thus far,
and position of content—on the observed votes on content? Our observational setup’s main
challenge arises in the form of unobserved confounders: unobserved factors that may explain
the association between the impression signals and observed votes. In this work, we adopt
the instrumental variable (IV) method to eliminate unobserved confounders’ impact. Using
the popularity of the past questions responded to by the answerer as the instrument, we
show that badges significantly influence votes, at times twice as much as the effect suggested
by the existing research. Further, using the timeliness of the answer as the instrument, we
show that the answer position has a significant influence on votes, almost twice as much as
the effect suggested by the existing research.
In Chapter 5, we develop a counterfactual framework for community voting. The frame-
work allows us to study the effects of alternative voting behaviors on user retention. We refer
to the existing voting norm as the control norm, whose voting outcomes can be observed
from log data. Our goal is to evaluate the outcomes of alternative voting norms that were
never observed. To perform this counterfactual analysis, we must understand the probability
of different voting outcomes under each norm. To this end, we examine several voting norms
that express how the members of a community can vote based upon different voting criteria,
such as length and readability. Given the control voting norm and an alternative voting
norm, we propose a counterfactual framework to evaluate the alternative voting norm’s out-
comes in terms of user retention. We first develop a propensity model for quantifying the
probabilities of different voting outcomes under each voting norm. We then define a util-
ity model for quantifying the derived utility of users from the votes they acquire. Finally,
we develop a counterfactual model for reasoning about user retention under different voting
norms. We use this framework to analyze voting behavior in Stack Exchange sites. Our main
findings are that had the community members voted based upon the length, readability, or
objectivity norm, the platform operator would have observed higher retention.
In Chapter 6, we examine user roles and the composition of communities based on these
roles. Motivated by the importance of user roles in platform sustainability, we ask the fol-
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lowing research questions. How do user roles affect the health of content-based platforms?
How can we discover user roles in a content-based platform? How do we extract the com-
position of communities in terms of roles? To answer these questions, we develop a general
framework for discovering user roles and the composition of communities in terms of these
roles. The design of our model is motivated by our goal of discovering interpretable descrip-
tions of functional roles played by users, as well as a representation for each community as
a mixture of these user roles. Specifically, we represent the roles as probability distributions
that describe the likelihood of taking individual actions when a user assumes a particular
functional role in one session. To automatically discover user roles from data, we appeal to
the general technique of probabilistic graphical models. A comprehensive experiment on all
161 non-meta communities on the Stack Exchange network demonstrates that our model
can shed light on user roles’ effect on platform sustainability. First, we show interesting dis-
tinctions in question-asking behavior on Stack Exchange and answering behavior. Second,
we find statistically significant differences in behavior compositions across topical groups of
communities on Stack Exchange. Those groups that have statistically significant differences
in health metrics suggest a relationship between behavior composition and health.
7.2 FUTURE WORK
How do platforms fail? Why do they fail? When do they fail?
Drawing from the literature on community behavior modeling, causal inference, and to a
less extent, survival analysis, we developed models that answer these questions. The inter-
section of these three areas is a fertile ground for future research on platform sustainability.
Some promising directions include modeling community composition, learning user represen-
tations for explaining survival, and unbiased learning to rank for content-based platforms.
Studying the Composition of User Community. We recognized an interesting fact
about the content-based online platforms, that many of these platforms have existed for more
than a decade: Stack Exchange (11 years), Reddit (14 years), and Quora (10 years). Since
the inception of the platforms to the present day, individuals have joined and abandoned the
platforms at different times, forming stage-structured populations—in which individuals vary
regarding their age (time spent in the platform), experience (active participation in content
creation), and expertise (quality of created content) in the platform. These stage-structured
populations provide us a unique opportunity to study the composition and evolution of the
underlying user community. Studying the age, experience, and expertise composition of the
user community is essential. Notably, the distribution of age in a user community portrays
a holistic picture of the retention of individuals in the accommodating platform. Similarly,
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the distribution of experience in the community depicts a detailed view of the engagement of
individuals. Further, the distribution of expertise in the community provides a circumstantial
view of the quality of content in the platform. Overall, the composition of a community has
serious implications for retention, engagement, and content quality in the accommodating
platform. Therefore, studying the composition of crowds is crucial for understanding their
evolution, predicting the successes and failures of platforms, and identifying platforms that
will sustain for a long time.
Learning Representations for Survival. Owing to the recent success of neural repre-
sentation learning methods such as word2vec [200] and doc2vec [201], representation learning
has become a popular research area. A plethora of recent works has developed methods to
learn representations for various machine learning tasks, such as item recommendation [202]
and churn prediction [154]. The successful adoption of representation learning in various
domains motivates us to ask: can we learn representations of users for survival analysis?
Prior work has typically relied on manual features or embeddings learned for other tasks to
perform survival analysis. In contrast, we propose to construct user embeddings specifically
for predicting the survival (i.e., time to leave platform) of users. By constructing such em-
beddings, one can identify the vulnerable user groups. Also, by analyzing these embeddings,
it may be possible to identify some common root causes behind users leaving the platform
and design interventions to retain users.
Unbiased Learning to Rank for Content-Based Platforms. In Chapter 4, we
showed that in content-based platforms, community feedback in the form of votes suffers
from different voter biases: reputation bias, social influence bias, and position bias. These
voter biases impose a significant challenge in using votes for downstream applications, such
as search ranking and content recommendation in content-based platforms. For instance,
position bias in search rankings strongly influences how many views a result receives. For
this reason, directly using votes as a training signal in traditional learning to rank (LTR)
methods yield sub-optimal results. The problem of unbiased learning to rank from biased
data is well-studied in the context of position bias in web search [123, 124, 165]. However,
the problem has not been explored in the context of content-based platforms, where other
forms of biases such as reputation bias and social influence bias also play a role in biasing the
training data. Developing unbiased learning to rank mechanism for content-based platforms
can prevent subsequent reinforcement of these biases. Preventing such reinforcement of
biases has the potential to improve platform sustainability by providing new users a fair
shot at obtaining a higher reputation.
There are other new threads of research to understand the sustainability of content-based
platforms better.
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Reasoning about Information Markets. Content-based platforms and the underly-
ing information markets are core institutions that underpin today’s attention economy, as
envisioned by Herbert A. Simon (1971) — “In an information-rich world, the wealth of in-
formation means a dearth of something else: a scarcity of whatever it is that information
consumes. What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its re-
cipients. Hence a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention and a need to allocate
that attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might con-
sume it.” Content production and consumption are core processes that drive these markets
and the encompassing attention economy. Yet, our understanding of these processes and
their relationship is limited. For instance, since users in content-based platforms have lim-
ited time and they are distributing their time across production and consumption activities
(e.g., In Facebook, a user distributes daily time between writing own posts and comments,
and reading posts and comments from friends), what can be inferred about the relationship
between production and consumption? Further, if users invest most of their time in con-
sumption activities (say reading posts and comments), or conversely, in production activities
(say generating posts and comments), how does it affect the platform’s sustainability, specif-
ically in terms of future production and consumption? Answering these questions is crucial
for developing a deeper understanding of the economic views of platforms and reason about
their sustainability.
Studying the Impact of Anti-Social Behaviors. Anti-social behaviors, such as
trolling, harassment, bullying, abuse, and hate speech, have become a significant issue in
content-based platforms. Users who face these issues are more likely to abandon the plat-
form. There has been considerable interest in studying anti-social behaviors in platforms like
Reddit [203, 204] and the role of moderators in preventing these behaviors [205]. Yet, the
relationship between anti-social behavior and platform sustainability is still under-explored.
For instance, while platforms continue to dedicate more resources to preventing anti-social
behaviors, the amount of abusive content on the Internet is still rising. We do not fully
understand why despite the increased moderation, anti-social behaviors continue to rise.
We also do not understand the role of social norms in mitigating the effects of anti-social
behaviors. For instance, how does community support affect the users who face anti-social
behaviors to stay on the platform? Revealing the impact of anti-social behaviors is crucial
for engineering norms to retain users in the platform.
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Canada, May 15-18, 2017., 2017, pp. 520–523.
[68] J. Stanford, “Economics for everyone: On-line glossary of terms & concepts,” 2008.
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[182] c. Gündüz and M. T. Özsu, “A web page prediction model based on click-stream tree
representation of user behavior,” in Proc. KDD, ser. KDD ’03, 2003, pp. 535–540.
[183] C. Geigle and C. Zhai, “Modeling mooc student behavior with two-layer hidden markov
models,” Journal of Educational Data Mining, vol. 9, no. 1, pp. 1–24, 2017.
[184] Q. Su and L. Chen, “A method for discovering clusters of e-commerce interest patterns
using click-stream data,” Electron. Commer. Rec. Appl., vol. 14, no. 1, pp. 1–13, Jan.
2015.
[185] F. Benevenuto, T. Rodrigues, M. Cha, and V. Almeida, “Characterizing user behavior
in online social networks,” in Proc. IMC, ser. IMC ’09, 2009, pp. 49–62.
[186] L. Lu, M. Dunham, and Y. Meng, “Mining significant usage patterns from clickstream
data,” in Proc. WebKDD, ser. WebKDD’05, 2006, pp. 1–17.
[187] N. Sadagopan and J. Li, “Characterizing typical and atypical user sessions in click-
streams,” in Proc. WWW, ser. WWW ’08, 2008, pp. 885–894.
[188] T. Hofmann, “Probabilistic latent semantic analysis,” in Proc. UAI, ser. UAI’99, 1999,
pp. 289–296.
[189] D. M. Blei, A. Y. Ng, and M. I. Jordan, “Latent dirichlet allocation,” J. Mach. Learn.
Res., vol. 3, pp. 993–1022, Mar. 2003.
[190] K. Nigam, A. K. Mccallum, S. Thrun, and T. Mitchell, “Text classification from labeled
and unlabeled documents using em,” Machine Learning, vol. 39, no. 2, pp. 103–134,
May 2000.
[191] J. Yin and J. Wang, “A dirichlet multinomial mixture model-based approach for short
text clustering,” in Proc. KDD, ser. KDD ’14, 2014, pp. 233–242.
[192] A. McCallum, X. Wang, and A. Corrada-Emmanuel, “Topic and role discovery in
social networks with experiments on enron and academic email,” J. Artif. Int. Res.,
vol. 30, no. 1, pp. 249–272, Oct. 2007.
[193] D. Koller and N. Friedman, Probabilistic Graphical Models: Principles and Techniques
- Adaptive Computation and Machine Learning. The MIT Press, 2009.
[194] C. J. Maddison, D. Tarlow, and T. Minka, “A* sampling,” in Advances in Neural
Information Processing Systems 27, Z. Ghahramani, M. Welling, C. Cortes, N. D.
Lawrence, and K. Q. Weinberger, Eds. Curran Associates, Inc., 2014, pp. 3086–3094.
[195] S. Kullback, Information Theory and Statistics. John Wiley & Sons, 1959.
[196] W. H. Kruskal and W. A. Wallis, “Use of ranks in one-criterion variance analysis,”
Journal of the American Statistical Association, vol. 47, no. 260, pp. 583–621, 1952.
136
[197] W. J. Conover and R. L. Iman, “On multiple-comparisons procedures,” Los Alamos
Scientific Laboratory, Tech. Rep., 1979.
[198] S. Holm, “A simple sequentially rejective multiple test proceedure,” Scandinavian
Journal of Statistics, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 65–70, 1979.
[199] H. Dev, C. Geigle, Q. Hu, J. Zheng, and H. Sundaram, “The size conundrum: Why
online knowledge markets can fail at scale,” in Proceedings of WWW 2018: The Web
Conference. New York, NY, USA: ACM, 4 2018, pp. 65–75.
[200] T. Mikolov, I. Sutskever, K. Chen, G. Corrado, and J. Dean, “Distributed rep-
resentations of words and phrases and their compositionality,” arXiv preprint
arXiv:1310.4546, 2013.
[201] Q. Le and T. Mikolov, “Distributed representations of sentences and documents,” in
International conference on machine learning. PMLR, 2014, pp. 1188–1196.
[202] O. Barkan and N. Koenigstein, “Item2vec: neural item embedding for collaborative
filtering,” in 2016 IEEE 26th International Workshop on Machine Learning for Signal
Processing (MLSP). IEEE, 2016, pp. 1–6.
[203] E. Chandrasekharan, M. Samory, S. Jhaver, H. Charvat, A. Bruckman, C. Lampe,
J. Eisenstein, and E. Gilbert, “The internet’s hidden rules: An empirical study of
reddit norm violations at micro, meso, and macro scales,” Proceedings of the ACM on
Human-Computer Interaction, vol. 2, no. CSCW, pp. 1–25, 2018.
[204] E. Chandrasekharan, U. Pavalanathan, A. Srinivasan, A. Glynn, J. Eisenstein, and
E. Gilbert, “You can’t stay here: The efficacy of reddit’s 2015 ban examined through
hate speech,” Proceedings of the ACM on Human-Computer Interaction, vol. 1, no.
CSCW, pp. 1–22, 2017.
[205] E. Chandrasekharan, C. Gandhi, M. W. Mustelier, and E. Gilbert, “Crossmod: A
cross-community learning-based system to assist reddit moderators,” Proceedings of
the ACM on human-computer interaction, vol. 3, no. CSCW, pp. 1–30, 2019.
137
